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INTRODUCTION
The economic theory of the labour-managed firm (LMF) has 
its origins in an article by Benjamin Ward (1958) on the 
Illyrian firm, and has further been developed by Jaroslav Vanek
(1970), James Meade (1972) and a number of other scholars.1 
Although originally Ward's model had been inspired by the
Yugoslav system of self-management,^ the concept of the LMF has 
in the meantime been extended to include producer cooperatives 
in Western economies.
Thus today, in the growing theoretical literature on 
labour-management, the LMF refers to both the self-managed 
socialist firm in Yugoslavia, and the workers' cooperative in 
the West. The models of both types of firms are considered to 
have the following principal features in common (Nuti, 1988a):
l)Self-«anagment: All workers participate in the decision­
making pro c e s s , usually on the basis of the principle one man, 
one vote# directly or through representative organs, on all 
major policy issues*
1. For a survey of the literature and an extensive 
bibliography, see Bartlett and Uvalic, (1986).
2. The reference to Illyria both suggests Yugoslavia and 
distances the analysis from it.
92)Egalitarian system of profit distribution: All workers 
participate in the distribution of profits on equal terms.
3)Collective property of capital: It xs usually considered 
that a LMF is in collective/social property, as there are 
restrictions on the appropriability of net assets, both in 
Yugoslavia and in Western cooperatives.
Given these specific features, the LMF has been distin­
guished for its objective function (Ward, 1956, Vanek, 1970). In 
contrast with the capitalist firm which maximizes total profits, 
the LMF is assumed to maximize income per worker. Of course, 
decision makers in both types of firms in reality are subject to 
a number of other considerations, such as size, growth, status, 
security, political influence etc., but tnere is agreement among 
scholars that capitalist profits and LMF income per worKer are 
the primary single concern.
Among the various problems of the LMF that have been em­
phasized in the literature, two have by far received most
attention: l)its "perverse" response to changes in product 
price, technology, and capital rental, and the related restric­
tive employment policies in the short run; and 2)the tendency of
the LMF, in the long run, to underinvest with respect to a
capitalist firm operating in similar conditions.
What is apparent from the vast economic literature on the 
LMF, however, is that a large part consists of highly abstract 
models that give only the barest indication of the institutional
9arrangements assumed. Hence much of the theory is unapplicaole 
to concrete institutional settings. However/ depending on the 
particular institutional environment considered, the LMF may 
show different patterns of behaviour. Labour management is only 
one aspect of the institutional setting# in spite of its 
"specific dimensions" that distinguish it from other economic 
forms * labour hiring capital and not vice versa. Other specific 
features inherent to the system under consideration might also 
be important.
The main objective of this study is to verify whether the 
LMF can be expected to have a distinct behaviour. Related to
this issue# we will need to evaluate the importance of other
features - besides labour-management - in determinining a LMF's 
behaviour. We will focus on the LMF * s investment decision# and 
present empirical evidence from Yugoslavia. If the hypothesis on 
the importance of the institutional environment is confirmed# 
this would have an important implication for the methodological
approach prevalently used in studying the LMF: that even in a
theoretical context# the concrete institutional arrangements and 
generel environment in which LMFs operate# cannot be neglected.
In spite of the generalized approach which dominates the 
theory of the LMF# based upon common features of the LMF out­
lined above» there are indeed important institutional 
differences between the Yugoslav firm and the Western coopera­
tive:
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1)Property regime: In Yugoslavia# after the official aboli­
tion of state property in 1953# all capital assets became social 
property# granting enterprises not property rights# but only the 
right to use capital assets. The Western cooperative# on the 
contrary# is usually based on a mixture of private property 
(shares) of workers employed# and collective property (specific 
funds).
2)Capital withdrawals: Precisely because of the difference 
in property regimes# restrictions concerning capital withdrawals 
are different in the two types of L M F s . In Yugoslavia# firms are 
obliged to maintain the value of their fixed capital# and hence 
must continuously refinance past investment. In Western coopera­
tives# interest on workers' shares is usually limited; shares 
are frequently redeemed at their nominal value; and in some 
countries allocation to specific funds is obligatory# which are 
not distributable to workers in case of closure.
3)Environment: The Yugoslav LMF is part of a socialist 
system# which might imply the presence of systemic features
%
characterizing other socialist economies. The workers' coopera­
tive# on the contrary# operates in a capitalist economy and 
consequently may face different types of problems than the 
Yugoslav firm.
These differences may have far-reaching theoretical im­
plications for the investment decision of the LMF# which is one
LI
of the issues we will try and clarify in the course of our 
research.
The structure of the study is as follows. Following these 
introductory remarks# the first chapter examines some of the 
theoretical issues relevant for the investment decision of a 
L M F . After a brief survey of the principal theories on invest­
ment in a LMF# the reviewed theories are critically evaluated, 
by considering first# specific assumptions of the two theories# 
and then# the main features common to both theories. Finally# 
restrictions on capital withdrawals applied in practice# both in 
workers' cooperatives in Western Europe# and in Yugoslavia, are 
discussed.
In the second chapter, Yugoslavia has been chosen for 
verifying theoretical predictions as it is the only existing 
economy in which LMFs are prevalent. Empirical evidence is 
presented# for the post-1966 period# on the savings and invest­
ment performance of the Yugoslav economy# on the savings 
performance of Yugoslav enterprises# and on the methods of 
financing investment.
In the third chapter# an explanation is proposed on why 
Yugoslav evidence diverges from theoretical predictions. The 
Furubotn and Pejovich*s theory is reexamined and confronted with 
Yugoslav data# in order to determine how adequate it is for 
explaining investment decisions of the Yugoslav LMF. An alterna­
tive approach is then proposed# based on Kornai's (1980) theory
of the socialist enterprise# and evidence from Yugoslavia sup­
porting the theory is provided. Finally# the two theories are 
tested econometricaily.
Chapter four discusses investment incentives in the 
Yugoslav economy# introduced by the 1970s economic reform. The 
theoretical bases of the new system are first exposed# and the 
practical implementation of existing mechanisms is discussed. 
Proposals for reforming the system of investment incentives are 
then reviewed# and Yugoslav workers' views on the issue are 
presented.
Chapter five examines some open problems of investment 
allocation and mobilization in Yugoslavia# and proposes the 
principal necessary conditions for improving the system.
Finally# concluding remarks are made# and the principal 
findings of the research are exposed.
13
Chapter 1.THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON THE INVESTMENT BEHAVIOUR 
OF A LMF
The purpose of this chapter is to examine some of the 
theoretical issues relevant for the investment decision of a 
LMF. After a brief survey of the principal theories on invest­
ment in a LMF/ the reviewed theories are critically evaluated, 
by examining both specific assumptions, and common features of 
the two theories. Finally, in order to clarify some of the main 
theoretical arguments, restrictions concerning capital 
withdrawals imposed in practice on the LMF are discussed.
1.1.The principal theories
Existing theoretical literature on the investment behaviour 
of a LMF is primarily based on the theories developed by 
Jaroslav Vanek (1970, 1971) and Eirik Furubotn and Svetozar 
Pejovich (1969-1980). Since both theories reach the same conclu­
sion - that workers in a LMF with collective ownership of 
capital will be reluctant to self-finance investment - some 
authors consider the two theories jointly as the "Vanek- 
Furubotn-Pejovich effect" (Bonin, 1985). Others, however, have 
considered these theories as two distinct schools of thought: 
the Cornell School (Vanek), and the Texas School (Furubotn and 
Pejovich) (Stephen, 1984), since there are several differences 
between the two approaches.
First, Vanek*s (1970) theory treats investment problems of 
the LMF in general, while his specific analysis (1971) is ad­
dressed to w o r k e r s 1 cooperatives in the West, whereas Furubotn 
and Pejovich1s theory is primarily based on institutional ar­
rangements present in Yugoslavia» Second, the cause of 
underinvestment is somewhat different: although both theories 
assume collective property of capital will have adverse effects 
on investment, the underinvestment effect according to Vanek 
derives from the mode of financing investment, whereas according 
to Furubotn and Pejovich, primarily fro« the absence of private 
property rights. Consequently, whereas Furubotn and Pejovich 
find no remedy for the investment bias, Vanek considers that the 
disincentive to invest can be removed, in spite of collective 
property, through complete external financing of investment.
The basic premises of V a n e k ’s theory on the investment 
behaviour of a LMF are already found in his General Theory
(1970).3 When taking an investment decision, the LMF considers, 
unlike the capitalist firm, the return per unit of employment. 
In order to ensure a higher income per worker, the LMF will tend 
to invest more in capital-intensive projects. The decision on an 
investment project will essentially depend on the effect of new
3. Vanek discusses the investment problem in relation to the 
national investment function, and in a formal theory on 
investment (see J. Vanek, 1970, Chapters 8 and 14).
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investment on employment. A project will be undertaken only if 
it involves an increase of employment proportionally greater 
tnan the associated increase in the present value of expected 
total earnings. This may lead to distortions in project selec­
tion, as projects having a positive present value may be 
rejected if they lower income per worker, while negative present 
value projects may be accepted if they raise income per worker 
(Vanek, 1970? Nuti, 1988a).
The investment mechanism of the labour-managed economy can, 
nevertheless, produce a tendency towards Pareto optimality as 
much as an equally idealized capitalist system, but on tne 
condition that LMFs are externally financed. Self-financed 
investment will be avoided, because collective ownership of 
assets implies that saving by investing in the firm requires a 
far higher current rate of return to be opted for, as compared 
with saving in a bank. Practices of self-financing are ineffi­
cient for the labour-managed economy, and hence should be made
4unnecessary by providing external funds.
However, it is only a year after the appearance of the 
General Theory that Vanek discusses the drawbacks of self- 
financed investment in a formal way, in an article which will t>e 
summarized below. Vanek (1971) examines a LMF maximizing income
4. Vanek (1970), pp. 168-172, 296-306.
per worker# a function of the capital-labour (hereafter K/L) 
ratio. All members have some time preference R, while the title 
of an investment remains in the hands of the collective. If the 
firm self-finances its investment# and constant returns to scale 
(hereafter CRS) are assumed# four dynamic forces operate on the 
equilibrium of a LMF: l)the first self-extinction force# or the 
desire of the LMF to reduce membership in order to increase 
income per worker# until the point where the firm is reduced to 
one member? 2)the second self-extinction force# or the desire to 
consume capital# that sets in after the first force has brought 
about a disequilibrium in the K/L ratio? 3)the underinvestment 
force# which arises because the collective nature of investment 
impels workers to recover the principal of an investment in the 
course of their expected employment (which is not the case if 
they "invest* in savings accounts); and 4)the never-employ 
force# because an increase in labour reduces the K/L ratio and 
therefore income per worker.
When deciding to invest# a worker compares the present 
value (V) of yearly returns (A) from investment in the firm# in 
i*l...T years preceeding a worker's expected retirement#
with the present value (W) of yearly returns from investment 
that ensures the recovery of the principal# in i=l...T years#
-i > 1
i*l
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W= A ^ —  {1+-R) ” 1 ♦ (1 + R)~T = 1
i = l
In comparing the :wo investment alternatives# the equi­
librium marginal product of capital Ax in the first case will be 
above the subjective time preference R by a positive magnitude 
D, the differencial distinguishing the two investment criteria. 
Hence# in order to compensate for the loss of the principal# 
returns from investment in the firm will have to be higher than 
R# such that Ax-R+D. Consequently# underinvestment in the firm's 
capital will prevail.
In the case of increasing-decreasing returns to scale 
(hereafter IDRS)# a self-financed LMF will operate in the in­
creasing returns to scale region which implies inefficiency (the 
analogue of the first two self-extinction forces)# the only 
difference being that the firm will never reduce membership to 
one worker because of the nonrealization of economies of scale. 
The underinvestment force remains unchanged.
In contrast# if investment is externally financed at a cost 
equal to the time preference R# all four forces disappear: in 
the CRS case# an equilibrium will be obtained at a point where 
the marginal product of capital equals the rate of time 
preference R; in the IDRS case# the LMF would always operate in 
the region of maximum physical efficiency (CRS)# where for a 
prescribed K/L ratio average and marginal products of labour are
18
equalized and along which the average product of labour is at 
its maximum.
The above arguments are presented as being crucia*. in 
explaining why cooperatives have fared poorly in the capitalist 
environment. By contrast to a self-financed cooperative, an 
externally financed firm would show a pattern of benaviour 
identical to an "ideal" capitalist firm.
Furubotn and Pejovich's theory is similar, but it considers 
only the underinvestment force# assumes a somewhat different
maximand,5 and in most articles, looks at a different context: 
a LMF under the Yugoslav institutional setting. Despite the 
differences in the formal treatment of the problem (see Table 
1), the essence of their hypothesis is the same. When workers do 
not have full ownership rights over the firm's assets (hence the 
term "non-owned assets"), as in the LMF under consideration, 
they cannot recover the principal of their investment at the end 
of their time horizon, whereas in individual savings accounts 
(or "owned assets” ), both the principal and interest will be 
reclaimed. The basic implication of such collective property 
rights is a bias in favour of "owned" and against "non-owned” 
assets.
5. Usually, the assumed maximand is wealth per worker, and 
hence the dynamic case of income per worker.
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The following formula gives tne condition for the -wo 
investment alternatives to be equally attractive, for a sum 
invested in t periods (Furubotn, 1971, p. 190):
Sfl+i)^ = S[(l+r)t -1] where
S is the principal invested
i is the interest from investing in savings accounts
t is the time horizon
r is the return from investing in the f i r m ’s capital stccx.
In the case of a one-year tine horizon, an investment in 
"owned assets’* brings back S+iS, whereas an investment in "non­
owned assets" brings back only rS, and hence r has to be large 
enough as to compensate for the loss of the principal S. With 
the prolonging of the time horizon, the difference between the 
required returns from "owned" and "non-owned" assets diminishes,
6but disappears only for an infinite time horizon*
The problem is first presented in Pejovich (1969), and its 
implications discussed in a numoer of later articles* Although 
the authors' principal hypothesis is that the greater the a t ­
tenuation of private property rights, the lower will be the
6 .Nevertheless, the difference between the required rates of 
return becomes negligabie for a fairly long time horizon; e.g. 
assuming the principle invested is 1, the rate of return frcm 
investment in non-owned assets, equivalent to a 5% rate of 
interest on owned assets, for a 1 year time horizon will be 
1.05%, whereas for a 20 year time horizon it will only be 0.C3 
(see Sacks, 1983, p. 79).
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level of voluntary savings in a LMF, their earlier articles 
leave more room for optimism. As opposed to wage maximization 
per worker (one-period case)# inconsistent with positive invest­
ment in the firm, wealth maximization (dynamic case) can ensure 
positive investment and wages below the maximum attainable
level•^
In all later articles, the authors' conclusions are rather 
more pesimistic. There will be no scope for self-financed in­
vestment in a LMF, and especially if bank credit is available, 
in which case only external funds will be used, and the more so 
the shorter is the time horizon, the higher is the rate of 
interest on savings, the lower is the cost of credit, and the 
lower is the marginal productivity of capital. This will cause a 
general retardation of voluntary savings, followed by inflation 
and inefficiency, and an economy composed of LMFs will not
attain Pareto optimality.8
Contrary to Vanek's proposal, rental contracts based on the 
leasing of capital do not banish the inefficiency problem of the 
LMF, because collective property rights, the main cause of the
7. See Furubotn and Pejovich (1970a) and (1970b), and Furubotn 
:1971).
♦ 8. See Furubotn and Pejovich (1973), and Furubotn (1974). The
preference of a LMF for oank-financed investment is also 
discussed in Pejovich (1976), Furubotn (1980a), and Furubotn 
(1980b).
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problem, distort incentives for investment (Furubotn, 1978). 
Workers will have little interest to protect and preserve leased 
capital. In addition, efforts will be made to shift the repay­
ment burden to future generations of workers, leading the LMF to 
choose projects which pay off relatively quickly, and hence a 
bias in project selection will be present.
However, neither does a simple change in property rights 
ensure optimal investment behaviour of a IMF (Furubotn, 1980c). 
If a LMF in a capitalist environment is considered, and trade- 
able claims held by individual workers are assumed, 
underinvestment will still prevail. Difficulties will emerge in 
selling workers' claims, and there will be a high probability 
that the LMF will degenerate into a conventional capitalist 
firm. Hence, allocative efficiency will not be brought about 
merely by giving each worker the option of selling his claim, 
since labour-management is not an inherently efficient economic 
organization.
In concluding, we have limited the analysis to the above 
two theories, as they are the ones that have laid down the bases 
of the principal hypotheses on the investment behaviour of the 
LMF. Although different authors have in the meantime made impor­
tant contributions to the field, as will be seen below, all 
later theoretical developments are an extention/critique of the 
discussed theories.
1.2.A critical evaluation of existing theories: differences and 
similar it ies
Since the two theories bear both similarities and dif­
ferences# we will examine first, specific assumptions of the two 
theories separately? and next, main features which are common to 
both theories.
1.2.1.Specific assumptions
1.2.1.l.Vanek's theory
We will examine the validity of V a n e k *s hypotheses on 
l)degeneration, 2 )underinvestment, and 3)external financing, by 
questioning both the acceptability, and the internal consistency 
of the model's principal assumptions.
l)The degeneration hypothesis
First it is necessary to question income per worker maxi­
mization, since it is precisely this maximand that leads to the 
disappearance of the firm under CRS and to its small size under 
IDRS. The maximand is not consistent with V a n e k 's own assumption 
on membership reductions, which are supposed to take place only 
via natural wastage since the community prohibits the expelling 
of members. The assumed maximand can be considered correct only 
if the adjustment of membership is viewed as a short-run 
phenomenon, whereas Vanek*s assumption on the prohibition of 
expelling workers assumes just the contrary - downward adjust­
ments only in the long run.
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If the LMF does have some preference for changes in memoer- 
ship, several models have shown m a t  tne objective of a LMF will 
r.Dt simply be the maximization of income per wcr.<er. Thus 
Ireland and Law (1982) propose a utility function which includes 
membership as well as income in the form U=u(Y,L); this maximand 
does not require the maximization of income per wcrser, since 
the LMF may oe willing to trade off lower incomes per worker for
9higher employment. Steinherr and Thisse (1979) and Zelic 
(1975) preserve the maximand of income per worker, but ex­
plicitly include a constraint that membership cannot oe reduced
10below its initial level. Horvat (1967# 1972), inspired by the 
practice cf profit distribution in Yugoslav firms, proposes the 
LMF maximizes total enterprise profits, above the specified 
personal income payments which are set in advance, and hence 
behaves similarly to a capitalist firm. Since profits are used 
for investment, investment is thus also maximized. The main 
differences between the LMF and the capitalist firm is tnat 
social property of capital (quite contrary to the Vanek,
9. Horvat (1972) similarly proposes that a LMF will ratner 
decrease wages than dismiss fellow workers.
10. Other authors have adopted similar assumptions, including 
Meade (1972) and Keren (1985).
Furubotn and Pejovich hypothesis), will reduce risk and uncer­
tainty# and hence a high rate of investment will be achieved 
(Horvat# 1972).
Finally# under the assumption of the reluctance to dismiss 
workers# degeneration will indeed require a long time: the
youngest members of the LMF would have to retire for the process 
to terminate# and a realistic time frame could be a period of 40 
years. In sucn a long-term framework# however# the LMF is even 
less likely to maximize its income per worker. Workers will 
consider maximizing tneir incomes over time# where growth oojec- 
tives requiring positive investment could be essential for
higher consumption in the f u t u r e # a n d  would therefore not, as 
suggested by Vanek# reduce progressively both factors of produc­
tion.
The second assumption that needs to be questioned is that 
of no non-labour costs. In the original model developed by Ward 
(1958)# Vanek (1970) and Meade (1972)# the choice of membership 
size is the outcome of two competing forces: one which seeks to 
reduce membership and hence increase revenue per worker# and the
11. This is Furubotn and Pejovich's (1970a) initial hypothesis: 
Vanek himself recognizes# in (1970)# that "it is conceivable 
that the LMF would see in its bigness a positive value# 
irrespective of what this does to the incomes of its individual 
members. But such megalomaniac firms ... are not our concern" 
(p. 304).
other which seeks to increase membership thereby reducing non­
labour costs per worker. Vanek explicitly assumes no non-labour 
costs are present# because the community owns collectively the 
firm’s assets and does not pay for them. But tnis is not a very 
realistic assumption: the LMF is bound to have certain non­
labour co s t s , even if assets are not paid for, not only 
concerning capital (e.g. maintenance) but also other costs 
necessarily present in any type of enterprise (rent, heating, 
insurance, etc.). Minimizing such non-labour costs by spreading 
them over a larger number of workers would represent an incen­
tive against membership reductions.
Another assumption of V a n e k 's model, although implicit, is 
the perfect homogeneity of the labour force. If specialization 
is introduced, it would represent a further obstacle in member­
ship reductions since certain types of workers# indispensable 
for production, would nave to be replaced on retirement. 
Similarly# the assumed perfect responsiveness in adjustments of 
capital may not always be possible? a machine that cannot be 
replaced by one operating with fewer workers may block member­
ship reductions.
Several inconsistencies related specifically to the second 
self-extinction force can also be pointed out. First, as rightly 
pointed out by Stephen, the maximand of income per worker does 
not require the reduction of capital, at least not in the CRS 
case, given that income per worker is a function of the X'L
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ratio# while the second force involves a reduction in that ratio 
(Stephen# 1984# p. 31). This again brings into question the 
credibility of the assumed maximand. Contrary to Var.ek's 
analysis of the degeneration process# where the opportunity cost 
of capital is assumed to be equal to zero# a more realistic 
objective function would be one maximizing income net of oppor­
tunity cost of capital per worker# or Y»(pX-rK)/L. This is 
because capital does have an opportunity cost# even if no finan­
cial payment is made for its use: it is the return to be earned 
from liquidating the asset and investing its proceeds (Stephen# 
1984# p. 80-94).
Another possible inconsistency related to the second force 
is that its operation requires such an institutional arrangement 
which explicitly allows the consumption of capital. However, 
this is not quite in conformity with V a n e k 1s later analysis of 
the underinvestment force# where workers are assumed not to be 
able to consume assets set up by an investment. If this was not 
so# the selling of an asset and distributing its proceeds could 
provide the recovery of the principal.
Finally# contrary to Vanek*s conclusion# the degeneration 
process will not necesssarily take place in case of IDRS. As 
argued by Stephen (1984# 1984# p. 78# 91)# in the IDRS case# the 
second self-extinction force need not benefit the collective# 
and this will depend on the particular production function 
assumed. Where the technology is not of a CRS type# the theory
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only provides an explanation of the small size of cooperatives, 
not their short life-span, but a small size does not necessarily 
imply a short life (Stephen, 1984, p. 78). Furthermore, a LMF 
under IDRS may obtain a technically efficient level of produc­
tion, if we consider capital does have an opportunity cost equal 
to R (Stephen, 1984, p. 84), or if we consider that the twc 
conditions necessary for the maximization of income per worker,
F * X/L and F 30i imply that CRS do hold (Bartlett, 1984).L K
In summarizing, the process described by Vanek, under IDRS 
does not, and under CRS needs not necessarily, involve degenera­
tion, once nore realistic assumptions are introduced. And since 
CRS is a very special, rather than general case usually 
encountered in practice, the degeneration process itself could 
occur only under specific conditions.
2 )The underinvestment hypothesis
In connection with the third force of underinvestment, 
three assumptions have been examined: the collective nature of
investment: the infinite durability of assets? and the cost of
capital.
Before proceeding with Vanek*s theory, it is important to
clarify that the collective nature of investment in a LMF can
have different implications, depending on the type of restric­
tions regarding capital withdrawals. The different rules 
limiting capital appropriability by individual workers of a LMF
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have in the literature often been considered jointly# under the
12generic term of "limited recovery of capital". Here we will 
make a distinction between the "limited recovery of capital** 
(hereafter LRC), which we will use in the sense of a general 
principle which in theory distinguishes a LMF from a capitalist 
firm; and specific restrictions regarding capital withdrawals 
imposed on LMFs in practice, such as, in Yugoslavia, the 
"capital maintenance requirement" (hereafter CMP), and those 
present in workers' cooperatives (hereafter restrictions in 
workers' cooperatives - RWC). We will briefly define the three 
sets of restrictions.
a)LRC: the limited recovery of capital principle derives
from the specific nature of a worker in a LMF, with respect to a 
capitalist entrepreneur, and hence from the difference between 
labour and capital. A worker of a LMF cannot sell his job and 
the future income stream it can generate# but may only be able 
to get his share of income by continuing to work in the coopera­
tive. This is not the case with the capitalist entrepreneur# who 
can capitalize his part of the firm's capital by selling his 
share on  the market# and hence immediately realize the present 
value of income it represents.
12. Synonims for this term used in the literature are limited 
appropriability of capital# limited recouperability of capital, 
etc.
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Since workers in a LMF may not be able to fully benefit 
from undertaken investment unless they stay in the firm for a 
sufficiently long p e n c d  of time, the LRC principle is expected
to lead the LMF to adopt a "truncated'* time horizon. ^  In a 
capitalist firm, the owner-entrepreneur can capitalize nis part 
of the firm's earnings# current and future, by selling nis claim 
on income flows, and hence his investment is to a smaller or 
greater extent "perfectly" liquid (depending on the organization 
of capital markets). This effectively means that he has a long 
enough planning norizon to benefit frcm ail future revenues 
expected of an investment, i.e. his planning horizon is 
"theoretically" infinite. In a LMF, on tne contrary# perfect 
liquidity of an investment is absent, and hence the planning 
horizon of a LMF# as a rule, is not as long. Consequently# a 
distinct feature of the LMF with respect to the capitalist firm 
is that when undertaking investment# its time horizon may become 
an important criterion. When deciding to invest, an individual 
worker will consider the time he expects to remain in the firm, 
since he may benefit from such investment only for as long as he 
stays with the same firm, which is not the case if he ir./ests in 
savings accounts.
13. The time horizon of the LMF is therefore defined as the 
period of time the average worker expects to remain employed in 
the same firm.
b)CMR: the capital maintenance requirement is a specific 
rule present in Yugoslavia, which requires enterprises to main­
tain the value of the firm's physical capital s t o c k . S i n c e  
the value of capital cannot be decreased, workers cannot decide 
to disinvest and consume capital in order to increase incomes of 
current workers, but must continuously refinance past invest­
ment .
c)RWC: restrictions imposed on workers* cooperatives differ 
substantially from country to country, but the most frequent 
restrictions, as already mentioned, include limited interest on 
workers' snares, redemption of shares at their nominal value, 
and obligatory collective funds which are not distributable tc 
workers in case of closure.
Since all three sets of rules imply a limitation of tradi­
tionally conceived capitalist property rights, these rules have
often been confounded in the literature. ^  However, the con­
crete implications of the LRC principle, which in theory 
distinguishes the LMF from the capitalist firm, will depend on 
specific regulations governing capital withdrawals in LMFs. In 
other words, although Doth the Yugoslav firm and the Western
14. The precise nature of the rule will be discussed in 1.3.2.
15. For some clarifications, see Zafiris (1982); and Ro c k  and 
Defourny (1984).
cooperative are characterized by the LRC, whether the disincen­
tive effects for the investment decision deriving from the LRC 
can be overcome (or in some way compensated for)# will depend on 
further considerations directly linked to the nature of concrete 
restrictions on capital withdrawals.
We support the view that the disincentive to invest from 
retained earnings can only be established unambiguously if the 
LMF is assumed to be cbliged to maintain its capital stock
indefinately (Zafiris, 1982# p. 5 7 ) . More precisely# a strong 
CMR as defined by Bonin (maintenance of the real value of assets 
over time)# does generate a disincentive to invest# since 
workers cannot recover the principal of an investment even if 
they remain with the same firm for the full duration of an
a s s e t , ^  and hence even if they adopt fairly long time horizons. 
Depreciation allowances will have to be devoted to the refinanc­
ing of past investment, whereas any new investment, financed
16. What is usually assumed in the literature by investment from
retained earnings in the enterprise is investment in physical
capital of the enterprise (which we will refer to as investment 
in capital stock), and not financial investment. The conclusions 
we draw are therefore based on such a definition of investment# 
but do not necessarily hold if one expands the analysis to
include investment in financial assets.
17. Bartlett (1986) regards the CMR is not a disincentive, but a
savings rate constraint, i.e. a way of preventing the LMF to
consume its capital. In our view, it is both: whereas the
savings rate constraint is the principle reason for imposing a 
CMR on the Yugoslav LMF, the CMR at the same time is expected to 
provoke a disincentive to invest.
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from firm's profits# will increase capital stock which sub­
sequently cannot be reduced. Hence# in both cases# the principal 
of an investment can never be recovered# because the value of 
fixed capital cannot be reduced. Therefore# a LMF with a strong 
CMR will exhibit the underinvestment effect# applying a higher 
rate of return from real assets than the capitalist firm# the 
rate being inversely related to workers' time horizon (Bonin# 
1985). The only exception is if infinite time horizons are 
assumed# since in this case the investment criterion of a LMF 
will not differ from that of a capitalist firm# and the required 
rate of return from investment in capital stock will be equal to 
the return from investment in savings accounts.
If# on the contrary# a LMF is not obliged to maintain the 
value of its capital stock# it can decide to disinvest# sell 
capital stock and hence recover the principal of an investment. 
While from the point of view of the individual worker# this 
solution does not yet eliminate the LRC problem if he decides to 
leave# the problem could be overcome through alternative reward 
schemes (see below). To what extent will a cooperative be able 
to reward workers for their investment decisions# will depend on 
how restrictive internal rules on profit distribution are in a 
given cooperative. In addition, the L M F 1s investment decision in 
this case will essentially depend on the relationship between 
its time horizon# and the repayment period of an investment.
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Only if the LMF's time horizon is shorter than the repay­
ment period of an investment, will the expected tenure of 
workers represent an essential, and specific investment 
criterion of tne IMF. In such a case, an investment in real 
assets to oe opted for, would have to earn gross profits having 
the same total present value as investment in bank deposits, net 
over the lifetime of the plant as in a capitalist firm, but over 
the expected tenure of workers.
The difference in criteria will lead to a different ranking 
of projects: projects with high returns over the LMF's time
horizon may be accepted because of shorter payback periods, even 
though those with higher rates of return are rejected. 
Therefore, a LMF may place liquidity concerns above the produc­
tivity of capital, discriminating against projects stretching 
beyond the workers' horizon (Benin, 1985, Zafiris, 1982).
This distortion implies suboptimality in the sense that 
the ranking of projects in a LMF will differ from that in a 
capitalist fir*. However, the distortion is not equivalent to 
underinvestment: it influences the type of projects chosen, but 
might not necessarily decrease the overall level of investment 
of a LMF; and the distortion is conditional on relatively short 
time horizons, which need not be the case.
If on the contrary, the time horizon of a LMF is longer 
than the repayment period of an investment, the investment 
behaviour of a LMF may not differ substantially from the one of
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a capitalist firm, since in this case the relevant criterion of 
the LMF will no longer be the time horizon» but the repayment
18period of an investment (Zafiris, 1982).
A fairly long time horizon could be present in a I.MF for a 
series of reasons (high commitment» limited labour ¡nobility, 
specific age structure of the labour force, etc. - see
I.2.2.2.). However, even if it is not, and the LRC principle 
indeed induces workers to initially adopt fairly short time 
horizons, different reward schemes could ensure the overcoming 
of its disincentive effects.
In order to eliminate uncertaintly deriving from the LRC 
principle, i.e. the risk of not fully recovering past Investment 
in case of leaving, and hence lead workers to adopt fairly long 
time horizons, a system of compensation for past investment 
would need to be introduced. There are different ways this could 
be achieved.
Ideally, the cause of the problem of LRC could be removed 
by introducing marketable workers' shares. However, there are 
difficulties connected with the practical implementation of this
18. 0. Ellerman (1986) similarly argues that earnings reinvested 
in social property would not penalize workers if they all 
remained with the firm long enough to completely depreciate the 
purchased assets (pp. 62-63).
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solution (possible in theory, but not applied in practice,
19except sometimes within a cooperative).
Alternative, more feasible arrangements could include 
remuneration schemes based on individually specified rewards for 
capital invested in the firm, corresponding to the net increase 
in the value of assets obtained through new investment, which
could take the form of workers' bonds or shares. Or,
dividends could be credited to a w o r k e r ’s account, on which 
interest would be paid, and the sum returned if he leaves the 
cooperative (similar to the scheme applied in Mondragon).
An elaborated version of such remuneration schemes is 
offered by Meade. His initial proposal (1972) on the
* inegalitarian cooperative", based on the maximization of
returns per workers' shares, ^  does eliminate some of the draw-
19. Unless, as proposed by Nuti (1988a), job tradeability is 
introduced only to ensure a zero price of labour; if the firm is 
obliged to hire more people as long as its jobs are demanded at 
a positive price, job rights would be tradeable only to have an 
automatic check on the enterprise employment policy, but shculd 
never be so valuable as to generate active trade. On the issue 
of tradeable workers* shares, see also Sertel (1982), and 
Schlicht and Von Weizsacker (1977).
20. In Yugoslavia, this was introduced in the form cf "past 
labour" rewards in the early 1970s, but the scheme has not 
worked successfully for a variety of reasons (see Chapter 4).
21. Each worker on joining the LMF is given a share L in tne 
total surplus (S) of the firm, and shares allotted to individual 
workers differ, among other things, on the time a worker has 
joined the firm. The objective of the LMF will be to maximize 
the return per share.
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backs of the LMF, but not the preference of a LMF for external
2 2financing of investment* However, in developing the model 
further, Meade offers a solution which effectively resolves the 
problem of underinvestment of a LMF. In Meade's (1986) labour- 
capital discriminating partnership, workers and capital 
providers instead of income, would be given a number of shares. 
Two types of shares would be issued: capital shares, freely
tradable on the market, and labour shares (pro-rata so as to 
exhaust all of the enterprise's revenue), which would be tied to 
an individual worker and surrendered upon departure. The invest* 
ment bias would be avoided by issuing either debentures (1982, 
p. 218), or free capital shares corresponding to self-financed 
investment, pro-rata to all labour and capital shareholders 
(Meade, 1986; Nuti, 1988a).
The major drawback of Meade's proposals is the in- 
egalitarian principle of distribution: those workers who join 
the LMF early, bearing the initial risks, will earn more than
those who come in later. ^  H e n c e , the underinvestment problem 
is resolved, but at the cost of income inequality. Whether this 
is an acceptable principle, is a matter of debate, but a pos­
sible argument in favour of such a scheme is that workers
22. See Meade (1972), and Nuti (1988a).
23. Meade (1972) himself recognizes this drawback. See also Nuti 
(1988a).
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joining earlier should indeed be rewarded for the bearing of 
initial risk.
Finally# since in a LMF not obliged to respect a CMR, no 
specific rules regarding the use of depreciation are likely to 
be imposed (in spite of obligatory legal depreciation), the 
possibility could be introduced to compensate workers from 
depreciation allowances. The depreciation fund would truis serve 
as a "guarantee" to the original investors (workers of the firm 
at the time of undertaking an investment). In case of leaving, a 
worker would have the right to cash in his share of an invest­
ment .
An objection to such an arrangement could be that it may 
lead to the consumption of capital stock, and this solution 
would indeed be no remedy for the underinvestment problem if all 
workers decided to leave. However, the mere possibility of
24leaving does not imply such behaviour. If the scheme is 
introduced only to provide a way of assuring a worker that he 
can withdraw his part of a past investment in case of leaving, 
it may serve in providing the necessary incentive to invest in 
capital stock.
24. As noted by Zafiris, capital assets do tend to be 
maintained, although optional and not compulsory, even in 
systems that have the possibility of liquidating their 
investment (Zafiris, 1982, p. 70).
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In the above alternative arrangements# the characteristic 
problem of the LMF - the LRC - would be overcome by adequate 
compensation# and a worker could recover both the principal and 
the returns of an investment. To what extent these alternative 
arrangements are feasible in practice# will depend on how
25restrictive internal rules are in a given LMF.
Returning now to Vanek's theory# some authors have argued 
that Vanek's underinvestment force derives from the CMR 
(Stephen# 1984# p. 79). Indeed# one of Vanek's assumptions is
the infinite durability of assets# which could implicitly be
considered as referring to the CMR 3ince the rule makes the life
of the asset infinite in the financial sense. Nevertheless#
Vanek's collective nature of investment did not refer to the CMR
26but rather to the more general principle of LRC# since Vanek's 
theory is addressed primarily to the Western cooperative# and is
27based on the assumption that capital can be consumed. Bence
25. As will be shown in 1.3.1# internal rules in Western 
cooperatives are not always# and not in all countries# as 
restrictive as is usually assumed.
26. A similar view is shared by Zafiris (1982)# although based 
on calculations which are not fully convincing (pp. 65-66).
27. Otherwise# the degeneration process (the second force of 
consuming capital) could not take place.
Vanek considers a LMF on which a strict CMR is not imposed, 
in which case, as argued above, the disincentive to invest need 
not necessarily be present.
It is in the light of the above analysis that V a n e k *s 
assumption on the infinite durability of assets can be seen to 
be highly misleading, not only because it implies the exclusion 
29of depreciation, but because such an assumption, by defini­
tion, provokes the disincentive to invest: assuming infinite
durability of assets and finite time horizons of workers ob­
viously implies that the principal can never be recovered within 
the workers' time horizon.
Finally, V a n e k 9s analysis provokes confusion since it 
assumes two different opportunity costs of capital, one prior to 
an investment equal to R+D, and another one for an asset already 
commited to the firm, equal to zero. Yet for CRS to hold, under 
the assumption of self-financing and the maximand of income per
23
28. Indeed, in a conversation with J. Vanek in Florence in July 
1985, he confirmed ray belief that he did not intend the 
inclusion of the CMR.
29. Vanek's exclusion of depreciation according to Stephen 
(1984, p. 79) "assumes away the basic problem1'; while according 
to Zafiris (1982, pp. 56-59) is "seriously misleading", because 
Vanek compares the annual returns required by the alternative 
investments, but these are not comparable because they are 
different in natures investment in bank deposits, in addition to 
interest# returns the original capital, while in real assets 
only yields an annual return, and therefore such a return should 
exceed the rate of interest as to allow for depreciation.
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worker, the optimal capital stock requires that the marginal 
product of capital is equal to zero, and not R+D, and hence 
would be Larger, not smaller than in the externally financed 
case, where the marginal product of capital equals R (Bartlett, 
1984).
3)External financing of investment
In connection with the preferability of external finance, 
it can be shown that the mode of financing nay not be as crucial 
as Vanek suggests; that tne main reasons for the poor perfor­
mance of cooperatives might not be solely the ones proposed by 
Vanek; and that additional difficulties may arise in the case of 
external finance.
Concerning the aode of financing, Vanek's differential 0 in 
the case of internal financing is not sufficiently justified, 
since here the opportunity cost of capital may in fact be equal 
to R (and not R+D), under the following alternative arrange­
ments: if the repayment period of an investment is shorter than
the LMF's time horizon, as proposed earlier; if investment is 
undertaken from financial assets already commited to the firm, 
where funds are transferred from one use to another and no
change in property takes p l a c e ; ^  or if individually held
30. Stephen (1984), pp. 80-34. A similar argument is proposed by 
Zelic (1975), and Connock (1982).
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tradeable shares were introduced, ^
Similarly, external financing might not be provided at a 
cost reflecting the time preference R, as idealv envisaged by 
Vanek. Imperfections arising from transaction costs and dif­
ferent lending and borrowing rates could lead to situations 
where external financing will not be preferred: if the weight of 
the repayment cannot be transferred into the future beyond the 
time horizon of the collective's majority, or if the repayment
32periods are shorter than the life of the asset.
Aoki (1984) has suggested that the choice of the method of 
financing by the LMF will depend essentially on whether an 
investment project is labour-saving or not. If an investment 
requires the employment of new workers and is financed inter­
nally, the entry of new workers is financed at the sacrifice of 
existing members, whereas future fruits from the investment will 
be shared equally by all workers (including newcomers). In this 
case external debt will be preferred, since future interest 
payments will be born equally by new and existing members. If 
however, an investment requires the introduction of labour- 
saving technology, there is less oportunity to mitigate the
31. The issue of tradeable workers' shares has been much debated 
in the literature; see Sertel (1982), Schlicht and Von 
Weizsäcker (1977), Nuti (1988a).
32. See Gui (1984), p. 175, and Chillemi (1981), pp. 161-162.
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burdens of cost-bearing by putting off the actual payment of the 
capital cost. Since there will be a smaller number o£ new 
entrants in respect to the number of outgoing workers, workers 
who have prospects of longer tenure will be better off by shar­
ing the capital cost currently with the relatively larger number 
of existing workers# and hence will prefer financing investment 
from retained earnings (pp. 87-88).
In addition, the existence of external finance does not 
remove the obligation of the LMF to pay back the principal 
eventually. Beth internal and external finance imply a sacrifice 
of current income, the only difference being that in the first 
case it will have to be paid for at once, while in the second 
gradually; the shorter is the payback period of a loan, the more 
external financing approaches internal financing of invest-
*  33 m e n t .
Passing to the second issue, the sain reason behind under­
investment of traditional cooperatives may not be the one 
proposed by Vanek - the high implicit cost of capital from 
internal sources - but limited internal funds, since the 
reliance on internal funds where the supply of funds is not
33. Bonin (1985) similarly argues that the investment decision 
will not be very different under external financing, since 
social capital, as the root of the problem, is not eliminated by 
external financing (p. 18).
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infinitely elastic clearly hampers the growth of the firm's 
capital stock (Stephen, 1984, p. 84-86).
Finally, in relation to Vanek's external financing solu­
tion, two additional problems have been widely discussed. Ths 
first is the problem of high dependence of LMFs on financial 
institutions, leading to banks' involvement in the internal 
policy of the firm which is against the principle of self­
management, and hence the confrontation between the owner of
34capital and its user. The second problem is the "moral 
hazard" problem, arising from risk connected with debt financing 
of a L M F . LMFs may be lacking effort to operate successfully if 
in risky situations substantial part of the losses can be get 
n d  off by bankruptcy, and hence lending to a firm of yet un­
known future profitability may involve a higher degree of
u  3 5risk .
1.2.1.2.Furubotn and Pejovich's theory
We will for the moment discuss two principle weaknesses of 
Furubotn and Pejovich's theory: l)its methodology; and 2)the
role of bank credit.
34. See Schlicht and Von Weizsäcker (1977), Jensen and Meckling 
(1979), Dumas and Serra (1973), Horvat (1982), Ellerman (1986), 
Bonin (1985).
35. See Schlicht and Von Weizsäcker (1977), Gui (1982-83), Keren 
(1985).
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1)Methodology
Furubotn and Pejovich have not properly analysed either the 
"pure" LMF, nor the Yugoslav firm. If the authors* intention had 
been to analyse the LMF in its ‘•pure'* form# it is misleading to 
have based their entire analysis on the Yugoslav firm - a
socialist LMF, obliged to respect the CMR and on this basis
propose general hypotheses for the LMF *s behaviour. ^  The CMR 
is not present in the legal framework of cooperatives in Western 
countries, and therefore investment behaviour under such an 
assumption cannot be generalized.
If, on the contrary, Furubotn and Pejovich wanted to ex­
amine the specific case of a Yugoslav LMF, it is misleading not 
to have taken into account other features, along with social 
property and the CMR, peculiar to the Yugoslav context. Whereas 
specific features of the Yugoslav economy will be treated in 
greater detail subsequently, here we will mention primarily 
those which are most relevant for theoretical considerations.
36. In most articles the CMR is explicitly assumed, although the 
authors fail to stress, with the exception of Furubotn (1980a), 
the importance of the CMR as a disincentive.
37. Thus in Furubotn# Pejovich (1973), the labour-managed system
with a specific property rights structure and the CMR is assumed 
(p. 278), but later the authors conclude that "the pure labour- 
managed system is an essentially unstable construction*1 (p. 
283); or in Furubotn (1974), the Yugoslav LMF is analysed, but 
conclusions are generalized: .there is an inherent flaw in
the structure of the pure LMF" (p. 284).
47
For example, since inflation has been the cnaracteristic 
feature of the Yugoslav economy, it has been argued that its 
presence has probably caused a systematic bias in favour of non- 
38owned assets. Although the authors propose inflation will be 
present in a labour-managed economy, they do not consider that 
inflation could render the CMR partially ineffective, when 
replacement costs exceed historical cost (Bonin, 1985; Zafiris, 
1982). Or, that a partial relief from the CMR could be present 
due to regulations regarding loan finance in Yugoslavia, which
39permit the repayment of a loan from depreciation allowances, 
or if debt repayment exceeds depreciation. Furubotn and Pejovich 
have also neglected actual banking policies in Yugoslavia, 
artificially low interest rates on loans, which have had their 
impact on the high level of bank-financed investment, and hence 
they are ascribing inefficiencies due to an imperfect capital
40market to Yugoslav property rights. Fina-ly, by concentrating
38. Sacks (1983), pp. 81-83. Sacks also argues that there is
rooa for argument over the appropriate method of calculation
when comparing returns from owned and non-owned assets, as
different discounting procedures can yield lower critical rates 
of return from investment in non-owned assets (Sacks, 1983, p. 
77-81).
39. See Stephen (1978); Connock (1982).
40. See Stephen (1984), p. 89. Estrin (1983) also notes that
the model "is not really concerned with the effects of labour- 
management at all, but rather the consequences of particular
legal constraint on private Yugoslav choices" (p. 6).
48
their argument on one issue - that of property rights - Furubotn 
and Pejovich disregard other systemic features of socialist 
economies (e.g. the tendency to overinvest)« which may be impor­
tant for analysing the investment decision of the Yugoslav LMF.
Hence, Furubotn and Pejovich's theory is based on assump­
tions which do not adequately reflect either the western 
cooperative, nor the Yugoslav LMF. The CMR does not usually 
apply to a LMF in a capitalist environment, whereas in the case 
of the Yugoslav LMF, its effectiveness needs to be evaluated by 
taking into account other features of the Yugoslav economy, that 
have played a part in maintaining a high level of investment in 
Yugoslavia, in spite of the absence of private property rights.
2)Bank credit
Furubotn-Pejovich's claim that the availability of external 
sources of finance will drive self-financed investment to zero 
has been extensively critisized, as the hypothesis is condi­
tional upon specific conditions.
Only if the CMR was not obligatory for investment financed 
externally, would there be an absolute preference for external
sources of finance.*1 Otherwise, whether bank finance will be 
the cheaper source, will depend on the length of the payback
41. Quite inconsistently, in Furubotn (1974) and (1976) the 
author did not apply the CMR to assets purchased by the use of 
borrowed funds; see Bonin (1985).
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period of loans, the time horizon, the interest rate, and the 
technological properties of a given investment.
Stephen (1980, 1984) has convincingly argued that when the 
loan repayment period is shorter or equal to the workers' time 
horizon, any investment must be seen as a combination of credit 
and self-finance. When borrowing and lending rates are the same, 
the required return for a project financed by a loan which is 
repaid within the planning horizon is the same as that for an 
internally financed project, and the availability of credit does 
not affect the level of investment. If these rates differ, it is 
highly likely that the sum borrowed will be less than the total 
investment and that there will be some self-financing.
Bonin (1985) confirms Stephen's conclusions and asserts 
that Furubotn's argument is valid only if no payment of 
principal is ever made. He notes that Furubotn and Pejovich's 
implicit assumption that maturity dates for loans are matched 
not with tenure# but rather with the expected life of the as­
sets, is a heroic assumption, since the CMR makes the life of an 
asset infinite, implying that the loan maturity date will also 
be infinite. For a LMF to rely only on external financing, 
either financial institutions will have to offer especially 
advantageous conditions (long maturity and low rates), or the
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representative worker's tenure would have to be quite short« or 
both.
Finally« as already stressed in reference to Vanek's 
theory« external sources of finance will not be preferred in 
case a project involves the introduction of labour-saving tech­
nology« since workers will prefer to share the capital cost 
currently with the relatively larger number of workers« and thus 
finance the project from retained earnings (Aoki« 1984).
Therefore« contrary to Furubotn and Pejovich's assertion« 
the LMF may rely more« under certain conditions« on internal 
financing of investment.
1.2.2.Common features
Three issues that are central in both theories will now be 
reconsidered« related to property rights« the planning horizon« 
and workers' interests« since it is precisely the nature of the 
assumptions on these three items that crucially determines the 
conclusion on underinvestment.
42. Similar objections are made by Zafiris (1982) who argues 
that the advantage of bank credit cannot be a decisive one under 
the CMR; if loans are ultimately repayable« bank finance also 
becomes self-finance in the long run. Ireland and Law (1982« p.
49) note that the proposal is based on the unrealistic 
assumptions that banks will allow the principal to be repaid at 
the same rate as the rate of depreciation« and that bank finance 
is unlimited.
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1.2*2.1.Property rights
Both schools of thought assume a strong causal relationship 
between legal ownership and the investment decision of a LMF. 
While Furubotn and Pejovich explicitly emphasize tnat underin­
vestment is caused by the attenuation of private property 
rights, Vanek is less explicit on this point, but nevertheless 
also assumes that the absence of private property rights in a 
LMF implies a major sacrifice for workers undertaxing invest­
ment .
What are the limitations of such an approach? Our first 
objection is that these theories, by considering exclusively 
one, in this case, negative feature of collective ownership, are
43one-sided, biased, and simplified.
In contrast with Marx's view of social relations as deter­
mined by the conditions of production, these theories disregard 
precisely that the change of ownership from private to collec­
tive, may lead to different social relations, having in turn, 
positive effects on the LMF's behaviour. A collectively-owned 
LMF may produce an ideologically more acceptable working en­
vironment, improved relations among workers, which could
43. For an excellent critique of specifically "property rights 
economics" as developed by Furubotn, Pejovich, and others, see 
Nutzinger (1982) .
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represent an important non-material benefit of collective 
property.
But besides these ideological preferences» there are direct 
material advantages a worker could have from collective owner­
ship. Among these are collective funds that can provide workers 
with important benefits (apartments» meals» health care» etc.). 
In addition» the structure of property rights enables a LMF to 
undertake investment in general human capital» which the
44capitalist firm would never undertake. Collective ownership 
of funds can also make the LMF more reliable to external 
financiers» and ensures a higher level of disposable financial 
capital» which can be advantageous for the LMF's operations 
(Ze v i » 1984).
Here it may be argued that in an economy where workers know 
of no other form of property rights» where private business 
opportunities are limited» as till recently has been the case in 
Yugoslavia, they will not be in a condition to sufficiently 
appreciate the advantages of non-private ownership. However, if 
we look at cooperatives in a capitalist environment, these are 
often based on collective property forms, yet this institutional
44. See Ring (1979) and Horvat (1982).
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arrangement is accepted on a voluntary basis. Therefore# collec­
tive ownership obviously does have its own advantages# its own 
raison-d'etre. In fact# Zevi (1984) suggests that the extension 
of private property rights in the case of Italian cooperatives, 
may have serious negative consequences.
Our second objection to tne considered theories is that 
they have overempnasized the role that the legal regulation of 
property may have on a L M F ’s actual behaviour. By an elaborate 
tax system# a private property economy can approach one labeled 
socialist, while an economy which has abolished private property 
rights can still introduce incentives similar to those in a
45private property economy. There may be ways of reconciling 
collective property with adequate remuneration of investment
46decisions.
1.2.2.2.Time horizon
In spite of the emphasized importance of the time horizon 
as a distinct criterion of the LMF# the collective nature of 
investment need not necessarily lead to the adoption of short 
time horizons# as is usually assumed.
45. A similar argument is proposed by Bajt (1968)# (1988). 
Bajt's proposal and alternative ways of achieving this will be 
discussed in Chapter 5.
46. A concrete proposal will be given in Chapter 5.
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Indeed, Vanek examines the case of a one-year time horizon, 
and argues that with time horizons longer than one year, the 
realistic ranges for the returns on investment in capital assets 
Ax will be between twice and four times the time preference rate 
R (we recall that Ax*R*D). This does not hold, however, if a
47sufficiently long time horizon is considered.
Furubotn and Pejovich, on the contrary, do adopt a dynamic 
analytical framework, yet the LMF's time horizon is regarded as 
being “typically short" because of the negative implications of
48collective property rights. It is only m  two articles that 
additional arguments are given: preferences of workers who plan 
to quit or retire; and risk increasing with time, since new
49voting patterns or revised payoff policies, may be introduced.
47. E.g., in a LKF consisting of a majority of young workers, 
who expect to retire after 30 years, assuming that R*6%, 
Ax=7,2%, the differential 0 is only 1,2%, and therefore Ax will 
not be much higher than R (as calculated by J. Defourny, 1983, 
p. 209).
48. In Furubotn, Pejovich (1973) the authors state: "in what may 
be regarded the typical case, a majority of workers in the firm 
will not be comaited to a 17 or 20 year planning horizon” (p. 
281); or in Furubotn (1974), "In what may be considered the 
typical case, the bank rate of interest (i) is almost certain to 
be less than the critical rate of return on non-owned assets 
(r*). That is, unless the collective's planning horizon (T) is 
quite long" (p. 272). The only exception is Furubotn (1980b): 
the author does assume a short time horizon, but notes that "it 
is still conceivable that the expected horizon will be 
substantial {for example, T»20)" (p. 801).
49. Furubotn (1974), p. 272; Furubotn (1980b), p. 801.
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However, these reasons do not seem sufficient for a short time 
horizon to be present in a LMF. The majority of workers would 
have to be about to leave in order for the LMF to have a rela­
tively short time h o r i z o n . ^  As for the second reason, the 
author seems to be forgetting that in a LMF, it is the workers 
themselves who decide on these matters.
The planning horizon of a LMF may, in fact, be as good as 
infinite, or long enough, at any rate, to eliminate the disin­
centive to invest (in Yugoslavia arising from the C M R ) , or the 
distortion in ranking projects (in workers* cooperatives arising 
from L R C ) , if additional factors, neglected by the literature, 
are taken into consideration: 1)level of commitment; 2)age
structure of the work force; and 3)effective investment criteria 
of a LMF.
l)CoaBitaent of workers in a LMF may be higher than else­
where, in the first place because of ideological reasons. In a 
socialist LMF, workers may feel sufficiently like ’guardians’ of 
society's capital to adopt infinite horizons with respect to
their investment,^  in which case even in a LMF with a strict
50. Of course, it is plausible that older workers (with shorter 
time horizons) will be the more influential# but this would 
imply abandoning one of the basic assumptions on the LMF# that 
each worker has equal voting power.
51. Zafiris (1982), p. 68.
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C M R * the disincentive to invest would be removed. Moral incen­
tives may play an equally important role in participatory 
organizations in the West# since personal and community rela­
tions can provide a stronger nonmaterial commitment than 
elsewhere.
Commitment may also be higher because of factors which 
reduce the mobility of labour. Schlicht and Von Weizsacker 
(1977# pp. 61-65) propose tnat the way in which the commitment 
problem will be solved in the labour managed market economy is 
by a sufficient de facto immobility of labour. While capitalism 
makes the commitment principle compatible with high mobility of 
workers# but their exclusion from decisions# a labour-managed 
economy makes it compatible with labour management by reducing
mobility.52
The principal reason why low mobility of labour might be 
present in a LMF more than elsewhere# is that past investment, 
due to the LRC# ties workers to their LMF (Horvat# 1982:
52. Furubotn himself proposes that under labour management# high 
labour mobility is ruled out# but criticizes Schlicht and Von 
Weizsacker*s approach# arguing that even if there is absolute 
commitment# the majority group controlling the firm will still 
undertake poor investment projects# since as it ages# the firm's 
effective planning horizon becomes shorter (Furubotn# 1979# p. 
216-229). However# he neglects the realistic possibility that 
with time# the majority group will not consist of the original 
workers# but will be renewed by younger workers# thus prolonging 
the LMF's time horizon.
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Nutzinger# 1975). It could also be present because of solidarity 
issues (reluctance to fire workers). A worker in a LMF, when 
deciding tc invest# is probably going to be concerned more about 
how such a decision is going to affect the firm's growth and 
therefore, his own future earnings, than with the possibil-ty of 
changing jobs. Transferred to the level of the whole collective, 
it is highly improbable that the majority of workers, at the 
moment of an investment decision, will think of seeking another 
employment at some near future.
Whereas an immobile labour force will cause other inef­
ficiencies and problems, its presence implies that penalty for
poor investment choice will have to be born by workers.
Consequently, it will be in their interest to make tne best 
possible investments, since poor decision will mean lower in­
comes in the future (Milenkovich, 1971, p. 224).
2)The second issue of importance for the LMF's time horizon
is the age structure of the work force, which is usually
neglected, or assumed to be such as to determine short time
horizons.53
If we accept the usual assumption that in a LMF, the system 
of decision-making is such as to provide each worker with one
53. Among the few exceptions are Furubotn (1979), Bonin (1985), 
and Conte (1980).
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voce, it is the median aged worker who will cast the decisive
54vote on investment. If the hiring policies of a LMF are such 
as to replace older members (at retirement) on a consistent 
basis with younger members, the median age of workers will 
remain approximately constant, and collective property rights is 
not a sufficient reason for the median aged worker to adopt a 
short time horizon. If there are no unvoluntary dismissals, as 
seems plausible, and the above mentioned hiring policy is ap­
plied, it is not unreasonable to propose a time horizon for the 
median worker to be around 20 years, which should be long 
enough, on average, to allow the benefits from an investment to 
be born by workers.
3)Finally, let us reconsider the inveataent criteria of the 
LMF. Although we have shown that the time horizon, if exceeding 
the repayment period of an investment, loses much of its 
relevance as a specific investment criterion of the LMF, let us 
for a moment consider a short time horizon, of e.g. 5 years. 
Such a horizon would allow sufficient time for workers to 
recover their shares of an investment (under appropriate reward
54. Here we are grateful to M. Conte (1980) who is one of the 
very few authors that has considered this problem. His article, 
in spite of the mathematical errors it contains, which Conte 
himself aknowledges, has to a large extent inspired our 
reflections on the matter.
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schemes) only if the firm selects projects with a pay-off period 
not longer than 5 years.
In this context it is useful to consider the capitalist
firm, which is increasingly using discounted cash flow tech­
niques in conjunction with other methods. Among these# the pay­
off period, as a method which provides a way of handling
uncertainty and risk,55 is reported to be used extensively by
capitalist firms.5** For a project to be undertaken, its pay-off 
period should not exceed the standard period which is customary
57in a given sector, ranging from under 2 to 5 years.
Therefore, it is very probable that a contemporary 
capitalist firm, operating under conditions of high uncertainty 
and rapidly developing technology, will not be in a position to 
maximize the present value of a given investment project, but 
will be constrained to primarily consider the period over which 
the investment is repaid through gross profits as the decisive 
criterion for guiding investment.
55. See Hirshleifer (1970), p. 59, Nuti (1987) pp. 2-3, Hodder 
(1986), p. 17.
56. On early evidence on the use of this investment criterion,
see Nuti (1987). Recent evidence is reported in Serial! et al.
(1978), who found that in a sample of 189 large U.S. firms, 741
used the pay-off period as an investment criterion.
57. Nuti, (1987).
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A LMF operating under the sane conditions of rapid tech­
nological progress, in order to survive, will have to behave 
similarly to its capitalist counterpart, and therefore opt £or 
fastest-yielding investment projects. Yet the proposed pay-off 
period of no more than 5 years is highly unlikely to be longer 
than the time horizon of an average worker in a LMF. In this 
case, the ranking of projects by a LMF would not differ substan­
tially from that of a capitalist firm, even in the case that the 
LMF has a finite (and rather short) time horizon as compared 
with the capitalist firm having an infinite one.
It is also worth noting that a key problem for the 
capitalist firm is that it has to frequently bargain with labour 
unions. Since investment weaxens the firm's bargaining position, 
a biasmay be created towards more liquid forms of investment or 
towards easily sellable capital, or simply towards investment. 
This may be a bigger problem for the capitalist firm than the 
time horizon problem is for the LMF (see Ireland, 1984).
1.2.2.3.Workers' interests
An assumption explicit in both Vanek's and Furubotn- 
P e j o v i c h ’s theory, is that workers in a LMF behave according to 
their own self-interest. Such an approach, based on strict 
individualism, considers a LMF is reducable to a group of uncon­
nected individuals, each pursuing his own self-interest and 
disregarding those of the firm or of his fellow workers. This is 
not surprising for Furubotn and Pejovich, but does seem strange
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for an author like Vanek# who in various works stresses trie
CO
"special dimensions" of labour-management.
However# individual self-interest# the favourite neoclassi­
cal assumption, may not be the most adequate criterion for 
explaining the behaviour of a LMF# since it implies the neglec- 
tion of collective value judgements, group behaviour# and the 
complexity of labour participation. If labour-management is to 
represent a different type of social organization based on 
elements such as democracy# participation# and solidarity# 
workers in a LMF will be more concerned about the effects of 
their decisions on others than elsewhere# precisely because of 
their active role in the decision-making process. The perfor­
mance of a LMF cannot# therefore# be judged and evaluated by 
simply aggregating individual preferences# since decisions in 
such an organizational setting are no longer individual# but 
collective.
While when investing a part of his income in a savings 
account# the worker acts according to his self-interest since 
the decision concerns only him as an individual# this may not 
be the case when he is considering investing in the firm# as
58. To quote Stephen (1984), to Vanek "the study of labour- 
management goes beyond the 'crossword puzzles' of the
neoclassical paradigm into the realm of 'relevance and
a p p l ication1'' (pp. 5-6).
such a decision is of a collective nature. It is through a 
process of discussion of all workers, at the general assembly or 
elsewhere, that a decision about investment in a LMF is usually 
made, and here it is the collective as a group who decides, who 
is responsible, and who bears the consequences of such a deci­
sion. Therefore the two types of investment are of a different 
nature.
In support of the above approach we will briefly present 
Sen's arguments, which are interesting in view of their possible 
application to a LMF. Sen (1967) shows that if we assume com­
plete independence of individuals' expectations of other 
people's action, the pursuit of self-interest by each produces 
an overall result that is Pareto-inferior. Individuals can do 
better off by collusion, but the collusive solution would not 
come about, except through compulsory enforcement. This is what 
Sen calls the "isolation paradox", as an extension of the two- 
person non-zero-sum game known as the "prisoners' dilemma". He 
applies it to the savings problem and shows that an individual 
in isolation will be better off not saving himself, although 
each would have preferred that others save. In contrast, if 
expectations about other people's behaviour are assumed, an 
individual expecting, and having assurance, that others will all 
vote for investment, will vote for investment himself, and 
enforcement becomes unnecessary. This is what Sen calls the 
"assurance problem": if each individual has complete faith that
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others are going to opt for investment, it is in his own inter­
est to act in the same way.
Sen concludes that individual self-interest influences 
collective decisions in a different way than it does unilateral 
decisions. Self-interest pursued by an individual in isolation 
produces a conflict between individual and collective 
preferences# and cooperation would need to be enforced in order 
to obtain a collectively-optimal outcome# whereas if in­
dividuals* actions are interdependent# such an optimal solution
59can be arrived at voluntarily.
While the first of the above problems# the "isolation 
paradox"# corresponds to Vanek's and Furubotn and Pejovich's 
notion of a IMF, the second problem of "assurance" could be 
resolved in an actual L M F . For this to be feasible two condi­
tions would need to be fulfilled: l)perfect information on other 
p e o p l e ’s opinion? and 2)a solid ground for assurance that others 
will also vote for a given decision.
These conditions could be fulfilled in a LMF# precisely 
because of the specific mechanism of the decision-making 
procesa. The first condition is fulfilled because discussion by 
all workers, and an exchange of opinion# ensures the flow of
59. It is important to note that the central point of the 
argument is not altruism. For a similar analysis# see Marglin 
(1963).
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information on other people's preferences* The second condition 
is fulfilled because after the phase of discussion, where each 
worker agrees to the adoption of a specific policy, he is un­
likely to change his initial opinion, and analogously, tnere 
should be no fear that others will do so and vote dif-
ferently.
Such a group-behavioural approach is therefore more likely 
to produce a collectively-optimal outcome, and is also more 
likely to lead to positive investment than the approach based on 
individuals1 isolated self-interest. If each worker realizes 
investment can be beneficial for the collective as a whole, 
including himself, provided he agrees to it, and workers jointly 
decide that it is in the interest of the firm to make an invest­
ment, they nay be willing to vote for positive investment as 
optimal.
Nevertheless, the above approach may also involve serious 
difficulties in its practical implementation. Its feasibility 
depends essentially on how "ideally" self-management functions, 
whether it is actually able to eliminate the conflict between 
individual and collective interests. The approach is based on 
the assumption that a harmonious process of convergence of
60. If this, however, was to happen, under conditions of public 
voting it would probably send the decision back to the initial 
stage and workers against would eventually be persuaded.
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workers* opinions will actually take place, and hence that a 
conflict-resolving decision-making process is a realistic 
framework, wnich is indeed a strong assumption. In addition, 
Sen's argument may be used against the entire idea of self­
management at the enterprise level, in favour of nation-wide 
cooperation.
1.3.Restrictions on capital withdrawals: some further clarifica­
tions
It has already been argued that the CMR and RWC have dif­
ferent implications for the investment decision of the IMF, but 
the analysis nas so far been primarily concentrated on the issue 
of the time horizon. Another important aspect of the problem of 
underinvestment concerns concrete restrictions in LMFs, i.e. how 
restrictive rules on capital withdrawals are in practice and 
what they actually imply. In the case of a cooperative, ever, if 
it adopts a time horizon longer than the life of an asset, and 
consequently uses the same criterion as the capitalist firm, 
what will be the effects of the LRC principle, and hence how 
much of an investment a worker will be able to recover in­
dividually, will depend on internal regulations concerning 
capital withdrawals. Similarly, under the CMR, how strong will 
the disincentive to invest be, will depend on the effectiveness 
of the rule in practice.
1.3.1.Rules in western cooperatives
Restrictions posed on capital withdrawals in workers' 
cooperatives in Western Europe differ substantially not only 
from country to country» but also within countries, as specific 
rules are sometimes determined only by the statutory acts of the 
single cooperative. The different regulations governing coopera­
tive practice in Western Europe are presented in Table 2.
The first point to be made is that in practice« there are 
almost no cases of 130% collective ownership of assets in the
sense of Vanek's theory.^1 The more frequent practice is a 
property form based on a mixture of private and collective 
ownership. Individual workers contribute a certain amount of 
capital when joining a cooperative, usually in the form of a 
share, which remains in private property and in most cases, 
under certain restrictions, is redeemable. What constitutes 
collective property of the cooperative is usually the part of 
capital which is allocated to various funds, which in case of 
closure, in some countries, cannot be distributed among workers.
The proportion of private capital respect to collective 
funds is very different across countries. In contrast with Spain 
(Mondragon) where 85% of original capital is put on members'
61. The only exception are some Danish cooperatives, which 
however, are owned, financed and controlled entirely by trade 
unions.
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individual capital accounts, and only 15% goes into the compul­
sory reserve fund, in Danish trade union cooperatives, the 
entire capital is collectively owned, in British ICOM coopera­
tives (cooperatives belonging to the "Industrial Common 
Ownership Movement'*) the percentage of collective funds is 
generally quite high because individual capital stakes are 
limited, and, e.g.# in British CPF (Cooperative Production 
Federation) cooperatives only 4% of capital was in individual 
ownership in 1968 (Estrin, 1985). Differences are found even 
within different sectors; for example, Estrin, Jones and Svejnar
(1984) found that private property of workers in French coopera­
tives represented 30% of capital in the building sector, but 
almost 60% in the electric energy sector.
This implies that, in general, capital in "collective 
property" to which Vanek*s theory refers to (and from which the 
underinvestment problem arises), represents only a part of total 
capital of a cooperative (smaller or larger, is a matter of 
empirical verification).
As to concrete restrictions which may be unstimuiative for 
the individual worker investing in a cooperative, they can be 
classified into two large groups. The first group are restric­
tions concerning shares, or initial capital contributions by 
members. Whereas in most countries there are no limitations on 
the maximum amount that can be contributed, there are exceptions
70
to the rule.*^ Second, interest on members' shares is usually 
limited, as this is one of the principles of the International 
Cooperative Alliance. The regulation present in almost all 
countries is that subscribed capital cannot be remunerated at an 
interest rate higher than a fixed predetermined level, but 
exceptions to this rule are also found (in Ireland, Germany, 
Belgium, and some cooperatives in the U.K.). The same principle 
of limited interest is also applied, in some countries, on 
members' loans (Italy, Netherlands). Third, if a worker decides 
to leave the cooperative, shares/initial capital contributions 
are usually reemborsed, but not always (in Ireland), sometimes 
only at their nominal value (Belgium, France, Italy), or only 
partially (in Spain 80t if leaving before retirement). Finally, 
shares cannot be sold to outsiders, and are not tradeable except 
sometimes among members.
Therefore, a worker as an individual, in most countries, 
cannot realize capital gains from investing personal wealth in 
the cooperative. In case of leaving, he may incur losses, and 
hence may be constrained by his time horizon, which however may
62. In British ICOM cooperatives the individual capital stake is 
limited to one share of 1 Pound per member; or limits put on 
total capital of a single memoer, as in Italy, until recently 
set to a maximum of 4 million Lira but now raised to 30 million 
Lira; in Ireland set to 3000 Pounds, and in British CPF 
cooperatives to the legal maximum of 5000 Pounds.
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become longer precisely because of limited redemption. 
However# enrichment is certainly not the main reason why a 
worker joins a cooperative, and in any case, as long as he 
remains in the cooperative, he could, in principle, be rewarded
6 4for investment undertaken collectively from retained earnings.
The second group of restrictions regards profit distribu­
tion, and the related issue of distribution of residual assets 
in case a cooperative is liquidated. With the exception of 
France# Italy, Spain and British ICOM cooperatives# where 
precise rules do exist on which percentage of profits needs to 
be dedicated to funds, in other West European countries the 
allocation of profits is not determined by law (in Belgium, 
Denmark# Germany# Ireland, the Netherlands).
However# the percentage of profits to be allocated to 
certain funds# even when obligatory, is not very high. The 
compulsory allocation to the reserve fund (indivisable reserves)
ranges from 15% of profits in Spain and France,65 to 20% in 
Italy. In Spain# an additional 10% must go into the Social Fund.
63. This will depend on whether the worker considers the ex ante
or ex post effects.
64. Some of the theoretical possibilities have already been 
discussed earlier; schemes effectively applied in practice will
be discussed below.
65. In France# however# it ceases to be obligatory once it has 
reached the level of the cooperative's capital.
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In France, 25% of profits aust be distributed to workers (or 
reinvested for them through the Workers' Participation Fund). In 
Italy, profits distributed to workers must not exceed by more 
than 20% the average salary bill on the market, otherwise the 
cooperative is no longer liable to ask for tax benefits.
In the above countries, if a cooperative is liquidated, the 
residual remaining in collective funds cannot be distributed 
among workers, but has to be desolved or dedicated to charity 
purposes. Whereas the strictest rules are present in Italy and 
France (the residual, once shares are redeemed and debts paid, 
entirely goes to charity purposes), the rules in Spain allow, in 
addition to the full recovery of capital held on individual 
members' accounts, the distribution of 50% of the compulsory 
reserve fund, the entire distribution of optional reserves, and 
only what remains goes into charity purposes.
This implies that a worker in an Italian, French, Spanish 
and ICON cooperative may not be able to capitalize his share of 
the firm's capital if the cooperative is liquidated. However, as 
long as the cooperative continues operating, and the worker 
remains in the cooperative for a sufficiently long time, he 
could benefit from undertaken investment through reward schemes 
which allow for an adequate recognition of individual contribu­
tions to capital accumulation. Since the property regime in 
cooperatives is already based on a part of capital being 
privately owned by workers, issuing additional capital shares to
workers in correspondence to the net increase in capital is a
perfectly feasible solution. 66 That interest on such shares 
would have to, in many countries, be limited, should not provoke 
serious disincentive effects, as these limits are such as to 
allow an interest which is at least equivalent (if not higher) 
than the bank interest rate.
There is indeed evidence that in some of these countries 
schemes rewarding investment undertaken from retained earnings 
are successfully applied in practice. In French cooperatives, 
when new assets are purchased members are sometimes issued with 
new shares corresponding to the value of new assets, effectively
67guaranteeing the return of the principal* Or, in Mondragon 
cooperatives even up to 70% of profits is allocated to in­
dividual member's accounts, which are revalued annually and 
fully redeemed at retirement.
In all other countries, in case of closure of a coopera­
tive# residual assets can be distributed to workers# usually in 
proportion to shares# and hence the disincentive to invest is 
not likely to be present.
66. In this sense# there are no systemic constraints, as in 
Yugoslavia, that workers cannot be owners of a part of capital
of the enterprise.
67. See Thornley (1981) and Oakeshott (1978)# as cited by Estrin
and Jones (1987).
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The discussed limitations posed on cooperatives also need 
to be weighted against advantages they may have, primarily in 
terms of fiscal benefits and financial support. It is precisely 
cooperatives in those countries in which the strictest rules are 
applied, that also enjoy major benefits (Italy, France, Spain). 
The general rule seems to be that freedom in setting internal
rules is paid by an unpreferential treatment respect to other
68types of enterprises. The stricter the rules are, the more the 
cooperative sector seems supported by external institutions.
Finally, the three countries in which the strictest rules
are applied - Italy, France, and Spain - are also the ones that
have experienced the most rapid growth of workers' cooperatives 
in the past 20 years, and that today account for the largest
69number of workers' cooperatives in Western Europe.
Nevertheless, it should be empnasized that a major problem
of the cooperative sector, both historically and today, has been
the problem of finance. The lack of capital has led to the
difusion of cooperatives almost exclusively in labour-intensive 
sectors (trade, construction, transport, light manufacturing, 
services) (see Nuti, 1988a). However, how much this tendency has
68. A possible exception is Belgium, where cooperatives are free 
to determine most of their internal rules, yet at the same time 
are offered some preferential treatment respect to other types 
of firms.
69. See Estrin, (1985).
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been due to a hostile environment and the related unprivileged 
access to bank finance# or to restrictions imposed on coopera­
tives and hence reluctance to finance investment from retained 
earnings# remains an open question.
As to empirical evidence# early evidence on British foot­
wear cooperatives seemed to offer support to Vanek's theory on
underinvestment (Jones and Bakus, 1977).70 However# more recent 
evidence suggests just the contrary. The system applied in 
Mondragon cooperatives nas secured a high level of reinvestment 
of profits# and a substantial part of investment is internally-
f i n a n c e d . ^  Similarly, latest evidence from France suggests 
that the basic determinants of investment in workers* coopera­
tives are similar to those in conventional firms# and that in 
general# no tendency to underinvest is present (Estrin and 
Jones# 1987).
The foregoing analysis of restrictions on capital 
withdrawals applied by workers' cooperatives in different coun­
tries shows that these rules include a wide variety of 
arrangeaents. Some of these regulations are not always# and not 
in all countries# as restrictive as is usually assumed in the
70. However# these results are not fully convincing and hence 
have not been universally accepted as a confirmation of the 
theory (see Stephen# 1984# p. 147).
71. See Commission of the European Communities (1984)# Vol. II# 
p. S16# and Thomas and Logan (1982).
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theoretical literature. In many cases, these regulations need 
not produce an unstimulative effect on investment.
Sven in countries where the strictest rules are applied, 
these restrictions essentially concern l)original capital of 
members (limited interest, redemption of shares at nominal 
value); and 2)subsequent increments of capital (obligatory 
collective funds, and the prohibition to distribute the residual 
in case of closure). Therefore, these limitations are likely to 
affect the worker primarily in two cases: if the worker leaves 
the cooperative, and if the cooperative is liquidated. As long 
as a worker remains in the cooperative, and the cooperative 
continues operating, if an adequate system of rewarding workers' 
investment decisions is introduced, these restrictions need not 
produce a disincentive to invest.
Nevertheless, what Vanek's theory is really concerned about 
is not the first limitation (individual members' stakes are 
anyway, usually not very high, except in Mondragon), but 
primarily the second referring to collective funds. Hence the 
restrictions existing in workers' cooperatives essentially come 
down to the obligation to allocate a part of profits to collec­
tive funds, which subsequently cannot be distributed to workers 
in case of closure. However, as long as the cooperative con­
tinues operating, the collective reserve fund which is usually 
held in financial form, can serve the cooperative for different 
purposes (e.g. in Italy, for covering losses).
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1.3.2.Yugoslav regulations
There is some confusion in the literature connected with 
the CMP. For some authors, this requirement is directly linked 
to Yugoslav practice; for others, which do not make a distinc­
tion between the CMR and the LRC, it is the reflection of
collective ownership of assets which implicitly contains such an 
obligation# and as such the rule is more widely applicable. In 
addition# the real meaning of the CMR in Yugoslavia has been 
questioned: whether it refers to the physical maintenance of
existing equipment or the maintenance of the value of capital# 
to the book or the real value of assets# to gross or net assets# 
to capital provided by the state or also future increments of 
72capital# etc.
The CMR is a specific regulation# fully present only in
Yugoslavia.73 Its implications will be analysed by briefly 
reviewing Yugoslav laws on depreciation and revaluation# and by
discussing some of the problems related to the implementation of
the CMR in practice.
72. See for example# Zafiris# (1982); Stephen (1984); Bonin
(1985).
73. French cooperatives are required to maintain the value of 
assets to 25% of the highest value they have reached (see Sstrin 
and Jones, 1987), but this minimum requirement on capital is not 
equivalent to the CMR. Or# Mondragon cooperatives effectively 
revalue all their capital assets# but in case of closure# can 
distribute a large part of capital among members# and hence are 
not obliged to maintain indefinitely the value of capital.
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1.3.2.1.The legal framework
The 1974 Constitution and the 1976 Associated Labour Act 
state that "workers are obliged to ... continuously renew,
74increase and improve social assets". Detailed instructions 
concerning the CMF are contained in various laws on depreciation 
and revaluation of assets, which have been changed continuously
in the past 20 y e a r s . ^
In the whole post-1967 period, the system of "free 
depreciation" was applied, implying first, that depreciation 
allowances, according to prescribed minimum rates, remain in the
enterprise for the purpose of maintaining the value of the
firm's fixed assets (instead of being put on special accounts, 
as in the pre-1967 system); and second, that enterprises may 
allocate to depreciation more than the prescribed minimum rate.
Until 1975, the basis for calculating depreciation was the
book value of assets. A revaluation of all fixed capital was.
74. Art. 15 of the 1974 Constitution, and Art. 13 of the 
Associated Labour Act (ALA). For further details, see Chapter VI 
of the ALA, which specifically refers to the management of 
social resources (Art. 227 onwards).
75. Since the first Law on depreciation was adopted in 1966,
effective from January 1, 1967, there has been a special law on 
depreciation rates (1966), other four laws on depreciation 
(1974, 1976, 1984, and 1986), and 16 ammendments to the
mentioned laws. The first law on the revaluation of fixed assets 
was adopted in 1975, followed by a new law in 1984, and its 
replacement, in 1986, by new provisions on revalorization 
included in the 1986 Law on total revenue.
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however, effectuated in 1953, 1957, 1962, 1966, and 1971, by
bringing up the value of capital to its market value. In 1972, 
regulations were adopted envisaging revaluation if the market 
price of fixed assets had exceeded their book value by over 5%. 
However# it is only from 1975 onwards, when the first law on the
revaluation of fixed assets was adopted,7** that enterprises are 
obliged to permanently revalue their assets if a difference 
emerges between the book value and the market value of fixed 
assets greater than 10%. Capital is revalued at the end of each 
current year, and as such serves as the basis for calculating 
next year's depreciation. Assets acquired using foreign loans 
are revalued in such a way as to adjust their book value to the 
corresponding change in the foreign exchange rate.
From Jan 1, 1985, revaluation is obligatory also for work­
ing capital (raw materials, work in progress, finished 
products). From 1987, a new system of revaluation has been
introduced,77 based on special coefficients which are deter­
mined on the basis of the index of industrial producers' prices. 
An important innovation is that revaluation must also be applied
76. Zakon o revalorizaciji... (1975).
77. The new system is included in the new Law on total revenue 
(Zakon o ukupno® prihodu, 1986), effective as of January 1, 
1987.
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to depreciation allowances (i.e. resources allocated to 
depreciation, not yet used for replacement).
78As to depreciation, the 1966 laws on depreciation have 
effectively served as the basis of all future laws. Resources to 
which depreciation rules apply are fixed assets and resources 
for collective consumption in use. The obligation to calculate 
depreciation lasts as long as these assets are not fully 
depreciated. If assets are put out of use before they are fully 
depreciated, either the undepreciated amount is compensated from 
the business fund, to be refunded in the next 6 years from 
income, or such assets are offered on sale through a public 
auction. If no buyer is found, assets can be written off by 
debiting the business fund, but without the corresponding com­
pensation from income; if a price lower than the value of such 
assets is obtained, the difference need not be compensated from 
the business fund. Finally, depreciation allowances are to be 
used primarily for the replacement of existing and the acquisi­
tion of new fixed assets, but may temporarily also be used for 
other purposes (e.g. as working capital).
Subsequent laws on depreciation and amendments to these 
laws have enlarged the list of resources to be depreciated (to
78. Zakon o amortizaciji osnovnih sredstava radnih organizacija, 
(1966), and Zakon o stopama amortizacije osnovnih sredstava 
radnih organizacija, (1966).
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include expenditure on innovation# and founder's investment)# 
but have also enlarged the list of fixed assets that can be
79written off without being depreciated. In the mid '70s, en­
terprises have also been given more freedom in using 
depreciation allowances (for the repayment of investment 
credits# as funds for obtaining bank credits for new investment# 
and in joint investment with other enterprises). From 1982, 
preferencial treatment was introduced for enterprises in process 
of liquidation or rehabilitation and those which do not use
80fixed assets at full capacity.
81According to the newest 1986 Law on depreciation, 
resources that need to be depreciated include fixed assets 
(buildings, equipment, cattle), material rights which are part 
of capital assets (provided for by investing into buildings or 
equipment), material rights to technology (patents, etc.), 
innovation resources, investment for enhancing agricultural 
production, founders' investment, forests, slow growing plants 
and fast growing trees (Art. 1). An exception is land (including
79. See the 1976 Law on depreciation.
80. In the first case, the possibility of transferring 50% of 
depreciation obligations to the next year, whereas in the second 
case, the reduction up to 50% of depreciation rates (see 
Amendments adopted at the end of 1982).
81. Zakon o anortizaciji drustvenih sredstava, (1986).
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long growing plants), edifices and equipment that serves na­
tional defence and state security, cultural monuments, fast 
growing trees and cattle in the process of being promoted. The
82depreciation rate is set on the basis of the purchase, or the 
revalued value of such resources, to be calculated until the 
value is not fully repaid (depreciated). An enterprise can lease 
assets out of use to other enterprises or to individuals which 
set up private businesses, or, as in previous laws, offer such 
assets on sale. Depreciation allowances can be used for a 
variety of different purposes, including the repayment of in-
83vestment credits and for working capital.
Besides these standard provisions which are similar to 
those in previous laws, the 1986 Law also introduces several new 
elements. Depreciation obligations can no longer be postponed or 
calculated at a lower rate if assets are not used at full
capacity.^4 Mandatory depreciation no longer enters income,**5
82. This refers only to newly-bought assets, purchased in a 
current year, to which from Jan. 1 of the next year standard 
provisions apply (revalued assets become the basis for 
depreciat ion).
83. The only restriction is that they cannot be used for 
purchasing collective consumption resources or for repaying 
credits intended for collective consumption (see Art. 44).
84. See Art. 14. The only exception are resources damaged due to 
"vis majeure", and assets in their first year of use (see Art. 
11).
85. Income (dohodak) in Yugoslavia is defined as gross revenue 
minus material costs.
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but material costs of an enterprise. Enterprises which are in 
the process of rehabilitation and regular liquidation# which 
were not privileged by the 1984 Law# are now again excempt from 
depreciation obligations. Finally# stricter regulations are set 
for assets out of use: if the price obtained by selling an asset 
is lower than the non-written off value of the asset# the dif-
86ference must be compensated.
Depreciation rates have been applied in the whole post-1967
87period on a uniform basis in the whole country# as set in the 
Nomenclature# a part of the federal law on depreciation in which 
all assets are classified into more than 100 different groups. 
The characteristic feature of depreciation rates is that they 
have remained almost unchanged in the past 20 years. The average 
rate of depreciation has been around 5% in most years following
1971 (with the exception of 1974# when it was 8,58% due to a
88different method of accounting)# although the rates for dif­
ferent groups of assets vary substantially# ranging from a
86. See Art. 41# 49# 57# 62# 64.
87. The only exception are republican laws on the depreciation 
of appartments# buildings# forests and roads.
88. See Zarkovic and Vujicic (1987)# p. 144.
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minimum of 1%, to a maximum of 50%. In the 1986 Law on 
depreciation# these rates have been increased for most groups of 
assets, in some cases even by more than 100%.
1.3.2.2.Problems in implementing the CMR
The systems of depreciation and revaluation of fixed assets 
in Yugoslavia has been extensively critisized on different 
grounds. The first is the inadequate revaluation of assets. 
Revaluation has not adequately been reflecting inflation, nor 
the change in the foreign exchange rate, due to the absence of 
revalorization until 1975# and thereafter# due to the untimely
90and inappropriate revaluation of fixed assets. In addition# 
until 1987# revaluation was not applied on yet unused deprecia­
tion allowances# which according to some calculations has 
decreased the real value of depreciation funds annually by more
91than one half.
8 9
89. B.g.# in the Nomenclature of the 1985 Law on depreciation# a 
1% rate is applied to earth sluices for water supply and 
canalization# branch lines for railway tracks# and sports 
facilities made of concrete (springing boards# skating tracks)# 
whereas a 50% rate is applied to certain types of cattle# and to 
furniture for the transport of radio and television equipment.
90. As already emphasized# this is because fixed assets are 
annually revalued for inflation in previous year# and revalued 
capital serves as a basis for depreciation only in the next 
year.
91. Zarkovic and Vujicic (1987)# p. 29.
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Such an inadequate system of revaluation has resulted in 
depreciation being lower than necessary for maintaining the real 
value of assets* To quote a government report, "A comparison 
between the increase in nominal values of depreciation in 1984 
respect to 1983, and in 1985 respect to 1984, and the level of 
prices and income, leads to the conclusion that in certain 
productive sectors the real level of depreciation has actually 
decreased, annually by about 20-30%, or by the amount for which 
depreciation has lagged behind the increase in prices, or the
92devaluation of the dinar".
It has also been calculated that in the 1971-1980 period, 
the nominal value of fixed assets increased 14.1 times, whereas 
depreciation only 10*7 times* The average depreciation rate 
actually declined from 6.5% in 1970, to 4.2% in 1980. Although 
from 1981 onwards these rates have been increased, the average 
rate has remained low and thus has resulted in a rather low 
average depreciation period of fixed assets: 23.6 years in 1980,
93and 21.7 years in 1981. The possibility of postponing
depreciation has meant that in practice, an enterprise could 
effectively# in a given year, calculate 50% of its current year
92. Federal Executive Council, June 1986, as quoted in Zarkovic 
and Vujicic (1987), p. 139.
93. See Drakul (ed.), (1984).
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depreciation, and only a part of last year's postponed deprecia-
94tion. According to Zarkovic and Vujicic (1987, p. 28), the 
prevailing estimates of the total Yugoslav '‘debt" owed to fixed 
assets (due to untimely depreciation), in the 1970-85 period 
amounts to 20 billion dollars.
Since depreciation enters material costs, its calculation 
lower than necessary for maintaining the real value of assets 
has meant that costs were understated, and thus products were 
sold at a lower price, while income could for the same amount 
artificially be overstated. This has had an important negative 
impact: higher income serves as the basis for paying higher
personal incomes, and thus the system encouraged the outflow of 
a substantial part of income from fixed assets into consurap-
95tion.
Such tendencies have also been favoured by existing ac­
counting procedures. When net assets are revalued, the
counterpart in the liabilities side is entered by increasing the 
value of the business fund (i.e. enterprise's own sources).
However, whereas the business fund is increased according to 
revalued capital, depreciation enters costs in a given year in 
its non-revalued amount. Such an automatic increase in the value
94. Zarkovic and Vujicic (1987), p. 119.
95. See Zarkovic and Vujicic, (1987), pp. 28-29, 39, 318.
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of the busines fund can serve as the basis for distributing a 
part of income, and hence not necessarily in proportion to 
obtained business results. In addition, it seems that inflation 
is, quite inappropriately, sometimes entered twice in an en­
terprise's balance sheets: not only through the revaluation of 
assets, but also through changes in interest rates and in for- 
96eign exchange. The existing systems of accounting,
depreciation, and revaluation have therefore been critisized as 
being an active generator of inflation, and have been blamed for
97the present liquidity crisis of the Yugoslav economy.
The existing accounting system has also been unstimulative 
for allocating funds to mandatory depreciation, at least until 
1986, since this part of depreciation was not included in costs, 
but in taxed income.
These tendencies have favoured a high reliance on bank 
loans. An enterprise can effectively use depreciation allowances 
as working capital, and compensate the amount, when needed in 
the future, through new bank credits, and thus it can realize a 
"gain" by saving on interest that would have been paid on a bank
96. See Bajt (1985), and Rankovic (1985). However, it is not 
quite clear why inflation is entered twice; to clarify the issue 
further, accounting laws would need to be examined in greater 
detail.
97. See also Rankov (1986).
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loan. It is claimed that this “ga i n ” is not entered into the
98business fund, but goes directly into consumption.
Finally, existing legislation is very complicated to apply. 
Indeed, in order to facilitate the implementation of existing 
laws by enterprises, several handbooks on their application have
99recently been made available.
In concluding, it is worth stressing that Yugoslav 
depreciation laws and problems encountered in implementing them
are very similar to those in other socialist countries. The 
Yugoslav economy in this respect (as in many others, as will be 
shown later) seems to resemble much more other socialist 
economies that the system of workers' cooperatives in Western 
Europe.
Therefore, in the whole post-1965 period in Yugoslavia, the 
CMR has been effective only partially. Even after 1975, in spite 
of the intention to introduce a strict CMR, the system has not 
adequately been reflecting inflation, and the maintenance of the 
real value of assets was never fully implemented. The CMR has 
not fully fulfilled the principle objective of its introduction,
98. Zarkovic and Vujicic (1987), pp. 101, 107, 131.
99. Some of these handbooks include Milosevic and Zivkovic 
(1984); Pancic (1985), Zarkovic and Vujicic (1987).
100. For a discussion of depreciation problems in the Soviet 
Union, for example, see Lavigne (1962), (1967), and (1968).
as existing accounting procedures have enabled the eating up of 
capital stock, and hence disinvestment. Under existing arrange­
ments, Yugoslav enterprises may indeed be stimulated to finance 
new investment from bank loans, while eating up their capital 
a ssets.
The main theoretical implication of the analysis is that a 
partial relief from the CMR, as suggested by several authors in 
the theoretical literature, is indeed present in Yugoslavia. 
Hence the investment bias is likely not to exhibit its full 
effect not even in Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, disregarding other 
considerations, it is still likely to be present (albeit 
partially) more than in workers' cooperatives, because the CMR 
is a stricter regulation than RWC.
The above analysis permits a further clarification of the 
differences between the CMR and the RWC. Since both the CMR and 
RWC put limits on the amount of capital that can be distributed 
to workers, it could be argued that obligatory collective funds 
implicitly involve the same type of disincentive as the 
CMR. However, the obligation to allocate a part of profits to 
collective funds is present only in some countries, and even 
when the allocation to collective funds is obligatory, it does 
not represent a large percentage of profits.
Therefore, the nature of the CMR and RWC is different. As 
long as a LMF continues operating, the CMR prohibits the con­
sumption of all physical capital, while RWC, by imposing a
90
minimum requirement on collective funds or limited interest on 
wo r kers1 shares, only prohibit the distribution of a relatively 
small part of financial capital* Hence the disincentive effects 
are likely to be weaker than in the case of a LMF obliged to 
respect a CMR. Whereas in Yugoslavia, there are limits on the 
amount that can be distributed to workers on account of both 
capital stock (because of the CMR)# and profits (as will be seen 
in Chapter 2), in Western cooperatives these limits on distribu­
tion primarily concern profits.
Under a CMR# workers must continuously refinance all in­
vestment# past and present# i.e. allocate sufficient amounts to 
depreciation and reinvest it subsequently in order to maintain 
the value of their fixed capital. Under RWC# on the contrary/ 
there is nothing in cooperative laws which prohibits disinvest­
ment# and hence the recovery# for the cooperative# of the 
principal of an investment. While this does not yet eliminate 
the problem of LRC for the individual worker# issuing additional 
capital shares to workers equivalent to reinvested income per 
worker# could eliminate its disincentive effects.
Finally# because of the difference in property regimes# in 
case an enterprise is closed# in Yugoslavia no part of capital 
can be appropriated by workers# as the enterprise is not the 
legal owner of its capital. In workers' cooperatives# on the 
contrary# only a part of capital (collective funds) cannot be
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distributed to workers, but needs to be dedicated to charity 
purposes (and this, only in some countries).
Therefore, as suggested earlier, the restrictions on capi­
tal appropriation present in Yugoslavia are indeed more 
restrictive than those in Western cooperatives.
1. 4 .Concluding remarks
The foregoing analysis on the theoretical problems of the 
L M F *s investment decision leads to the following principal 
conclusions. Respect to a capitalist firm, when undertaking 
investment from retained earnings a LMF does face a distinct 
problem, deriving from limited transferability rights over real 
property and income streams it can generate# and hence absence 
of perfect liquidity of an investment. Unlike the capitalist 
entrepreneur whose investment is "perfectly* liquid, a worker in 
a LMF cannot sell his job and the future income streams as­
sociated with it« and thus capitalize his part of the firm's 
earnings, but can only benefit from an investment over the 
period of employment in the same firm. This specific feature of 
the LMF is expected to lead to a truncated time horizon, a 
problem non-existent in the capitalist firm, and this in turn is 
expected to cause underinvestment of the LMF respect to its 
capitalist counterpart.
However, the conclusion on underinvestment cannot be 
generalized« How serious will the problem of limited trans­
ferability rights be, and what will its implications be for the
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investment decision of a LMF, will depend on two groups of 
additional considerations» which are closely interrelated:
(l)nature and practical application of restrictions on 
capital withdrawals, distinguishing between the CMP and RWC, or 
the rules in Yugoslavia and in workers' cooperatives; and 
(2)effective length of the time horizon, as a LMF will not 
necessarily operate with a short (truncated) time horizon.
In spite of the fact that both the CMR and RWC represent a 
limitation of traditionally conceived property rights, our 
analysis nas suggested that the CMR is a more restrictive 
obligation than those present in workers' cooperatives. The CMR 
requires continuous refinancing of all investment in capital 
stock, past and present, and hence prohibits disinvestment 
(which would, in principle, provide for the recovery of an 
investment).
The disincentive to invest would unambiguously be present 
only under the CMR, fully effective under the strong CMR, or 
partially under the regulation to maintain the book value of 
assets. Under a C M R , workers will not be able to recover 
resources invested in fixed capital, even if they remain with 
the firm for the full duration of an asset, and hence irrespec­
tive of the length of their time horizon. The only exception is 
if infinite time horizons are adopted.
However, a strict CMR is an extreme case not encountered in 
practice, in spite of intentions to introduce it in Yugoslavia
after 1975. Hence the investment bias is likely not to exhibit 
its full effect not even in Yugoslavia/ but is still likely to 
be present more than in workers' cooperatives, because the CMR 
is a more restrictive regulation that those existing in workers' 
cooperatives in Western Europe.
In the absence of the CMR, the LRC principle need not 
necessarily lead to the adoption of a truncated time horizon, 
the use of the time horizon as the dominant criterion in invest­
ment selection, and to underinvestment. RWC do impose a minimum 
requirement on collective reserves which are not distributable 
to workers in case of closure (however, only in some countries), 
but do not seem to prevent cooperatives from adopting remunera­
tion schemes which could compensate workers for the lack of 
perfect liquidity of an investment.
In a LMF not obliged to respect a CMR, whether the time 
horizon will present itself as the dominant criterion of the 
LMF, will depend on the effective length of the time horizon
adopted, in relation to the repayment period of an investment:
a)If the time horizon is shorter than the repayment period
of an investment, a LMF will probably exhibit a preference for
short-lived projects, but this distortion is not equivalent to 
underinvestment, and need not lead to distinct behaviour if we 
consider that in practice today, a capitalist firm may often 
have the same preference for quickest-yielding projects.
b)I£ the time horizon exceeds the repayment period of an 
investment, workers could, in principle, fully benefit from 
income flows of an investment, and underinvestment need not 
prevail. A long time horizon is plausible for a number of 
reasons, mainly neglected by the literature: advantages a worker 
could have from collective property; high level of commitment; 
reduced labour mobility; constant renewal of the labour force; 
longer-term interests; and group-behavioural approach.
However, even if the LRC leads workers to initially adopt 
relatively short time horizons, workers could be compensated, 
through various remuneration schemes rewarding investment, for 
the imperfect liquidity of an investment. Such schemes are 
likely to decrease workers' uncertainty with respect to tenure 
with the firm, and hence lengthen workers' time horizon.
As to the concrete mode of financing investment, neither is 
internal financing always excluded by the LMF (as suggested by 
Furubotn and Pejovich), nor is external financing (proposed by 
Vanek) necessarily the more convenient way of financing invest­
ment. Whether external finance will have absolute preference 
over M l f - f i n a n e « ,  will depend on the terms of a loan (repayment 
period# interest rate), workers's time horizon, and the tech­
nological properties of an investment project.
Therefore, whereas in theory, the LRC principle is expected 
to lead to a truncated time horizon, and this in turn to under­
investment, in practice there is a variety of different possible
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outcomes and the disincentive effect is not inevitable* A sum­
mary of the different possibilities concerning a IMF's 
investment decision is presented in Table 3. The Table indeed 
shows that the time horizon may, but need not always be the 
decisive criterion of the LMF's investment decision. Contrary to 
the surveyed theories which draw their conclusions by ex­
clusively focussing on the workers' time horizon as the dominant 
criterion of a LMF's investment decision, two other horizons are 
equally important: in case of self-financed investment, the 
payback period of an investment; in case of external finance, 
the repayment period of a loan. However, even when the time 
horizon is applied as the dominant criterion in a LMF undertak­
ing investment, it need not, under certain conditions, lead to 
underinvestment. Therefore, our principle conclusion is that 
underinvestment in a LMF with collective ownership need not 
prevail, but needs to be evaluated by taking into account the 
concrete institutional setting in which a LMF operates.
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Table 3. THE IMPACT OF APPROPRIABILITY RESTRICTIONS ON LMF 
INVESTMENT BEHAVIOUR
Restrictions
l.LRC + CMR
1.1.Maintain 
real value 
of assets
1.2.Maintain 
boo* value 
of assets
1.3.Maintain real 
or book value 
of assets
Time
horizon (T)
Finite
Finite
Infinite
2.LRC without a CMR
2.1.T relatively
short# due a . T d n v e s t .  
to LRC pay-back
period (PP)
b.T<Loan
maturity
(LM)
2.2.T relatively 
long# due to 
l)age structure# a.T>PP 
commitment # e t c • 
or 2)reward 
schemes meant 
to prolong T 
(e.g.shares) b.T>LM
Investment Underinvestment 
criterion
Horizon
Horizon
Horizon
Horizon
Standard
Standard
Fully
present
Present only 
partially
Standard* Not present
Distortion in rank­
ing projects# which 
is not equivalent to 
under investment # and 
could be avoided by 
schemes meant to 
lenghten LMF horizon
Not necessarily 
present if lending 
rate is high
Not necessarily 
present# if workers 
are adequately 
rewarded
Not present# 
especially if 
lending terms 
are unfavourable
c.T>PP# but 
techn. properties 
of a project are 
considered:
If labour- 
intensive 
If labour- 
______________ saving_____
Present
Indefinite
♦Criteria 
cash flow 
return).
usually used in capitalist firms 
techniques (net present value#
based on discounted 
internal rate of
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Chapter 2.TESTING THEORETICAL HYPOTHESES ON EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
FROM YUGOSLAVIA - A FIRST ASSESSMENT
The conventional theories of the investment behaviour of a 
LMF suggest two sets of hypotheses. The first concerns the 
incentives to invest from retained earnings. In a LMF where 
capital is collectively/socially o w n e d , low levels of savings 
and investment in the firm's capital assets are predicted 
(Vanek, 1971, Furubotn, 1974). This is expected to lead to a 
"retardation of voluntary saving in the econoay as a whole" 
(Furubotn, 1974, p. 274). The second hypothesis, closely related 
to the first, concerns the financing of investment. The 
availability of external sources of finance, according to one 
variant, will drive savings of a LMF and voluntary self-financed 
investment to zero (Furubotn 1974, Stephen 1984). According to 
the other variant, external sources of finance can remove the 
mentioned underinvestment effect (Vanek, 1971).
The principal theoretical predictions on investment of the 
LMF will be contrasted with empirical evidence from Yugoslavia, 
but the analysis will primarily concern Furubotn and Pejovich's 
hypotheses, as their theory, contrary to Vanek's, does aspire to 
explain the behaviour of the Yugoslav LMF.
We will for the moment assume that Yugoslavia is ap­
propriate for testing theoretical predictions on investment of 
the LMF. Indeed, Yugoslavia may seem most adequate for this 
purpose for several reasons. First, since it is the only exist­
ing economy where LMFs are prevalent, it has most frequently 
been used in empirical research for testing theoretical
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hypotheses on the L M F . Second, the largest part of the 
Yugoslav economy is characterised by non-private property rigths 
(i.e. the social sector, which produces around 85% of Gross
102Material Product - G M P ) . Finally, our previous analysis has 
led to the conclusion that the underinvestment effect, dis­
regarding other considerations, is more likely to be present in 
Yugoslavia than elsewhere, because of stricter regulations 
concerning capital withdrawals (the presence of the CMP).
The period under examination is the whole post-1965 period. 
It is with the reforms of the mid 1960s, which marked the pas­
sage to "market socialism" in Yugoslavia, that major changes 
were introduced into the field of investment, parallel with the 
strengthening of self-management. The system of mobilysing and 
allocating investment resources was transformed from a 
centrally-directed mechanism financed predominantly through 
government funds, to a system that relies on enterprises' self- 
financing, and the banking mechanism as its principle financial 
intermediary. Central investment funds were abolished, and 
decisions about finance and investment were decentralized to
101
101. For various empirical tests of theoretical hypotheses on 
the LMF on Yugoslav data, see Bartlett and Uvalic (1986).
102. Gross material product, or social product in Yugoslav 
terminology, is the value added in market prices of productive 
sectors in both the social and the private sector of the 
economy. It does not include non-productive sectors, such as 
housing, health, education, administration, defence.
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enterprises and self-managed banks.103 At the same time, fiscal 
burdens on firms were reduced, which left a larger share of 
income generated at the disposal of firms, and enterprise 
autonomy was increased regarding the distribution of enterprise 
income between capital accumulation and personal incomes.
It has been argued that only the 1965-72 period can be 
considered Mtruly self-managed” , and hence appropriate for 
testing hypotheses from self-management theory. The new rules on 
income distribution introduced in 1971 have indeed limited 
enterprise autonomy, by obliging enterprises to respect general 
principles on income distribution set in social compacts, which
104directly or indirectly impose a minimum savings requirement. 
Nevertheless, even after 1971, enterprises have retained some 
discretion in their savings decisions.
However, irrespective of formal regulations governing
enterprise a u t o n o m y , t h e  principal reason why the analysis 
has been extended beyond 1972, is that the general characteris­
tics of the specific field we are examining - investment policy
103. The only federal investment fund existing today is the Fund 
for the development of less-developed republics and regions, 
which however, comprises a small percentage of total investment 
effort (around 0.4% of gross investment in 1983).
104. Social compacts are agreements between state 
representatives, enterprises, and other organisations on prices, 
income distribution, employment policy, etc. Social Compacts on 
Income are concluded at the republican level. A detailed 
description of the new regulations on income distribution 
introduced in 1971 and subséquente modifications are given in 
Appendix A(a).
105. While formal autonomy over income distribution is an 
important issue, it will be shown later that it is not crucial.
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- have remained much the same throughout the whole post-1965
• -a 106period.
2.1.Investment and savings performance of the Yugoslav economy 
The first hypothesis that will be tested is whether low 
savings ar.d investment will be present in an economy in which 
capital is predominantly socially-owned.
On the aggregate level, the Yugoslav economy has achieved 
high investment and savings rates since the reforms introduced 
in 1965. In the years immediately following the reform# some 
moderation of these rates was registered* In comparison with the 
1961-65 period# in 1966-70 the share of gross investment in 
GMP# as measured in current prices# declined from 43% to 38%
107(see Table Al# Appendix A(b)). When inventories are excluded# 
however# this decline is less pronounced: from 32.2% of GMP in 
1961-65# investment in fixed assets declined to 30.6% in 1966-
70. At the same time# a decline in the domestic savings/GM? 
ratio was registered# from an average of 41.5% in 1961-65# to 
35.8% in 1966-70 (see Table A2).
106. For the moment, this is only a hypothesis# which will be 
elaborated further in Chapter 3.
107. Gross investment in Yugoslav statistics includes investment 
by the social and the private sector of the economy# both in 
productive and non-productive sectors. However# since the 
Yugoslav concept of GMP does not include non-productive sectors# 
the presented investment/GMP ratios are obviously an 
overestimation« Nevertheless# they are presented as they are the 
official figures reported in Yugoslav statistics# and as such 
are the only data available for the entire period being 
examined.
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This decline in the savings and investment rates after 1965/
may seem evidence which directly supports theoretical predic­
tions* However, a fact which is often neglected and which 
substantially alters this conclusion is that one of the main
objectives of the reform was to give priority to consumption and
redistribute national output in favour of personal incomes. In 
fact, the 1966-70 Social Plan explicitly stresses as a major 
objective of the period the rise of personal consumption and
108living standard of the population. As a result, the decline 
of the share of savings and investment in the post-refora period 
was at least partially intentional. Rather than supporting 
theoretical predictions, it can be considered a sign of success­
ful implementation of planned objectives.
After this initial decline, investment and savings shares 
in GMP registered a steady increasing trend during the 1970s. 
The domestic savings/GMP ratio rose to 37.5% in 1971-75, and
further to 41.0% in 1976-80. Similarly, the gross investment/GMP 
ratio rose to around 40%, and further to around 43% of GMP in 
the two subperiods of the 1970s, of which investment in fixed 
assets accounted for around 30% and 37% of GMP respectively. By
108. In the 1966-70 Social Plan, the very ¿irst among the
principle objectives of economic and social development of the
period is "continuous increase of the living standard,
particularly personal consumption, and the rise of the share of 
personal incomes in the distribution of national income“ (1966, 
p. 49). The plan also envisaged a decline in the
accumulation/GMP ratio.
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the end of the 1970s* Yugoslavia had one of the highest invest­
ment rates in the world.
However, the level of investment reached at the end of the 
1970s was well above the domestic savings potential of the
Yugoslav economy. Expansionary policies of the 1970s were in­
creasingly financed through foreign borrowing, leading to a very
109rapid rise in external debt. This led to a constant increase 
in foreign financing of investment: as a percentage of GMP, it 
rose from 1.1% in 1961-65 to 3.4% in 1976-80 (see Table A 2 ).
The trend of increasing reliance on foreign loans to 
finance domestic expansion has been reversed only with the 
restrictive policies of the 1980s* which have cut domestic 
demand, and especially investment in fixed assets drastically. 
Although a drop in gross investment in GMP was not registered, 
as the ratio remained above 40% throughout the 1980s, a negative 
change in the structure of gross investment is evident: a 
notable fall in investment in fixed assets in favour of stocks, 
so that in 1981-85 fixed investment fell to an unprecedented low 
level of only 26.4% of GMP. In addition, for the first time 
in the post-war period, investment in fixed assets has con­
stantly registered a negative rate of growth in real terms (on
average over the 1981-85 period of -9.0% ).
109. The Yugoslav net debt increased from 1.9 billion dollars in 
1970, to 13.7 billion in 1979, 17.3 billion in 1980, and 20.4 
billion in 1987.
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Restrictive measures of tne 1980s have resulted in the 
domestic savings/GMP ratio being higher than the gross 
investment/GMP ratio from 1981 onwards, thus leading to a nega­
tive foreign financing/GMP ratio. However, this positive result 
and the improvements achieved by 1983 in the external sec-
110tor, have been accompanied by a serious deterioration of 
domestic economic performance and a severe economic crisis: 
stagnation of GMP (even a negative growth rate in 1983)? uncon­
trollable inflation, which by 1987 had reached 167% and is 
likely not to be lower in 1988; rising unemployment (of around 
13% of the labour force in 1987); a substantial reduction of the 
living standard (a fall in real wages of over 30% in the 1979-34 
period).
When the savings performance of the Yugoslav economy is 
viewed in the framework of standardized western concepts, the 
ratios of gross savings and of gross investment to GNP are 
somewhat lower than the ones based on Yugoslav concepts. This is 
primarily because the GMP base includes value added in non­
productive activities, which is omitted from the Yugoslav 
concept of GMP. According to OECD estimates of GNP, and data of 
the Federal Institute of Statistics (SZS), over the whole 1966- 
84 period, the gross national savings/GNP ratio was on average 
around 34%, whereas the gross domestic investment/GNP ratio 
around 36% (see Table A2). Both of these ratios increased
110. Priaarilly the transformation of the current account 
deficit into a surplus, which has remained positive since.
steadily after 1965. According to World Bank estimates of GNP,
and data cf the National Bank of Yugoslavia ( N B Y ) # ^ *  the gross 
investment/GNP ratio declined from 33.7% in 1961-65 to 29.7% in 
1966-70 and further to 28.4% in 1971-75# but it rose to 35% in 
1976-80. The gross national savings/GNP ratio showed a similar 
trend of decline from 32.6% in 1961-65 to 28.7% in 1966-70 and 
further to 27.1% in 1971-75# but thereafter it rose to 32.2% in 
1976-80.
Yugoslavia has also performed well when compared with 
countries at a similar level of development# at least until the 
1980s. According to World Bank and OECD estimates# Yugoslavia's 
gross national savings/GNP ratio in the 1965-80 period# and its 
gross investment/GDP ratio in the 1960-80 period# have exceeded 
the ratios in Greece# Spain and Turkey (see Table A3)# countries 
with which Yugoslavia can reasonably be compared. In the 1974-80 
period# in years for which data are available# Yugoslavia per­
formed better than all three countries in terms of achieved 
gross fixed capital formation/GDP ratio (except in 1974 when it 
was exceeded by Spain by 0.2 percentage points). Even with the 
introduction of restrictive policies in the 1980s# Yugoslavia's 
gross fixed capital formation/GDP ratio was in 1984 higher than 
in the other three countries# and in 1985-86 was only exceeded 
by that of Turkey (by 1.8 percentage points). Finally# during
111. Data of the NBY somewhat differ from Yugoslav national 
accounts provided by the SZS# because the NBY records payments 
for investment according to flow-of-funds accounts# rather than 
the value of work done# as in data of the SZS.
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the 1969-80 period, the growth rate of gross capital formation 
of over 6% reached places Yugoslavia at the top of the range of 
these middle-income countries? during the 1980s, although com­
parable data are not available, Yugoslavia has probably been
surpassed by all three countries (in view of negative growth 
rates of investment in fixed assets).
Therefore, two different conclusions can be drawn for two 
distinct periods. In the whole 1966-90 period, in spite of the 
differences in the ratios presented, and variations in the 
subperiods examined, the long-term trend points to ratios that
can be considered high by international standards. Contrary to 
what is postulated by theoretical predictions, the Yugoslav 
economy has successfully maintained its investment and savings 
rates. The short-term moderation in these rates immediately 
after 1965 did not influence significantly the long-term trend 
of relatively high investment and savings rates.
Starting from 1980, a reversal of the trend is present, 
because policies of adjustment due to rising foreign indebted­
ness required a drastic reduction of investment spending. 
Nevertheless, since the theory is based on the assumption that
LMFs are free to decide on their principal policy issues, while 
the reduction of investment was achieved by imposing very strict 
administrative measures on enterprises (on the distribution of 
income, direct limits on investment spending, etc.), this rever­
sal in the trend of high investment in the 1980s cannot be used
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as an argument supporting theoretical predictions. That these 
measures were untimely# as they should have been introduced much 
earlier in order to avoid some of the problems which led to the
economic crisis in the 1980s# is another question.
2 . 2 .Enterprises savings performance
The second hypothesis to be tested is whether low savings 
(and investment) will prevail in socially-owned L M F s . Since the 
social sector of the economy has accounted for nearly 70% of 
domestic savings# and for over 80% of gross investment over the 
1966-84 period (see Table A4)# aggregate data presented earlier 
are already an indication of the savings and investment perfor­
mance of social sector enterprises in Yugoslavia. Nevertheless# 
the savings performance of social sector enterprises will now be 
analysed in greater detail.
We will start by presenting four different savings ratios 
of Yugoslav enterprises: l)gross savings/enterprise GMP; 2)gross 
savings/enterprise net income; 3)net savings/enterprise GMP; and 
4)net savings/enterprise net income.
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112. Rather# this seems to support the hypothesis which will be 
advanced later: that the state has retained# in the whole period 
after 1965# strong influence on the sphere of investment 
decision-mak ing.
113. As shown by Balassa and Tyson (1985)# neither Yugoslavia 
nor Hungary took macroeconomic adjustment measures in response 
to external shocks in 1974-75. Rather# they maintained earlier 
rates of consumption growth and exhibited substantial increases 
in investment. Although both countries took measures to restrain 
aggregate expenditure in 1976# these measures were subsequently 
reversed.
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1)F611owing World Bank definitions, the gross savings/GMP
ratio of productive enterprises, i.e. the sum of depreciation 
and allocation to funds (business fund, reserve fund, and col­
lective consumption fund) in relation to GMP produced, 
registered a substantial decline in the years following the 
reform: it fell from 28.9% in 1966 to 21.0% in 1969 (see Table
A 5 ). This tendency was reversed in 1970-75, and enterprise gross 
savings rose from an average rate of 24.8% in 1966-70 to 26.1% 
in 1971-75. In the second half of the 1970s, after an initial 
substantial drop registered in 1976 relative to 1975 (from 26.5% 
to 21.8% of GMP), enterprise gross savings tended to increase 
continuously, but the average share of gross savings in GMP in 
the 1976-80 period was somewhat lower than in the preceding 5- 
year period, around 24.4%. With the income controls of the 
1980s, enterprise gross savings reached a high, unprecedented
114level of 28.1% of GMP in 1981-85.
2)What is of major interest for our analysis, however, is 
the distribution of net enterprise income, or the sum of net 
personal incomes# depreciation, and allocation to funds, after 
taxes and contributions are deducted. Similar to the above 
observed trend in the gross savings/GMP ratio, the gross
114. The gross savings/GMP ratio of enterprises is lower when 
adjusted for stock overvaluation. Schrenk's (1979) calculations 
available for tne years 1966-75, which correct the inventory 
overvaluation by taking into account the difference between 
year-end and mid-year prices of inventories, yield ratios that 
are lower, especially in 1969-75, than the ones just reported. 
The ratio does not exceed 20% of enterprise GMP on average in 
the period as a whole.
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savings/net enterprise income ratio in the years immediately 
following the reform also declined from 45.3% in 1966 to 36*4% 
in 1969. Nevertheless, the average rate of gross savings out of 
net enterprise income showed a tendency of constant increase: it 
rose from an average of 40.6% in 1966-70 to 42.6% in 1971-75, to 
44.3% in 1976-30, and further to 47.8% in 1981-85. This long­
term trend of increasing shares of gross savings of enterprises 
in their net income has largely been due to increasing snares of 
allocation to funds, as depreciation shares tended to be rela­
tively constant in the whole period.
L. Tyson's (1977) investigation of Yugoslav sectoral data 
supports the observed trends at the aggregate level. Her empiri­
cal test of the savings performance of 16 industrial sectors in 
Yugoslavia for the period 1965-74 shows that the long-run 
savings rates (the sun of depreciation and allocation to en­
terprise funds) out of enterprises' net income (the sum of 
savings and net personal incomes) were approximately 25% or more 
in all but 2 of the 11 sectors that yielded statistically sig­
nificant results, whereas the hypothesis that the long-run 
savings rate is zero could be rejected in all but 3 sectors. 
This led Tyson to conclude that "savings rates in many Yugoslav 
firm* are positive and substantial rather than zero as predicted 
by theory" (1977, p. 407).
115. With the exception of the minimum and maximum levels - 
13.5% in 1966 and 21.3% in 1983 - depreciation accounted, on
average, for about 17% to 18% of net enterprise income.
3)It is also of interest to look at enterprise savings net
of depreciation# because Yugoslav firms are obliged tc 
depreciate their assets at a legally prescribed minimum rate#
and hence depreciation is not a voluntary component of savings 
in the sense of self-management theory (Stephen# 1984). The 
average net savings/enterprise GMP ratio (i.e. allocation to 
enterprise funds as a percentage of enterprise GMP) did not
exhibit significant changes over time: it rose from an average 
of 14.5% in 1966-70 to 14.8% in 1971-75# and then fell to 13.6% 
in 1976-80# whereas in 1981-85# it amounted to 16.7%.
4)Finally# the net savings/net enterprise incoae ratio#
once again of major interest because of exclusion of taxes# has 
been oscilating in a similar way# although the 5-year average 
did rise# moderately but continuously# from 23.7% to 24.3% and 
further to 26% in the three five-year periods following the 
reform# reaching 28.3% in 1981-85.
Although the four savings ratios of Yugoslav enterprises 
which have been discussed are based on four different defini­
tions of savings# they nevertheless all exhibit a similar 
tendency over time (see Graph 1): a fall in the 1966-69 period# 
constancy or a modest increase in 1969-74# a decline in 1974-76# 
and a continuous increase in the 1976-84 period.
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Graph 1.
SAVINGS RATIOS Of YUGOSLAV ENTERPRISES. 1966-1984 
(in X)
NS/GMP
GS/GMP
—  NS/EI
—  6S/EI
66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84
Source; Table A5, Appendix A(b).
However, data utilized to show positive net savings of 
Yugoslav enterprises may be questioned for their adequacy on 
several grounds. The first problem that will be discussed is 
that unambiguous refutation of the theory requires that volun­
tary savings of LMFs are positive. On the one hand, however, 
even if we consider the narrower category of savings (net 
savings, i.e. excluding depreciation which is obligatory), 
neither is this part of savings entirely voluntary, because 
first, the formation of enterprise funds is legally subject to a 
minimum requirement (in line with general principles set in 
social compacts); and second, at least until 1977 another 10% to
*
151 of net savings had to be dedicated to various additional
Ill
taxes and contributions (see Table A 6 ). On the other hand, a 
problem emphasized by Stephen (1984) is that bank loans are 
partly repaid out of resources allocated to the business fund, 
which implies that positive allocation to the business fund may 
arise from the need to repay loans contracted in previous 
periods.
Although it is not possible to make a clear distinction 
between the voluntary and imposed component of enterprise 
savings in Yugoslavia, a closer look at the structure of en­
terprises net savings (or accumulation in Yugoslav terminology) 
enables a more disaggregated analysis of the use of enterprise 
savings (see Table A6). Looking at the various items comprising 
accumulation in Table A6, they have been grouped, for the pur­
pose of our analysis, into four distinct categories of savings:
1)depreciation above the legal minimum (mandatory depreciation);
2)allocation to enterprise funds (business fund, reserve fund 
and other funds); 3 )contractual obligations (interest payments 
on bank loans, insurance premia); and 4)various taxes and con­
tributions paid out of enterprise net savings.
It is only the first category of savings - mandatory 
depreciation - which is entirely and undoubtedly a voluntary 
component of savings. Depreciation above the legal minimum has 
varied# during the 1967-85 period, from 1% to 14% of accumula­
tion of Yugoslav enterprises. Nevertheless, it was close to, or 
over 10% in about half of the years following the reform. 
Although voluntary depreciation may not have been very high in 
certain years, it has been positive in the entire period under
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exaaination. This is sufficient proof that, contrary to what 
might be expected from theoretical predictions, Yugoslav firms 
do save a part of their income voluntarily*
The tendency of allocating a part of net income to 
depreciation above the legally prescribed minimum is observable 
not only at the sectoral level. Prasnikar's (1983) data, col­
lected from 147 Yugoslav firms for the period 1975-79, reveal 
that mandatory depreciation has accounted for 2% to 21% of
accumulation (see Table A7).**^ Similar evidence is reported by 
Miovic, wno has estimated that on average Slovenian firms in the 
industrial sector depreciate at more than twice the minimum rate 
* * 117 of depreciation.
Apart from mandatory depreciation, it is not possible to 
determine the exact proportion of savings that can be considered 
"voluntary". Nevertheless, mandatory depreciation is probably 
only a minimum of such voluntary savings, because some of the 
other categories of enterprise net savings do include savings 
which are in part voluntary (allocation to funds), or could be 
considered as being voluntary (contractual obligations).
Thus allocation to enterprise funds is partly imposed on 
f i r n  (Minimum levels), but enterprises are free to allocate
116. The level of depreciation above the legal minimum was 
exceptionally high in 1975 (over 20% of total accumulation), as 
the legal rates in that year were low, which thereafter were 
substantially increased, leading to a drop of this component 
from 1976 onwards.
117. Miovic (1975), p. 108, as reported in Tyson (1977), p. 402.
more to these funds than legally required, and this part exceed­
ing the minimum requirements can be considered as part of 
voluntary savings* Nevertheless, a problem has been raised 
concerning resources allocated to the business fund, the most 
important of these funds. The business fund often serves for 
loan repayment, and thus it nas been suggested that such savings 
are not voluntary at the time they take place, for they are 
obligations carried over from a previous period (Stephen, 1984, 
p. 124).
Data on credit repayments indeed suggest that in order to 
be able to repay bank loans, firms are constrained to allocate a 
sufficient amount to the business fund. In 14 out of the 19 
years following 1965, resources allocated to the business fund 
by enterprises have entirely been used for repaying investment 
credits# and in most years were not even sufficient so that a 
part of resources set aside for depreciation were used (see
, . 118 Table A8).
On the other hand, the decision to take a loan could also 
be considered as anticipated savings, as an intertemporal shift 
of voluntary savings from the present to the future, in which 
case loan repayments and other contractual obligations can be 
considered a voluntary component of savings. If contractual 
obligations are viewed as a reflection of a voluntary choice of 
firms in the present to finance investment from external
118. As already mentioned, enterprises have from the mid-1970s 
been allowed to repay loans from the depreciation fund.
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sources, rather than from retained earnings, voluntary savings 
of Yugoslav firms can be seen to be substantially higher than 
the figures reported on depreciation above the legal minimum*
Resources allocated to the business fund may also be a 
reflection of the obligation of Yugoslav firms to contribute a 
certain percentage of own savings in order to obtain bank 
credit. Indeed, in Prasnikar's sample of enterprises, 57% of 
workers replied that own sources for financing investment were 
just sufficient to cover the share needed for obtaining bank 
credits (see Table A10).
As to the last category of net savings - taxes and con­
tributions - these are clearly an unvoluntary component of 
enterprise savings, but this part of net savings has substan­
tially declined. Although until 1976 around 10% to 15% of 
accumulation had to be dedicated to various taxes and contribu­
tions, thereafter the burden has significantly been reduced and 
from 1980 onwards it represents only 0.2% of enterprises* net 
savings.
The above analysis suggests that Yugoslav firms need to 
allocate sufficient amounts to accumulation in order to be able 
to repay loans, participate with own sources for obtaining new 
credits, and meet their obligations concerning various taxes and 
contributions. Available resources for undertaking investment, 
according to existing rules on net income distribution, repre­
sent only a residual of net income. Only after allocating the 
necessary amounts for the above mentioned purposes, can remain-
*
ing resources be used for undertaking investment. These
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observations, however, while clearly indicating some of the 
constraints Yugoslav firms are likely to be facing, do not alter 
our previous conclusion that voluntary savings of Yugoslav firms 
have been positive.
A final problem to be addressed is that in theory, en­
terprise savings for collective consumption purposes should be 
distinguished frcm enterprise savings that finance productive 
investment. As noted by Tyson (1977), workers who might be 
reluctant to save to finance a risky business investment, might 
be eager to save to finance the construction of an apartment 
complex for their own use. However, savings allocated to the 
collective consumption fund (in Tables A6 and A7 included under 
"other funds”), which is effectively used for investment for 
collective consumption purposes, has represented a low propor­
tion of total accumulation (the total sum allocated to "other 
funds" ranged from 0.4% to 1.2% according to sectoral data, or 
from 1% to 5% according to Prasnikar's enterprise data, of 
accumulation). Hence this problem is not as serious as suggested 
by Tyson.
It is also worth noting that Yugoslav policy-makers have 
continuously been critisizing productive enterprises for low 
savings rates, as only about half of gross national savings is 
generated by productive enterprises of the social sector. 
Nevertheless, the share of productive enterprises in both gross 
domestic savingB and in social sector savings registered a
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continuous increase in the post-1965 reform period. As to the 
share of social sector productive enterprises in total gross 
investment, it remained fairly constant at the level of around
12070% during the 1966-80 period, or above 85% of gross invest­
ment undertaken by the social sector (see Table A9).
Evidence based on disaggregad data is provided by Estrin
(1983). Estrin found that Yugoslav firms tended to invest rela­
tively more after 1965# since the post-1965 period is 
characterized by an acceleration in the rate of growth of capi­
tal stock, 3e observed similar changes in the pattern of growth 
of each of tne 19 individual industrial sectors. After 1965, 
capital accumulation actually accelerated in absolute terms in 
11 of these sectors# while the rate of growth of the capital 
stock accelerated relative to output in every sector and ab­
solutely in a few (Estrin# 1983, pp. 154-158).
Questionnaire data from Prasnikar's sample offers addi­
tional evidence (see Table A10). Although 50% of workers gave 
personal incomes priority over accumulation in income distribu­
tion# 37% considered the two categories equally important, 
whereas 7% had a preference for accumulation# and the large 
majority (over 70%) considered the level of accumulation was too
119
119. Productive enterprise share in gross domestic savings rose 
from 48.6% in 1961-65# to 51.2% in 1966-70 and 53.6% in 1971-75, 
and further to 54.1% in 1976-80# whereas their share in social 
sector savings increased from 69.7% to 79.3% to 79.4% in the 
three 5-year periods following the reform.
120. The share of social sector productive enterprises in gross 
investment declined from an average of 72.4% in 1966-70 to 69.6% 
in 1971-75, but rose to 71.5% in 1976-80.
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low. Concerning investment, over 62% of workers thought there 
was need for investment (medium to quite high), and 47% of
workers were actually ready to renounce personal incomes in
favour of investment (partly or completely).
In conclusion, Yugoslav enterprises' savings have been 
positive and not exceptionally low in the whole 1966-85 period, 
and have accounted for a rising portion of gross domestic 
savings. Although some cf the evidence on positive savings of 
Yugoslav firms could be rejected on the basis of the argument 
that they do not reflect a voluntary component of savings, a 
more detailed analysis of tne distribution of net savings, on 
the basis of not only sectoral but also enterprise data, does 
confirm that Yugoslav firms have, at least until 1980, been
saving a part of their net income voluntarily.
2.3.Financing of investment
The second issue of importance for verifying predictions 
on the L M F ’s investment behaviour concerns the financing of 
investment. Will the availability of external sources of finance 
drive self-financed investment of a LMF to zero (Furubotn, 
1974)? If a part of investment is self-financed, is this done on 
a voluntary basis (Stephen, 1984)?
l)The proposed tendency of a LMF to finance its investment 
from external sources, rather than from retained earnings, will 
first be evaluated by examining the self-financing ratio of 
Yugoslav enterprises, or the portion of enterprise investment 
which is financed from enterprise savings.
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One of the standard methods of calculating the self-
financing ratio of Yugoslav firms is based on data of the NBY on
productive enterprises' gross savings, financial savings, and 
gross investment. Their self-financing ratio is then calculated 
as the ratio of their gross savings to their gross invest-
121ment. According to this method, productive enterprises' self- 
financing ratio increased substantially in the decade following 
the reform, from an average of 62.3% in 1961-65, to 68.4% in
1966-70, and to 74% in 1971-75. Thereafter, in 1976-80, it
declined to 70.8%, and in 1981-84 it reached a high average of
79% (see Table All).
However, since the above calculations are based on figures 
on total investment (i.e. including inventories), these ratios
122are somewhat overestimated. Indeed, Schrenk et al. (1979, p. 
153) report a lower self-financing rate of economic organisa­
tions in the social sector, calculated on the basis of adjusted 
gross savings and adjusted gross investment, of 66.8% in 1966-70 
and 63.8% in 1971-75.
A further limitation of the above method of calculating the 
self-financing ratio of Yugoslav enterprises is that it overes­
timates the part of enterprise gross savings that are really 
disposable for undertaking investment. The method relies on
121. Data using this method is reported by different authors, 
including Dimitrijevic and Macesich (1983); Lydall (1984), p. 
115; Stephen (1984), p. 119.
122. As already mentioned, this is because stocks are inflated 
in Yugoslav statistics because they are calculated according to 
end-year prices.
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figures on the formation of gross savings, but only a small part 
of these gross savings is effectively used for investment pur­
poses. In fact# we have seen that 30% to 60% of resources 
allocated to the business fund and depreciation, which are the 
principle components of enterprise gross savings, are being used 
for repayment of investment credits. Therefore, enterprise 
savings remaining available for undertaking investment, after 
loans have been repaid, are substantially lover than the figures 
reported, and consequently, also their self-financing ratio.
2)For this reason it is necessary to consider a more reli­
able method: investment in fixed assets by source of finance, as
123provided by the SZS (see Table A12). The share of en­
terprises in total sources for financing fixed investment 
increased substantially immediately after 1965, which was
124precisely one of the intensions of the reform. It remained 
relatively constant at the level of around or over 50% until the 
1980s, when restrictive policies and greater emphasis on en­
terprise self-financing increased enterprises' share, by 1985, 
to 66% (see Graph 2).
123. Data using this method is reported by the OECD in its 
Economic Surveys on Yugoslavia? Schrenk et al. (1979, p. 336-7)? 
Horvat (1976, p. 222).
124. Enterprises self-financing ratio was only 28% in 1965. The 
substantial increase in self-financing after 1965 was in part 
the direct consequence of the reduction of fiscal burden on 
firms after 1965.
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Graph 2. 
INVESTMENT IN FIXED ASSETS IN YUGOSLAVIA. BY SOURCE OF FINANCE 
1967-1984 
(as X of total)
67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84
Source: Table A12, Appendix A.
It is also of interest to analyse available enterprise data 
on the proportion of self-financed investment. In the period
1975-79, for the sample of firms investigated by Prasnikar, 
enterprises' own sources in the financing of investment osci- 
lated fro« a minimum of 31.181 in 1977, to a maximum of 42.70% 
in 1979 (see Table A13). These figures are, therefore, lower 
than the ratios presented earlier. However, if in Prasnikar's 
table, credits from domestic suppliers are considered as sources 
provided by other enterprises belonging to the productive sector 
of the economy, as they represent direct credits from other 
productive enterprises and therefore are a form of internal 
financing (as opposed to financing through bank credit),
Prasnikar's self-financing ratios are higher# and approach the 
self-finaneing ratio of over 40% in the late 1970s presented 
earlier.
Prasnikar's questionnaire data offers additional evidence 
on a self-financing ratio of around 50%. More than half of 
interviewed workers expressed the view that the portion of 
enterprise savings respect to bank loans for financing invest­
ment, were about equal. In addition, although 65% of workers did 
express a preference for borrowed funds# 35% actually preferred 
ora sources for financing investment (see Table A10).
Finally# it nas been argued that the observed positive 
level of self-financed investment is not a refutation of the 
theory since no distinction has been made between self-financed 
net and self-financed gross investment (Stephen# 1984). Stephen 
suggests that self-financed investment in Yugoslav firms has 
been roughly equal to their depreciation allowances, and hence, 
that self-financed net investment# or the part of investment 
being self-financed by enterprises on a voluntary basis# has 
been close to zero. He*tests the hypothesis empirically by using 
sectoral data from the 19 industries in the Yugoslav mining and 
manufacturing sector in the years 1969# 1970# and 1971# and
125concludes that the hypothesis cannot reasonably be rejected.
Evidence on the use of gross savings of Yugoslav en­
terprises indirectly supports Stephen's hypothesis. Around 33%
125. Stephen (1984)# pp. 125-126.
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to 59% of resources allocated to the business fund and deprecia­
tion, which are the principal internal sources of enterprises 
for financing gross investment, have actually been used for 
repaying investment credits in the post-1965 period (see Table 
A 8 ). In 14 out of 19 years following the reform, resources 
allocated to the business fund were not sufficient for repaying 
loans, but a part of resources allocated to depreciation had to 
be used. Therefore, enterprises' own resources available for net 
investment, remaining after loans have been repaid and 
obligatory depreciation covered, may not have been very high. In 
other words, net investment, i.e. investment other than replace­
ment of worn-out capacity, probably had to, in most years, be 
financed externally.
On the other hand, a different picture emerges if we con­
front productive enterprises' depreciation allowances, with 
total payments for investment in fixed assets financed by en­
terprises (see Table A14). The difference should represent the 
part of investment which is self-financed by Yugoslav firms, yet 
is not directly imposed on firms as in the case of legal
126depreciation. This part of self-financed investment exceeding 
depreciation has been 26.9%, 31.6%, and 32% of gross investment 
in the three years considered. Therefore, enterprise own sources
'126. This part of self-financed investment need not represent 
actual net investment, because depreciation may not correspond 
to actual replacement of productive capacity, but this component 
of enterprise self-financed investment exceeding depreciation is 
fully in line with what Stephen considers "net investment".
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for financing investment# other than the ones used for deprecia­
tion which is imposed on firms, have been well above zero.
In addition# if we look at figures on investment in new 
capacity and enlargement, as opposed to capital maintenance (see
Table A 1 5 ) , * ^  investment in new capacity and enlargement has 
accounted, in the three years considered by Stephen, for over 
80% of total investment in fixed assets. Recalling that in 1969- 
71, around 51% of fixed investment was financed by enterprises, 
it would seem that at least a part of these resources provided 
by enterprises had to be used for investment in new capacity and 
enlargement, and not exclusively for capital maintenance. In 
other words, the reported levels of investment in new capacity 
and enlargement seem rather high to offer support to Stephen's 
hypothesis.
Therefore, our evidence differs from that presented by 
Stephen, and leaves room to believe that a part of investment in 
Yugoslavia is self-financed on a voluntary basis (although it is 
not possible to determine the exact proportion).
A similar conclusion can be drawn by examining calculations 
provided by Schrenk et al. (1979, p. 153), where figures on 
depreciation and net investment of productive enterprises in
127. According to the definition provided by the SZS, 
maintenance refers to the replacement of capital, whereas 
enlargement includes enlargement, reconstruction and 
modernisation, referring to changes in assortment, technology, 
and technique of production, rearrangement of equipment and 
purchase of new fixed assets within existing working units.
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Yugoslavia are reported. The shares of net investment in 
total gross investment have been 69.9% and 68.1% respectively in 
the two 5-year periods following the 1965 reform, and consider­
ing that trie self-financing ratios for these subperiods as 
provided by Schrenk et al., were 66.8% and 63.8% respectively, 
we can get approximative figures for net investment financed by 
enterprise sources of 46.7% in 1966-70 and 43.4% in 1971-75.
In conclusion, it seems that theoretical hypotheses on the 
financing of investment of a LMF are also not fully supported by 
empirical evidence from Yugoslavia. Furubotn and Pejovich's 
prediction that the availability of external sources of finance 
will drive savings and self-financed investment of LMFs to zero, 
runs counter to the observed relatively high level of self- 
financing of Yugoslav firms in the entire period under 
examination (even if not all of it is done on an entirely volun­
tary basis). Stephen's hypothesis, that self-financed net 
investment of Yugoslav LMFs has been close to zero, runs counter 
to our calculations, which suggest that self-financed net in­
vestment (and hence voluntary self-finance) of Yugoslav firms 
has been positive.
Nevertheless# there are several problems which render it 
difficult to definitely assess the validity of these hypotheses.
128
128. Depreciation of productive sectors was 49.6 billion dinars
*in 1966-70, as compared with net investment in both fixed assets 
and inventories, of 115.3 billion dinars. In 1971-75, 
depreciation amounted to 156.7 billion dinars, as compared with 
net investment in fixed assets and inventories of 334.9 billion 
dinars.
The first and most serious problem is that it is not possible to 
determine which part of investment is actually self-financed on 
a fully voluntary basis in Yugoslavia. This is because external 
(state) influence on the investment sphere, in the period 
proceeding the 1980s# included a minimum savings requirement 
imposed through social compacts, legal depreciation, and the 
obligation of firms to contribute a certain percentage of own 
savings in order to obtain bank credits; while in the 1980s, 
in addition to m e  above, direct administrative measures which 
have severely interfered with enterprise autonomy.
The second problem is that Furubotn and Pejovich's 
hypothesis applies to an extreme hypothethical case: that bank
credit will exclusively be used if available. In practice, 
however# Yugoslav firms have relied on both own and external 
sources for financing investment. Among other things, because of 
the mentioned requirement to participate with own sources when 
applying for credit, and because external sources of finance 
have obviously# not been available in unlimited amounts. Hence 
it is not possible to determine whether bank credits would be 
used exclusively if provided in sufficient amounts, nor the 
consequences of such full reliance on external finance.
The third problem relates to specific features of Yugoslav 
banking policies# and primarily very low interest rates on 
loans. It may be that such policies, rather than the structure 
of property rights# have significantly stimulated bank financing 
of investment (and investment itself). The reliance on external
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sources of finance cannot, therefore, unambiguously be inter­
preted as evidence supporting theoretical predictions on the 
lack of incentives to self-finance investment from retained 
earnings in socially-owned firms.
The fourth problem is that banks in Yugoslavia are specific 
institutions, "service" agencies of enterprises operating under
129their direct control. Banks' funds are provided by the found­
ing enterprises, and all bank profits are distributed among
enterprises-members. This implies that it is difficult to make a
net distinction, under existing Yugoslav arrangements, between 
H internal * and "external" sources of finance.
Finally, why should self-financing necessarily be good, and 
external financing bad, or vice versa? Can a ratios of around
50% be considered high or low? Which is the margin of self-
financing that can be considered "acceptable"? Is the 
traditional theory of the cost of capital, which holds that an 
increase in the debt-equity ratio is not beneficial for the 
firm, applicable to Yugoslav conditions? It is worth noting that 
the self-financing ratio of firms in different capitalist
129. The concept of banks as "service" agencies of enterprises 
fhas been abandoned only recently. The new law on banking adopted 
in 1985 envisages their transformation into profit-making 
institutions, whereas the latest proposal envisages the setting 
up of banks as shareholding institutions (see Kkonoaska Politika 
no. 1908, Oct. 24, 1988).
127
economies varies considerably across c o u n t r i e s , a n d  hence 
there are no universally acceptable prescriptions on the Mideal" 
debt-equity ratio*
2. 4 .Concluding remarks
Throughout the foregoing analysis of the savings and in­
vestment performance of Yugoslav firms, different problems have 
been emphasized. These included insufficient statistical infor­
mation and lack of disaggregated data; official regulations 
which limit enterprise autonomy, which does not permit us to 
determine the part of voluntary savings and self-finance? alter­
native methods of calculation, different concepts and hence 
different interpretations of observed trends. These problems 
render it difficult to definitely refute the theory.
However, neither does the evidence presented fully support 
the theory. On the contrary, our analysis has led us to conclude 
that predictions from conventional theory on the investment 
behaviour of a LMF are not, in general, supported by empirical 
evidence from Yugoslavia. In Chapter 3, an attempt is made to 
determine why this is so.
130. E . g .t British firms tend to rely heavily on retained 
earnings for financing investment (often approaching 100%), 
whereas Italian firms had a self-financing ratio of only 19% in 
1975, and 21% in 1983? see OECD, Economic Surveys - Italy, 1975, 
p. 14.
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Chapter 3. DIVERGENCE OF LMF INVESTMENT THEORY AND YUGOSLAV 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE - AN INTERPRETATION
An interpretation of why theoretical hypotheses cn the 
investment behaviour of a LMF are not supported by empirical 
evidence from Yugoslavia will now be proposed. Furubotn and 
Pejovich's theory is first reconsidered# in order to determine 
to what extent its assumptions are appropriate for explaining 
Yugoslav reality. An alternative approach will then be used 
based primarily on J. Kornai's theory of the socialist firm# and 
evidence from Yugoslavia supporting the theory is presented. 
Finally# the two theories are tested# using regression analysis# 
on Yugoslav data.
3.1.Applicability of Furubotn and Pejovich's theory to 
Yugoslavia
Some observers are surprised by the fact that Yugoslav 
empirical evidence does not support theoretical hypotheses on
self-financing of a LMF.13^ However# this is not at all surpris­
ing, considering specific characteristics of the Yugoslav 
economic system. On the one hand# our previous analysis has led 
us to conclude that due to existing regulations in
* 131. Tyson (1977). Nevertheless# in later articles# Tyson does 
stress the similarity between the Yugoslav and Hungarian 
experience in investment allocation (1983)# and in macroeconomic 
adjustments to external shocks (Salassa and Tyson# 1985)# and 
hence approaches our view.
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Yugoslavia, a part of savings used for investment purposes is 
not an entirely voluntary component of enterprise savings# and 
hence it is normal to expect positive self-finance of Yugoslav 
firms. On the other hand, other specific features of the 
Yugoslav economic system which will be discussed below, have 
strongly stimulated investment in capital stock in Yugoslavia.
In view of these institutional characteristics, it will be 
argued (and shown) that the principal determinants of the in­
vestment decision proposed by Furubotn and Pejovich, are 
variables which do not quite adequately reflect Yugoslav 
reality. According to the theory, investment in savings 
deposits, and in firm's capital stock, is expected to primarily 
depend on the interest rate, the lending rate, the marginal 
productivity of capital, and the time horizon of the repre-
. . 133sentative worker.
Table B1 in Appendix B(a) contains data on the above vari­
ables in Yugoslavia during the 1966-85 period. Since inflation 
has characterised the Yugoslav economy in the period under 
examination, interest rates on savings deposits and on bank 
loans have been deflated, the first by the cost of living index, 
and tbm second by the industrial producers' prices index, in
V
o r d « r t o  obtain figures on returns on savings deposits and the
132
132. Primarily the requirement to contribute a portion of own 
resources in order to obtain bank credits; obligatory 
depreciation; and the minimum savings requirement set by social 
compacts.
133. Furubotn and Pejovich (1973), p. 281.
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cost of borrowed funds in real terms. As to capital returns,
three sets of figures are presented: l)the pre-tax profit
135rate, as it is the category which is most likely to ap­
proximate marginal productivity of capital? 2)the post-tax
profit rate,*^6 as it has the advantage of excluding taxes and
contributions, as well as different other obligations (including
137interest payments as a separate item)? and realized returns 
on 100 dinars of utilized assets, as the official indicator
provided by the SDK. Finally, the time horizon variable is
approximated through figures on labour turnover in the Yugoslav 
economy.
Several observations follow from data in Table B1 concern­
ing interest rates, profits, and labour turnover. There was 
practically no position interest rate policy in Yugoslavia at 
least until 1982, as rates were fixed for a long number of
134
134. Using a different deflator may not seem justified, but for 
the moment it has been used only in order to show the effective 
losses and gains of the two sectors. In the econometric tests 
which follow, one single price deflator has been used.
135. Pre-tax profit rate * [(Gross revenue - material costs 
net personal incomes - depreciation ) / h i s t o n c a l  value of 
capital] x 100, referred to in Table B1 as Profit rate I.
136. The post-tax profit rate s [(depreciation «■ allocation to 
, funds)/historical value of capital)] x 100, referred to in Table
B1 as Profit rate II.
137. Nevertheless, since we have seen that loans are often also 
repaid from the business fund, it is not clear whether all 
interest payments are effectively included in the deducted 
item of "interest payments11.
years. T..e presence of inflation has meant that real returns 
from investment in savings deposits have been negative almost 
tnrougnout the whole period (except in 1967, I960 and 1994).
Inf.a-ion nas also significantly reduced the real cost of bor­
rowed funds, which has also more often been negative than 
positive (except in 1967-69, 1972, 1976-78, and 1983-34), imply­
ing that enterprises have often been paying a negative orice on 
borrowed capital (see Graph 1).
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Sraph 1 
Real interest rates in Yugoslavia 
1966-1984
— Households 
”  Firms
Sources Table Bl, Appendix 3(a).
An important implication of such an interest rate policy is 
that a specific form of redistribution, from the households to
138. The inadequacy of the interest rate policy conducted in the 
past is presently one of the most widely discussed issues in 
Yugoslavia; see, e.g.# Ekonomski Institut Pravne fakultete 
(1985).
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the enterprise sector# has been taking place in Yugoslavia (see 
Graph 2).
Graph 2
Distributional effects of interest rates in Yugoslavia
Households’ gains from savings deposits 
1966-1964
-10  -
66 67 66 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 76 79 00 81 62 83 84
Firms’ gains from bank loans 
1966-1984
66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 73 76 77 78 79 80 81 02 83 84 
Sou r c e : Table Bl, Appendix B(a).
Whereas negative interest rates on savings deposits repre­
sent a loss for households, negative interest rates on loans, on
133
the contrary, represent a gain for enterprises. To capture the 
distributional effects of interest rates on the two sectors, in 
Graph 2 the two real interest rates are presented in terms of 
gains (losses) of the two sectors. The Graph clearly 
demonstrates that in most of the years following 1965, due to 
inflation, enterprises have been "subsidized*, through the 
banking mechanism, by savings of households. Although in 1984, a 
positive real interest rate has been achieved, for a brief 
period, on both the lending and the borrowing rate, in 1985 both 
interest rates again turned negative.
It is very probable that this was indeed an intentional 
policy. Interest rates on savings deposits have until very 
recently always been kept low because of ideological reasons, 
since rental income has been considered appropriation not ac­
cording to work performed, but on the basis of ^exploitation". 
The above data shows that it was indeed the enterprise sector 
t.*.at was "exploiting" the households sector, and not vice versa.
The foregoing analysis of interest rates suggests a 
privileged position of the productive sector vis-a- 
vis households in Yugoslavia, which is important to stress as it 
may be one of the factors which have favoured investment in non- 
cwned assets in Yugoslavia, respect to investment in owned 
assets*
The essential point for the investment decision, however, 
is the gap between the borrowing rate and the rate of return, 
whether in monetary or real terms. Analysing capital returns, if 
we consider the pre-tax profit rate, or average returns on
134
capital as calculated by the SDK, these have indeed been higner 
than the nominal interest rate on bank loans during the entire 
1966-82 period. It is only in 1983-85# due to the substantial 
increase in nominal interest rates» that the relationship has 
been reversed. However« even if the post-tax profit rate is 
considered, which is the lowest among the three sets of figures 
presented in Table Bl, this profit rate was higher than the 
nominal interest rate on loans in the larger part of the period
139under examination (except in 1976, 1978-79, and 1982-85).
Additional evidence based on more precise data are avail­
able, although in real terms and for a shorter period of time 
(1965-75). According to prevailing estimates, the real rate of 
return on enterprise investment in Yugoslavia has been somewhere 
from 9% to 12% during the 10-year period following the 1965
140reform. When compared with the real rate of interest paid on 
bank loans in the same period, which has more often been nega­
tive than positive, the gap between the borrowing rate and the 
rate of return in real terms is likely to have often favoured 
investment in non-owned assets.
Finally, labour turnover in Yugoslavia has been low. After 
an initial increasing trend due to the opening of Yugoslav 
borders and the outflow of workers to Western Europe in the late
, 139. However, since our profit rates, as already mentioned, are 
not calculated in an entirely satisfactory way, the presented 
calculations and comparisons remain approximative.
140. Miovic (1975), Vanek and Jovicic (1975), as reported by 
Tyson (1977).
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1960s, labour turnover stabilized at a level of around 1% and 
has been relatively constant thereafter. Low mobility of labour 
in Yugoslavia has been supported by existing legislation which 
ensures a high level of job security. However, it has also been 
conditioned by specific historical, cultural and national fac-
141tors that have set regional barriers to labour mobility.
Data based on managers' and workers' answers in Prasnikar's 
sample of 147 Yugoslav firms suggests that labour force mobility 
in Yugoslavia is indeed low (Prasnikar, 1983). In 96% of cases, 
managers did not consider firing workers because of bad business 
results, and 58% of managers regarded workers' fluctuation 
occurs rarely. Around 65% of workers didn't think of searching 
employment in another firm; around 40% of workers had been 
employed in the same firm for 6-15 years, and another 29% over 
15 years; and the level of workers' commitment seems quite high 
(80% of workers considered their firm a relatively good firm) 
(see Table B2).
Immobile labour implies the extension of the time horizon, 
and hence it is very probable that the average Yugoslav worker 
actually adopts a fairly long time horizon. With the prolonging 
of the time horizon, the difference between investment in owned 
and non-owned assets diminishes substantially: e.g., for a 20
141. Since the principal similarities between Yugoslavia and 
other socialist countries will be analysed later, it is to be 
noted that in this respect (low mobility of labour) the Yugoslav 
experience contrasts with that of several other socialist 
countries.
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year time horizon# an 3% return from non-owned assets is re­
quired to make the worker as well off as with a 5% return from 
owned assets. Since the Yugoslav worker in most years could not 
have even received a positive real interest on savings deposits, 
and investment opportunities yielding above 8% in real terms, as 
reported earlier, do seem to have existed, investment from 
retained earnings in Yugoslavia could have been not only an 
acceptable, but even the more profitable alternative respect to
142investment m  owned assets.
The foregoing analysis suggests that the assumptions on 
which Furubotn and Pejovich's theory is based on are not quite 
appropriate for explaining the investment behaviour of the 
Yugoslav-type L M F . The authors put all emphasis on one institu­
tional characteristic of the Yugoslav economic system - limited 
property rights - but disregard all other features, among which 
quite a few seem to have favoured investment in non-owned assets 
respect to own assets (low mobility of labour, severe capital 
market distortions, etc.). This can lead us to conclude that 
Furubotn and Pejovich's theory does not seem fully applicable to 
Yugoslavia.
142. Other factors of minor importance have favoured investment 
in non-owned assets relative to owned assets in Yugoslavia: 
fiscal policies that tax personal incomes on a progressive 
basis, relatively more than f i r m s 1 profits, and limited 
possibilities (until recently) of private investment.
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3.2.An alternative approach: Kornai's soft-budget constraint
Workers in Yugoslav firms have been investing in capital 
stock, in spite of trie nonrecoverability of the principal of an 
investment. How does one explain such behaviour? Some of the 
elements that may have favoured investment in capital assets in 
Yugoslavia have already been discussed. We will now turn to 
systemic features of socialist economies, since besides being a 
self-managed and a market economy, Yugoslavia is also (and 
perhaps foremost) a socialist economy. Our principal hypothesis 
is that in the field of investment, it is the socialist features 
of the economy that dominate. As a result, the investment 
process in Yugoslavia resembles much more that in other 
socialist countries than any market-based process in capitalist 
economies. In ranking what the investment process in Yugoslavia 
is, and has been during most of the period following the 1965 
reform, we would first, characterise it as socialist 
(regulated); second, self-managed; and last, a market process.
Let us begin with the main features that apparently distin­
guish Yugoslavia from most of the other countries of the 
socialist world, that have emerged primarily from the develop­
ment of self-management over the last 35 years. Following the 
1965 economic reform, the investment process has been exten­
sively decentralised# as individual firms and banks were to 
become the principal agents of investment decisions. The 
autonomy of firms in profit disposal has increased significantly 
through the reduction of fiscal burdens, and firms are in 
principle free to choose their own investment projects, as well
138
as the proportion of profits to be allocated to investment. The 
sources for financing investment are no longer provided by the 
central federal fund, but by banks and enterprises* savings. 
Finally, the banking mechanism has sustained significant 
changes, as a diversified structure of decentralised all-purpose 
banks, which are founded by enterprises, has replaced the system 
of sectoral banks at the federal level existing prior to 1965.
However, in spite of these changes, the essence of the 
investment process has remained much the same. In order to show 
that in the field of investment, the Yugoslav enterprise has 
retained many features of the traditional socialist enterprise, 
parts of Kornai's (1980) theory on enterprise behaviour in a 
socialist economy will be used. Leaving apart the question
143whether K o r n a i ’s theory is generally acceptable, in the 
absence of an alternative# more appropriate# theoretical 
framework some parts of his theory and concepts he uses can help 
in understanding Yugoslav practice in the field of investment 
decision-making. It is also worth noting that although Kornai
143. It is not our intention to offer an extensive evaluation of 
Kornai's theory# as this would require a separate research, much 
beyond the scope and interest of our present analysis. Some 
parts of Kornai's theory which could be questioned# particularly 
in reference to Yugoslavia# include the notion of 
shortage; his perception of price policy of socialist 
enterprises# as the Yugoslav experience is quite different; his 
hypothesis on interest rate policy as not being an effective 
regulator of total investment demand in a socialist country# as 
the recent change in Yugoslav policies seems to point to the 
contrary; or his emphasis on redistribution of profits# which is 
probably less present in Yugoslavia than in other socialist 
countries.
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initially (1980) develops his theory for CM2A countries 
(primarily for Hungary), he extends the theory to other coun­
tries (1986) suggesting that the theory is also applicable to 
Yugoslavia.
The Yugoslav economy has been characterised by exactly the 
same basic systemic features as those in other socialist 
economies: by expansion drive, or the strive for high growth 
rates (Kornai, 1980; Bauer, 1985). According to Kornai (1980), 
in a socialist economy it is expansion drive that explains
144investment hunger. Expansion drive, present at all levels, is 
a form of behaviour preconditioned by social relations, which 
however became rooted so deeply in the thinking and acting 
routine of leaders in the socialist economy that it has become a 
"natural instinct1*. Consequently, no firm is found that should
145not want to invest and investment hunger is permanent.
This "natural instinct", in our view, is still very much 
present in the Yugoslav economy (although the term is perhaps 
not quite appopriate, as it is only a disguised term for strong 
state influence). Yugoslavs have for generations been educated 
in the spirit of the sacredness of growth objectives. Such an 
attitude, while initially imposed on firms through precise norms 
to be fulfilled, today is a part of the socialist morale, and
144. Kornai also discusses other causes of investment hunger, 
which we do not accept as fully applicable to Yugoslavia, 
including the awareness of shortage (1980, p. 334).
145. Kornai (1980), pp. 191-4, 317-21.
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hence continues to be transmitted to firms, although often in an 
informal and indirect way.
Expansion drive has remained a characteristic feature of
the Yugoslav economy until the 19 8 0 s , while the recent drastic 
reduction in investment spending only supports another of 
Kornai*s hypothesis: that the upward swing of investment growth 
will last as long as the process does not hit one of the
"tolerance limits". According to Kornai# one of these limits is
the balance of payments situation, and if drastic intervention
is necessary# the most obvious field will be investment.*4**
What has enabled such an overinvestment drive in
Yugoslavia# as in other socialist countries# is the absence of a 
"hard" budget constraint. While all the necessary conditions for 
the presence of the "soft" budget constraint listed by Kornai 
are more or less present in the Yugoslav firm# what is of major 
importance is the consequence of such a "soft** budget con­
straint# which is fully applicable to Yugoslavia: no risk
bearing by the individual firm# its protection from bankruptcy# 
and hence# due to the absence of financial failure# no voluntary
147constraint on investment hunger. Although deficits arising 
from inefficient investment are no longer covered directly by
146. Kornai (1980)# pp. 211-214.
147. As noted by Nuti when discussing the reasons for the 
accumulation bias of the Soviet-type economy# "both at the macro 
and the micro level the same urge to accumulate typical of the 
capitalist system is present# but without the checks and 
constraints of the capitalist system (such as stock market 
valuation# takeover bids# bankruptcy discipline# and so o n ) M (in 
D. Lane# 1985# p. 115). See also Tyson (1983).
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the federal budget, but indirectly, through the banking 
mechanism (loans at favourable terms, rescheduling of debt), by 
reserve funds of other enterprises or reserves of the commune, 
by a lowering or abolishment of fiscal burdens, they are still, 
in most cases, covered by (or shared with) other agents, and not
148primarily by the individual firm. The Yugoslav enterprise 
does bear risk, but more frequently for investment decisions of 
other enteprises, than its own.
From an ambitious investment project, under present cir­
cumstances, a Yugoslav enterprise has nothing to lose. On the 
contrary, it expects substantial gains, not only material: 
praise from Iccal authorities if such projects open new work 
places, or increase the living standard of the local community. 
If resources are not sufficient to terminate the project, addi­
tional resources will be required, the larger the project, the 
more important it may seem to bank officials, and the larger the 
firm, the more likely it is to get additional finance (because 
of the influence of enterprises-founders on banks). If the 
project is a failure# however, losses are socialized.
Furthermore# although the "allocator" of resources in 
Yugoslavia (to use Rornai's expression) is no longer the state, 
but banks# capital continues to be rationed, predominantly 
according to non-market criteria (see belowi. The level of 
political influence in no longer the one of federal ministries,
148. On the socialization of losses in Yugoslavia# see Knight
(1984)? OECD Econoaic Survey - Yugoslavia# 1987/88.
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but that of local communes. The channels of state influence are 
no longer necessarily direct, through plan norms to be ful­
filled, but indirect, through policy guidelines or as informal 
as simple advice, usually via commune representatives in the 
boards of banks, or their influence on terms set in social
 ^ 149compacts.
Therefore, the behaviour and motivation of firms has net 
changed much regarding investment, in spite of all undertaken 
reforms. Workers of the Yugoslav LMF are today more interested 
in increasing profits, and are in principle free to determine
150their investment levels, but this fact does not determine in 
itself their behaviour. To use Kornai's words, "the main ques­
tion - ... - is not the actual form of incentive, but the rules 
for the survival and growth of the firm, and, linked to these 
phenomena, the relation between firm and state" (1980, p. 319). 
In fact, it is precisely the enterprise-state relationship that 
has remained almost intact in Yugoslavia, in spite of the 
development of self-management. The investment process has 
remained "soft", as extensive decentralisation has not yet meant 
the transfer of responsibility and risk-bearing for undertaken
151investment to the individual enterprise. The enterprise
149. As already mentioned, social compacts, introduced by the 
1974 economic reform, are agreements concluded by state 
representatives and enterprises on prices, income distribution, 
employment policy, etc.
150. Indeed, every investment project to be undertaken needs to 
be approved by each individual worker.
151. Similar conclusions are drawn by Tyson (1983).
continues, in most cases, to be protected from financial 
failure, while the price being paid for such protection is 
limited freedom and persistent government intervention,
Tyson*s analysis has led to similar conclusions: although
the economic reforms in Yugoslavia have continuously been 
modifying decision-making authority of other agents, they have 
not affected the effective discretion of enterprises (1983, p. 
301), while Burkitt (1983) found that every administrative 
instrument used in the period before 1965 in the field of in­
vestment policy, was also occasionally used in the post-reform 
period.
There are different channels of state influence and regula­
tion in Yugoslavia (not to use the word planning, as planning in 
the traditional sense of the word has lost much of its meaning). 
Some of the existing mechanisms of economic regulation are 
specific to self-management (e.g. social compacts as agreements 
reached through a bargaining process between different agents). 
Others resemble state intervention practices in capitalist 
countries (economic policy of the federal government, such as 
e.g. monetary policy). Still others are similar to those in 
other socialist countries, such as various planning instruments 
(e.g. 5-year plans which define priority objectives and priority 
sectors of the period, or annual economic resolutions which set 
the annual targets). These elements of regulation are the main 
instruments for the transmission of social objectives and inter­
ests to the individual enterprise.
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However# in addition to the above instruments of macro- 
economic regulation, which are in one form or another necessary, 
and hence present in most existing economies# the Yugoslav 
government has retained the right to intervene# in case of 
necessity, with ad hoc administrative measures in practically 
ail daily policy issues of the enterprise. In recent years/ 
under the pressure of the severe economic crisis# frequent 
government intervention of this type has included direct limits 
on increases in personal incomes and price freezes# as well as 
various indirect measures (e.g. ceilings on bank credits for 
investment purposes). It is primarily this type of administra­
tive state intervention in an enterprise’s daily economic policy 
that is today being critisized in Yugoslavia, and that the
present reform is trying to eliminate.
3.3.Kornai's theory; evidence from Yugoslavia
We will consider some of Rornai's principal hypotheses on 
the investment behaviour of the socialist enterprise, primarily
the ones that do seem relevant also for the Yugoslav economy.^53
152. Whereas the first group of instruments of regulation are of 
a more "permanent" type# as they are known in advance and hence 
an enterprise has the possibility of planning its activity in 
accordance with them# the second type of ad hoc intervention is 
administratively imposed from one day to another and hence quite 
unpredictable# not leaving much room for autonomous decisions to 
the individual enterprise.
153. Although we use Kornai' work to illustrate the principal 
characteristics of the investment process in Yugoslavia# the 
hypotheses that will be discussed have also been stressed 
by different other authors# including Tyson (1983)# World Bank 
(1983)# Knight (1984)# Nuti (1985)# OECD Economic Survey - 
Yugoslavia# 1987/88.
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These hypotheses are summarized below, and evidence from 
Yugoslavia supporting them is presented.
l ) *'Soft" budget constraint. Demand for investment is not 
limited by fear of loss or failure. Repayment of money received 
for investment purposes can never cause much worry. A possible 
financial loss is compensated by different means. The budget
constraint of expenditures earmarked for an investment action is
soft (Kornai# 1979, p. 531).
Evidence frcm Yugoslavia offers support that the budget 
constraint of the Yugoslav firm is indeed "soft". Twc types of
data are presented: on the number of liquidated firms, and on
the socialization of losses (see Table B3 and B4, in Appendix 
B(a)). Table B3 shows that 262 enterprises were liquidated in
1976-78, 442 in 1979-80, 345 in 1981-82 and 283 in 1983-84.154
This is indeed considerable in comparison with the practice in 
other socialist countries, but the number of liquidated en­
terprises is still small relative to total organization changes/ 
and to the number of enterprises ceasing to exist (see Graph 3).
154. However, it is possible that these figures do not really 
refer to enterprises that have gone bankrupt. The OECD (Economic 
Survey - Yugoslavia# 1987/88# p. 37) suggests a much smaller 
number of bankrupt enterprises for the 1983-84 period (around 10 
and 22 in the two years respectively)# than the SZS figures on 
liquidated firms reported here. Since both sources are based on 
official Yugoslav statistics# either OECD data contain an error 
(since the number of bankrupt firms is given only in graphic 
form and hence there may be a printing mistake in the scale 
presented)# or the difference arises from a different definition 
of "bankruptcy* respect to "liquidation" (although the two terms 
suggest the same thing).
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In the 1976-84 period, liquidated enterprises represented be­
tween 1.9% and 5.7% of total organizational changes. Of major 
interest, however, is that liquidated enterprises represented 
only 9.6%, 22.2%, 20.7% and 14% in the four two-year periods
respectively, of all enterprises that have ceased to exist. A 
more frequent way of closing down an enterprise is to merge or 
affiliate it to another enterprise (50% to 60%).
Graph 3
Liquidated «ntarprises in Yugoslavia
1976-1984
25
1976-78 1979-80 1901-82 1983-84
Source: Table B3, Appendix B(a).
The ratio of liquidated firms to total exit of firms sug­
gests that the budget constraint seems to have somewhat 
"hardened" in 1979-82 with respect to the previous period, but 
thereafter, in 1983-84 it was again "softened", in spite of the 
fact that it is precisely in 1983 that the legislation on
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bankruptcy had been changed in order to impose more severe
conditions on firms operating with losses.^“55
Nevertheless, the very recent developments suggest that 
such permissive policies are finally being abandoned. With the 
new law on rehabilitation and liquidation adopted in December 
1986, which applies stricter criteria for defining losses, 
introduces major controls, and substantially shortens the period 
of rehabilitation of loss-making enterprises, it seems that the 
budget contraint of Yugoslav firms has been significantly 
"hardened". Compared to previous years, when bankruptcies af­
fected only a small number of workers (2000 on average, between 
1982 and 1986), in 1987, as a consequence of the doubling of the 
number of bankrupt firms in 1987 respect to 1986, some 16 000 
workers were laid off (OECD Economic Surveys - Yugoslavia, 
1987/88, p. 38).
As to the socialisation of losses, Table B4 shows that 80% 
to 95% of enterprise losses in the 1980-87 period has been 
covered through different means, using resources of other en­
terprises, socio-political communities, and banks. The largest 
part of losses is being covered through rehabilitation credit, 
but a substantial amount through non-reimbursable funds, as well 
as the writing off of claims (see Graph 4). These data, like the 
previous# also suggest that instead of "hardening", the budget
155. The Law on rehabilitation and liquidation of organisations 
of associated labour of July 1980, has been ammended twice in 
1983.
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constraint seems to have become even "softer" during the 1980s: 
rehabilitation credits, through which over 80% of total losses 
were covered in 1980# declined to 50% by 1987# whereas non­
reimbursable funds increased from 15% in 1980 to 31% in 1987.
Graph 4
Cover ago of losses in Yugoslavia 
1960-1967
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 I98S 1986 1987
So u r c e : Table B4, Appendix B(a).
2 )Cost overruns and overdues. In a socialist economy
claimants underestimate expected costs# since chances of accept­
ance (when applying for funds) are greater if costs are
relatively small. Approval must be obtained for starting the
investment; once started# it will also end in some way and at
156some time (Kornai# 1980# p. 326).
Table B5 provides data on time overdues and cost overuns in 
a sample of 125 investment projects in industry and agriculture#
156. On the underestimation of cost of investment projects in 
Yugoslavia# see also Tyson (1983).
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all on the territory of Serbia# undertaken in the 1979-82 period 
through the Associated Belgrade Bank (Celenkovic et ai, 
1984). The average delay in project completion# compared with 
planned time# was around 50%. Out of the 122 completed
p r o j e c t s # 82% surpassed the planned time of completion# only 
14% were terminated as planned and 4.1% were completed before 
time. The analysis of cost overruns shows that 37.5% of invest­
ment projects had surpassed the estimated planned cost# by 
around 50% of the planned value. As to the financing of cost 
overruns# enterprises investors participated with a relatively 
small amount (22% of total), whereas the bulk was financed 
through bank credit (over 50%).
Another empirical study# also undertaken by the Associated
158Belgrade Bank (Ostojlc et al, 1985) provides similar data,* 
analysing in addition the sectoral distribution of delays and 
cost overruns of investment projects. The study shows that 
projects undertaken in sectors which were considered priority 
sectors in the 1980-85 period, had higher time overdues and cost 
overruns respect to projects in non-priority sectors. Out of 
total loans for financing cost overruns, the by far largest part 
was assigned to projects in priority sectors (70% to 90% in
157. Out of 125 investment projects, 3 were still not completed 
at the time the study was finished, and hence they have been 
excluded.
158. The sample is quite representative, since it includes all 
projects undertaken through the Associated Belgrade Bank, which 
represented 23% to 25% of all investment projects undertaken in 
1982-84 on the whole territory of Yugoslavia.
1979-83). This suggests a high level of protection of priority 
sectors, and credit rationing in their favour.
3)Proliferation of interfirm credits. Another indirect 
symptom of the softness of the system of short-term financing of 
the socialist firm, is the proliferation of interfirm credits. 
In times of restrictive monetary policy, firms nelp themselves 
by mutually tolerating indebtedness towards each other, through 
the expansion of interfirm credit (Kornai, 1980, p. 915-916).
OraphS
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Source; Table B6, Appendix B(a).
Table B6 and Graph 5 . indeed show the dramatic increase in 
the issuing of promissory notes fro« 1977 onwards. In the 1977- 
84 period, promissory notes accounted for by far the largest
1 V t J
■ i .i —  i^ i
part of all securities# whereas the main issuers of all
159securities were# indeed# enterprises*
4)Non-market allocation of investment resources. Investment 
resources in a socialist economy are rationed, mainly according 
to nonprice criteria (Kornai# 1980# p. 420).
A good example for illustrating the small use of market 
criteria in Yugoslavia, and the inference of political struc­
tures (and considerations) into the microeconomic sphere# is the 
practice in investment project appraisal.
Prior to 1965# investors had to prepare investment projects 
according tc unified instructions provided by the social invest­
ment funds, whereas project appraisal was done by specialized 
agencies. After 1965# these functions were transferred to banks 
as one of the principal agents of investment policy# and banks 
were ’•free" to choose their own criteria for project selection.
This resulted in very heterogeneous banking practices in 
project selection# but economic criteria based on profitability
160of projects were seldom applied* The system of priority 
investments introduced after 1976 envisaged the setting aside of 
investment resources for priority sector development through
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159. Li. Tyson (1977a) provides similar data on interfirm 
credits# but in reference to earlier periods.
160. As noted by Tyson# "it is rare that any project is 
abandoned# because there are no accepted criteria to distinguish 
good from bad projects... the criteria used varied from project 
to project# region to region# and time to time" (Tyson# 1983# 
pp. 293# 301-2).
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social compacts# whereas the main instrument for its implementa­
tion were selective credits of the NBY for priority sectors. The 
selective credit mechanism# which gave priority access to fund­
ing (privileged discount rate) to priority sectors# meant that 
priority sector projects were not exposed to realistic pricing 
of capital# and were not subject to the same appraisals methods
. ... 161 as projects m  n o n p n o r i t y  sectors.
Hence# instead of highest yielding projects, the system 
encouraged investment primarily in priority sectors# irrespec­
tive of effective returns. Economic profitability of a project 
was usually subordinated to more general economic objectives. 
This is indeed confirmed by some of the existing methodologies
on project appraisal.
All of these methodologies have the same general features. 
They contain an excessive number of criteria that should simul­
taneously be respected# and hence it is not surprising that they 
were rarely used in practice. Besides including Nm i croM criteria 
on the market-financial efficiency of a project# based on stan­
dard criteria of project selection (net present value# internal 
rate of return, etc.)# these methodologies also include a number 
of other "macro4* criteria on the socio-economic efficiency of a
161. See World Bank (1983)# p. 286-287.
162. See methodologies of the Association of Yugoslav Banks
(Udruzenje banaka Jugoslavi je# 1981)# of the Associated Belgrade 
Bank (Lajsic# 1984)# of the Republican Institute for Social 
Planning of Serbia (Republicki zavod za drustveno 
planiranj e , 1984)# and of the Association of Belgrade Banks
(Udruzenje bankarskih o r g a n i z a d  ja Beograd# 1985).
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project, such as its effect on experts, foreign exchange, domes­
tic sources of energy, raw materials and equipment, employment, 
sources of financing, contribution to regional development, 
pollution, even the contribution of an investment project to 
"the association of labour and resources". Social cost-benefit 
considerations clearly dominate over profitability criteria. For 
example, the methodology of the Association of Belgrade Banks 
(Udruzenje bankarskih organizacija Beograd, 1985) contains a 
total of 21 criteria that should be respected, of which only the
first three refer to the economic profitability of an invest­
ment.
Since no adequate institutional mechanism existed to
encourage efficiency in investment selection (no uniform
methodology at the national level# mandatory evaluation of 
investment projects)# a social compact was concluded in December 
1985 between representatives of tne federal and republican
163Executive Councils. The compact envisages the elaboration of 
a uniform methodology on project appraisal# which will be in­
stitutionalized as obligatory through a self-management 
agreement on its application, to be signed by all Yugoslav 
banks. However# the compact also envisages that approval for 
projects should be obtained from the Federal Institute for 
Social Planning, which ought to give its opinion on whether the
163. Drustveni dogovor o davanju misljenja ..., 20 December
1985.
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project is consistent with the economic policy established by 
the social plan.
The unique methodology, completed by the middle of 1986, 
has been widely critisized for its excessive length (over 600 
pages) in spite of the fact that it fails to cover some impor­
tant aspects, its inconsistency (e.g. between the methodological 
part and the operative part), the duplication of prescriptions, 
etc. A revised version was ready by the middle of 1987 
(Bendekovic et al. 1987). This methodology does not differ much 
from the above described methodologies: it similarly includes 
both market (financial) criteria (internal rate of return, net 
present value# etc.), and a number of ’•socio-economic" criteria 
which evaluate a project's contribution to broader objectives of 
socio-economic development (savings, balance of payments, 
employment, foreign markets competitiveness, underutilization of 
resources, technology, etc.), among which even a criterion on a 
project's effect "on the economic and military-strategic inde­
pendence of the country". Besides the individual discount rate, 
a social discount rate, which takes into account the social 
preferences of the community, should also be applied.
The above analysis clearly illustrates how government 
authorities use extra-market processes to direct investment
activities of enterprises. Even in a decentralized economy
164. On this issue, see also Bergson (1967).
such as Yugoslavia, socialism directly imposes the supremacy of 
social, over individual interests.
3.4.Confrontinq the two theories; an econometric analysis
Furubotn and Pejcvich’s theory will now be confronted with 
Kornai's theory in order to evaluate, using econometric methods, 
which of the two alternative theories offers a better explana­
tion of the investment process in Yugoslavia. The two theories 
are first considered separately, by evaluating the role of the 
two alternative groups of variables proposed by each of the two 
theories as being crucial for explaining savings deposits, 
investment and self-financed investment. The two theories are 
then evaluated jointly, by applying the complete parameter 
encompassing procedure (unrestricted-restricted model).
3.4.1.Testing Furubotn and Pejovich's theory
The most explicit statement made by Furubotn and Pejovich 
on what determines the level of savings, investment and self- 
financed investment in a Yugoslav-type LMF is found in their
(1973) article (p. 281):165
165. The problem of how to quantify Furubotn and Pejovich's 
theory in a most appropriate way has raised many question, and 
has suggested a number of alternative approaches to the one that 
has finally been chosen. One way of proceeding could have been 
to construct a fairly complex model which includes a large 
number of explanatory variables, but not only were we limited by 
degrees of freedom, but this procedure was more subject to our 
own subjective evaluation which of the variables are the most 
important. The other way was to construct a simpler model, which 
however fully reflects the point of view of the authors, and try 
to improve it at a later stage. We have opted for the second 
method.
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"We find that (l)the shorter the collective's planning 
horizon, (2)the higher the rate So (interest paid on savings 
deposits - M. U . ), (3)the lower the rate i (cost of bank credit 
- M. U . ), and (4)the lower the marginal productivity of capital 
in the firm, the less attractive are non-owned assets in com­
parison with owned assets and the less likely is self-finance 
activity. *•
The theory therefore proposes that savings deposits, in­
vestment, and self-financed investment are determined by the 
planning horizon, interest rate on savings deposits, cost of 
bank credit, and capital returns, the first three variables 
being the dependent, and the last four being the explanatory 
variables.
In testing the theory on empirical evidence from 
Yugoslavia, aggregate data has been used for the above seven 
variables, represented as E (planning horizon), IR (interest 
rate on savings deposits), LR (interest rate on bank credit), PF 
(capital returns), SD (savings deposits), INV (investment), and 
SFI (self-financed investment) (see Appendix B(b)). All vari­
ables have been deflated, and hence are in real terms. The 
period being examined is 1966-84. Investment and self-financed 
investment data, however, refer to the 1967-84 period, since 
changes in the methodology of reporting statistics did not 
permit the inclusion of 1966.
The following procedure was applied. First, in order to get 
a first insight into the relationship between these seven vari­
ables, correlation coefficients have been calculated, and their
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significance tested. Second, a series of single regression 
equations have been estimated. Finally, two simultaneous equa­
tion models have been estimated.
3.4.1.1.Correlation
The correlation matrix between the seven variables reflect­
ing Furubotn and Pejovich's theory, for the 1967-84 period, is 
presented in Table 1.
Table 1. CORRELATION MATRIX - FURUBOTN AND PEJOVICH'S THEORY
SD INV SFI IR LR H PF
SD 1.000
INV 0.949 1.000
SFI 0.929 0.951 1.000
IR -0.337 -0.452 -0.461 1.000
LR -0.334 -0.459 -0.403 0.959 1.000
H 0.663 0.625 0.783 -0.425 -0.308 1.000
PF -0.178 -0.306 -0.359 -0.096 -0.147 -0.174 1.000
All correlation coefficients higher than 0.5 have been put 
in bold, in order to render the table more readable. The cor­
responding t values, which measure the significance of 
correlation coefficients, reveal that all of the above coeffi­
cients are statistically significant.
Quite surprisingly, there is higher correlation among 
variables considered dependent by the theory (SD, INV, SFI), 
than between each of these and the explanatory variables. The 
only variable that is highly correlated with SD, INV, and SFI is
166. Using the formula ta r where r is the correlation
V ( l - r V d f
coefficient, and df is the degree of freedom, the t test is 
applied to correlation coefficients (see Mayes and Mayes, 1976, 
pp. 84-86). All reported coefficients proved significant at 5% 
level, since obtained t-vaiues were higher than the critical t 
value (for 18 observations, two explanatory variables and hence 
16 degrees of freedom, t>2.120).
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the time horizon variaole (H).*67 The correlation coefficients 
between SD, INV, SFI and the other 3 variables, are generally 
low. As to the relationship among explanatory variables, only 
two seem highly correlated: the two interest rates.
3.4.1.2.The general model
Three single equations have first been estimated using OLS:
(D Savings deposits equation:
SD= b^IR * b^LR ♦ b 3H ♦ b4PF + b $ ♦ u (1.1)
1 C Q
b >0, b <0, b <0, b <0 1 2  3 4
IR : interest rate on savings deposits
LR : lending rate on credits to firms
H : a proxy for the time horizon
PF : profit rate
u : error term (see Appendix B(b))
(2)The investment equation:
INV= b.IR + b_LR ♦ b,H ♦ b,PF + b e + u (1.2.)
1 2 J 4 D
b l< 0 ' b2 >°' b 3>0, b 4>0 169
INV: investment in fixed assets (social sector). All other 
variables are same as in (1.1).
167. In the case of savings, however, the sign of the
coefficient is contrary to what is postulated by the theory.
168. The IR is expected to positively influence SD, whereas the
remaining three variables influence savings indirectly, through 
the investment decision. Thus the lower is the LR, the shorter 
is H, and the lower are PF, the less likely is SFI, and hence 
the more likely are SD.
169. The lower is the IR on SD, the less likely are SD and the
more likely is INV. The higher is the H and PF, the higher is
SFI likely to be, and hence also INV. As to LR, although the 
sign according to Furubotn and Pejovich’s statement ought to be 
positive (b2>0), its influence on INV is indeterminate as it 
will depend on the proportion between internal and external 
finance.
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(3)The self-financed investment equation:
SFI- b, IR +■ b2LR + b 3fl - b 4PF + b5 + u (1.3.)
b,< 0 9 b >0, b . > 0 / b >0 2 3 4
170
SFI : self-financed investment in fixed assets (social sector) 
All other variables are same as in (1.1) and (1.2).
Results:
OLS Period: 1966-84
Dep. variable: SD R 2 : 0.620 R 2 C : 0.511
Indep. variables Est. Coeff St. dev. t BC%
31 IR 1.644
32 LR -1.694 
B3 H 23.616 
34 PF -0.284 
B5 Constant -2288.496
1.100
1.034
5.136
0.432
505.614
1.49 33.0 
1.64 35.9 
4.60 27.3 
0.66 3.7 
4.53 0.0
St.error: 7.245 MAPS: 16.90 DW: 0.953 RHC(l): 0.52
OLS Period: 1967-94 (1.2.)
Dep. variable: INV R2: 0.601 R 2 C : 0.473
Indep. variables Est. Coeff. St. dev. t 3C%
B1 IR 4.008 
32 LR -4.824 
B3 H 50.015
34 PF -1.726
35 Constant -4806.978
2.840
2.569
17.609
1.080
1737.728
1.41 31.6 
1.88 40.2 
2.84 19.1 
1.60 9.2 
2.77 0.0
St.error: 17.559 MAPE: 15.43 DW: 1.045 RH0(1): 0.46
OLS Period: 1967-84 (1.3.)
Dep. variable: SFI R 2 : 0.724 R2C: 0.639
Indep. variables Est. Coeff. St. dev t BC%
B1 IR 0.826 
32 LR -1.194 
B3 H 30.831 
B4 PF -0.882 
B5 Constant -2978.098
1.236
1.118
7.661
0.470
756.053
0.67 19.8 
1.07 30.2 
4.02 35.8 
1.88 14.2 
3.94 0.0
St.error: 7.639 MAPE: 14.53 DW: 0.937 RHC(l): 0.51
Note: Details on reported statistics are given in Appendix 3(b)
170. The lower is the IR on SD, the less likely are SD and hence 
the more likely is SFI. The higher is the LR, H, and PF, the 
more likely is SFI.
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The results are similar for all three equations. The rela­
tively low R2C suggests that the fit is not very good. The 
Durbin-Watson statistics and the high RH0(1) indicate there may 
be a problem of positive autocorrelation of residuals. Since the 
DW in all three equations lies in the inconclusive region, the 
Ourbin Watson Exact Test (DWE) was applied, which confirmed 
positive autocorrelation in all three equations (the HO on no 
autocorrelation is rejected# since the probability that it is 
correct is 0.03%, 0.06% and 0.01% in the three equations respec­
tively, i.e. below 5%).
Autocorrelation of residuals suggests misspecification of 
the equations, and in its presence inefficient regression es­
timates and misleading t-statistics are produced. In order to
discover which type of specification bias is p r e s e n t , a  
series of tests have been performed: for normality of residuals, 
presence of outliers, heteroscedasticity, linearity of vari­
ables, correctness of the functional fora and of the model 
specification (NORMAL, OUTLIE, HETERO, HARVEY, RBOW, DIFF,
172IWT). The results (reported in Appendix B(b)) reveal that the
171. Misspecification can imply: l)omission of relevant
variables or inclusion of irrelevant ones? 2) incorrect 
functional fora; 3)use of a linear model where a nonlinear model 
is needed; 4) incorrect specification of the error term, etc.
172. Details on of each of these tests are reported in Appendix 
B ( b ).
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three regressions passed all of the above tests. Therefore, it 
seems that misspecification derives primarily from the omission 
of relevant variables and/or inclusion of irrelevant ones.
3.4.1.3.Improving the model
In trying to improve the model, several attempts were 
undertaken. First, in order to correct for autocorrelation, the 
Cochrane-Orcutt (CO) method has been applied (instead of OLS) in 
estimating equations 1.1«, 1.2., and 1.3., both by including and 
excluding the first observation. This, however, did not yield 
satisfactory results, since serial correlation remained a 
problem (except in one case, wnere it was at the margin,
173autocorrelation was confimed by the OWE).
Second, since the two interest rates, IR and LR are highly 
correlated (correlation coefficient of 0.959), a remedial 
measure was applied to remove the problem of collinearity, by a 
different parametrisation of the interest rates. IR was 
retained, while LR has been replaced by a new variable DIR 
representing the absolute difference between IR and LR# i.e. 
DIR*IR-LR. However, neither did this procedure provide better 
results. In all three equations, the results ware very similar
173. The DWE on the regressions estimated by CO gave tne 
following probability values: for equation 1.1., 0.15% and
4.25%? for equation 1.2.# 0.25% and 0.97%; and for equation 1.3, 
0.78% and 5.02% respectively# when including and excluding the 
first observation.
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as before (identical R2, R2C, DW). The t statistics remained 
unchanged for all variables (DIR had same t statistics as the 
previous variable LR), except for IR: in the first two equa­
tions, it was actually lower than before (quite contrary to 
expectations), while in the third it was somewhat higher (1.05).
Finally, although Furubotn and Pejovich (1973) very ex­
plicitly list IR, LR, H, and PF as the crucial determinants of 
SD, INV, and SFI, additional explanatory variables have been 
added to the original three equations, as the tests performed 
suggested that misspecification is likely to derive from the 
omission of relevant variables*
In the first place, besides considering the cost of credit, 
captured by the variable LR, it may be equally important to 
consider the level of credit availability. Therefore, bank loans 
for fixed assets extended to enterprises (BL) has been added to 
the original three equations.
(l)Savings equation: (1.1) + bj_BL b 5>0 (1.4.)
(2)Investment equation: (1.2. ) + b^BL cr U) VA o (1.5.)
(3)Self-financed investment: (1.3) ^ b^BL b 5<0 (1.6.)
174. The availability of bank loans is expected to decrease SFI, 
and hence increase SD. As to the effect on INV, as in the case 
of equation 1.2», the effect remains indeterminate, as this 
depends on the proportion between internal and external funds.
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Results:
OLS Period: 1966-84 (1.4.)
Dep. variable: SD R2 : 0.715 R2C: 0.605
Indep. variables Est. Coeff. St. dev. t BC%
Bl IR 2.361 1.048 2.25 36.1
B2 LR -2.294 0.974 2.36 37.0
B3 H 17.758 5.414 3.28 15.7
B4 PF -0.026 0.408 0.06 0.3
B5 BL 0.149 0.072 2.08 11.0
B6 Constant -1735.291 527.089 3.29 0.0
St.error: 6.516 MAPS: 16.25 DW: 0.995 RH0(1): 0.49
DW Exact: Prob. 0.0%
OLS Period: 1967-84 (1.5.)
Dep. variable: INV R 2 : 0.741 R2C: 0.633
IndeD. variables Est. Coeff. St. dev. t BC%
B1 IR 6.603 2.593 2.55 35.9
B2 LR -6.855 2.299 2.98 39.4
B3 H 40.151 15.277 2.63 10.6
B4 PF -0.841 0.971 0.87 3.1
B5 BL 0.426 0.168 2.54 11.0
B6 Constant -3906.357 1500.518 2.60 0.0
St.error: 14.733 MAPE: 12.41 DW: 1.316 RH0(1): 0.32
DW Exact: Prob* 0.38%
OLS Period: 1967-84 (1.6.)
Dep. variable: SFI R2 : 0.878 R2C: 0.828
Indep. variables Est. Coeff. St. dev. t BC%
B1 IR 2.254 0.929 2.43 30.9
B2 LR -2.311 0.823 2.81 33.4
B3 H 25.406 5.472 4.64 16.9
B4 PF -0.396 0.348 1.14 3.7
B5 BL 0.234 0.060 3.90 15.2
B6 Constant -2482.750 537.503 4.62 0.0
St.error: 5.278 MAPE: 9.09 DW: 1.275 RHO(l): 0.35
DW Exact: Prob. 0.27%
In all three equations, although adding the variable BL
improves the fit of the equations, ^7 5 it did not eliminate the 
problem of autocorrelation, confirmed to be present in all three
175. This was to be expected? adding a variable usually 
increases R2, never decreases it.
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equations by the DWE (Prob. of 0%, 0.38%, and 0.27% in 1.4, 1.5. 
and 1.6. respectively). Consequently the t statistics, although 
high for most of the variables, are not precise, and do not
permit any definite conclusions.*76
Next, although all variables have been deflated, this might 
not have been sufficient to remove the influence of time on our 
dependent variables, and hence a trend variable has been added 
to the original three equations:
(1)Savings equation: (1.1) + b^T b^>0 (1.7.)
(2)Investment equation: (1.2.) + b^T b 5 >0 (1.8.)
177(3)Self-f inanced investment: (1.3) + b^T b 5>0 (1.9.)
Results:
OLS Period: 1966-34_______________________________________(1.7.)
Dep. variable: SO R 2 : 0.742 R2C: 0 .643
Indep. variables 3st. Coeff St. dev. t BC%
B1 IR 2.680 1.030 2.60 37.1
B2 LR -2.436 0.934 2.61 35.6
B3 H -0.394 10.645 0.04 0.3
B4 PP 0.354 0.451 0.79 3.2
B5 T 1.881 0.759 2.48 23.8
B6 Constant -76.464 992.450 0.08 0.0
St.error: 6.197 MAPE: 13.21 OH: 1.048 RH0(1): 0. 47
DW Exact: Prob. 0.03%
176. This procedure was also applied to an alternative set of 
equations, where LR is replaced by DIR, which yielded similar
.results.
177. All three dependent variables are likely to increase with 
time.
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Dep. variable: INV R 2 : 0.722 R2C: 0 .606
Indep. variables 2st. Coeff. St. dev. t 3C%
31 IR 6.277 2.661 2.36 36.2
32 LR -6.462 2.345 2.76 39.4
33 H -5.593 28.770 0.19 1.6
34 PF -0.298 1.128 0.26 1.2
35 T 4.273 1.872 2.28 21.6
36 Constant 323.415 2707.834 0.12 0.0
St.error : 15.260 MAPE: 13.60 DW: 1.293 RH0 (1)2 0 .33
DW Exact: Prob. 0.33%
OLS Period: 1967-84 (1.9.)
Dep. variable: SFI R2: 0.876 R2C: 0 .825
Indep. variables Est. Coeff. St. dev. t 3C%
31 IR 2.159 0.928 2.33 32.0
B2 LR -2.156 0.818 2.63 33.7
B3 H -1.828 10.037 0.18 1.3
B4 PF -0.044 0.394 0.11 3.4
B5 T 2.509 0.653 3.84 32.6
B6 Constant 35.052 944.699 0.04 3.0
St.error: 5.324 MAPE : 9.24 DW: 1.176 RH0(1): 0 .39
DW Exact: Prob. 0.10%
Since these equations did not provide much better results, 
and primarily, did not eliminate autocorrelation, a final at­
tempt to improve Furubotn and Pejovich's model using single 
regressions, was to include a variable reflecting institutional 
change. Since the change in economic policies in Yugoslavia from 
1980 onwards has been taken into account in the alternative set 
of regressions, which test Kornai's theory, the same dummy 
variable DA# which is 0 until 1979 and 1 thereafter, has also 
been added to the original three equations reflecting Furubotn 
and Pejovich's theory:
(1)Savinqa equation: (1.1) + b,.DA b 5<0 (1.10.)
(2)Investment equation: (1.2.) * b^DA b^<0 (1.11.)
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(3 )Self-financed investment: (1.3) + b^DA b^<0 (1.12.)i70
Re s u l t s :
OLS Period: 1966-84_______________________________________(1.10.)
Dep. variable: SD R 2 : 0.642 R2C: 0. 511
Indep. variables Est. Coeff. St. dev. t BC%
B1 IR 1.014 1.273 0.80 22.1
B2 LR -1.223 1.140 1.07 28.1
B3 H 26.374 5.852 4.51 33.2
B4 PF -0.498 0.484 1.03 7.1
B5 DA -5.922 6.002 0.99 9.5
B6 Constant -2555.106 573.724 4.45 0.0
St.error: 7.252 MAPE: 17.05 DW: 0.953 RH0(1): 0.52
DW Exact: Prob. 0.001
OLS Period: 1967-84 d . U . )
Dep. variable: INV R2: 0.607 R2C: 0.444
Indep. variables Est. Coeff. St. dev. t BC%
B1 IR 3.223 3.415 0.94 26.6
B2 LR -4.248 2.947 1.44 37.1
B3 H 52.372 18.924 2.77 21.0
B4 PF -1.987 1.258 1.58 11.1
B5 DA -6.781 15.146 0.45 4.2
B6 Constant -5033.029 1863.485 2.70 0.0
St.error: 18.125 MAPS: 15.41 DW: 1.052 RH0(1): 0 .46
OH Exact: Prob. 0.04%
OLS Period: 1967-84
....( 1.12.)
Dep. variable: SFI R2: 0.724 R2C: 0 .610
Indep. variables Est. Coeff. St. dev. t BC%
B1 IR 0.932 1.497 0.62 21.2
B2 LR -1.271 1.292 0.98 30.6
B3 H 30.514 8.296 3.68 33.7
B4 PF -0.044 0.394 0.11 0.4
B5 T 2.509 0.653 3.84 32.6
B6 Constant 35.052 944.699 0.04 0.0
St.error: 5.324 MAPE: 9.24 DW: 1.176 RHO(l): 0 .39
OH Exact: Prob. 0.10%
Therefore, similar conclusions can be drawn for both i
o£ regressions (1.7, 1.8, 1.9, and 1.10, 1.11, 1.12). Although
178. Restrictive policies introduced in the 1980s are expected 
«to negatively influence both SO (because of limits on personal 
incomes), and INV and SFI (because of different measures aimed 
at cutting investment demand).
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in some cases the R2C is higher, and nence suggests a better 
fit than in the original equations, the problem of autocorrela­
tion, confirmed by the DWE t est, has not been eliminated, thus 
producing misleading t statistics, and inefficient coefficient 
estimates. Hence, as before, little can be concluded about the 
significance of each of tnese variables in determining savings 
deposits, investment and self-financed investment in Yugoslavia. 
Our attempts to improve the original model did not provide 
better results, more supportive of the theory, but have in 
addition provided evidence that the model is very sensitive to
179minor changes.
3.4.1.4.A simultaneous equation model
The theory examines the choice of workers whether to dis­
tribute retained earnings in the form of personal incomes and 
put these savings on a bank account, or invest retained earnings 
in capital stock of the firm. In other words, the theory postu­
lates that savings deposits and self-financed investment are 
■utually dependent, aoving in the opposite direction.
Therefore a simultaneous equation model may reflect the 
theory in a more adequate way. Although the positive sign of the
179. E.g., in the first group of regressions (1.7, 1.8, 1.9),
the variable H seemed one of the least significant, whereas in 
the second group (1.10, 1.11, 1.12) it seemed highly significant 
(although this is approximative because of the presence of 
autocorrelation).
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correlation coefficient between SO and SFI suggested just the 
contrary (a positive linear relationship), a set of simultaneous 
equation models have been estimated using TSLS. The first is 
based on the original three equations (1.1, 1.2, 1.3):
SD « a^SFI ♦ a2IR + a3 ♦ u, (1 .13a .)
a i < 0 '  a 2 > 0
SFI = b^ SD ♦ b2LR + b3H + bjPF ♦ b5 ♦ u2 (1.13b.)
b < 0 ,  b >0, b,>0, b >0 1 2 3 4
In each of the equations, only those variables which are 
expected to directly influence the dependent variable have been 
included. Thus in 1.13a, savings deposits are directly in­
fluenced by the interest rate and by self-financed investment, 
whereas all other explanatory variables influence it indirectly, 
through self-financed investment, and therefore are excluded 
from 1.13a, but included in 1.13b.
Results:
TSLS Period: 1967-84 (1.13«)
Dep. variable: SD R2: 0.872
Indep. variables 2 s t . Coeff St. dev. t BCt
A1 SFI 0.651 0.102 6.39 93.7
A2 IR 0.092 0.181 0.51 6.3
A3 Constant 5.149 3.584 1.44 0.0
St.error: 3.821 MAPE: 10.47 DW: 0.469 Rfi0(l) : 0.73
ARSIM: value of test-statistics 1 .056
TSLS Period: 1967-84 (1.13b)
Dep. variable: SFI R2: 0.913
Indep. variables E s t . Coeff St. dev. t 3C%
B1 SD 0.486 0.417 1.17 30.0
B2 LR -0.355 0.206 1.72 14.6
B3 H 18.977 9.003 2.11 35.7
B4 PF -0.752 0.286 2.63 19.7
B5 Constant -182 8.526 875.430 2.09 0.0
St.error: 4.393 MAPE: 8.56_______ DW: 1.054 RH0(1): 0.46
ARSIM: value of test-statistics 1.053
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Although the model confirms a better fit than the one 
obtained in single regression (a higher R2), the ARSIM test 
statistics in both regressions suggest that the HO on the
180presence of autocorrelation cannot be rejected. This model, 
therefore, did not provide much better results than the single 
equations.
In the alternative simultaneous equation model, the vari­
able on bank loans for fixed assets (3L) has been added to the 
second, SFI equation:
SD = a^SFI * a^IR ^ a3 * u i (1.14a.)
a L<0, aj>9
SFI * b,SD * b„LR * b„B + b,PF + 1 2 3 4 b BL + b +5 6 U 2 (1.141
b.<0, b,>0, b,>0, b >0, 1 2 3 4 b 5>0
Results:
TSLS Period: 1967-84 (1. 14a)
Dep. variable: SD R2: 0.873
Indap. variables Est. Coeff. St. dev. t BC%
A1 SFI 0.661 
A2 IR 0.101 
A3 Constant 4.841
0.089
0.173
3.180
7.46
0.58
1.52
93.2
6.8
0.0
St.error: 3.789 MAPE: 10.45 DW: 0.464 RH0(1) : 0.74
ARSIM: value of test-statistics 1. 082
180. The value of the ARSIM test statistics of 1.056 in 1.13a. 
is at the margin for accepting autocorrelation (the lower bound 
DW statistics for 18 observations and 2 explanatory variables at 
5% level of significance is 1.05), whereas 1.053 in 1.13b. lies 
in the inconclusive region (for 18 observations and 4 
explanatory variables, at 5t level of significance, the lower 
bound DW is 0.82 and the upper bound 1.87).
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TSLS Period: 1967-84____________________________________ (1.14b)
Dep. variable: SFI R2: 0.991
Indep. variables Est. Coeff. St. dev. t BC%
B1 SD 0.842 0.094 8.95 49.0
B2 LR -0.216 0.062 3.48 8.4
B3 H 8.006 2.036 3.93 14.3
B4 PF -0.453 0.095 4.78 11.2
B5 BL 0.098 0.017 5.63 17.1
B6 Constant -777.531 199.059 3.91 0.0
St.error: 1.443 MAPS: 2.87 DW: 2.340 RH0(1) ■0.23
ARSIM: value of test-statistics 2.333
The savings equation again suggests there may be autocor-
181relation, but the self-financed investment equation provides 
good overall results: a higher R2 than in 1.13b., no autocor-
182relation of residuals# and high significance of ail variables 
(at 1%).
However, looking at the signs of the estimated coeffi­
cients, four out of five are contrary to what is postulated by 
Furubotn and Pejovich*s theory (for variables SD, LR, PF, and 
BL). Self-financed investment seems highly influenced by savings 
deposits, but positively; the lower is the lending rate and the 
lower are profits, quite contradictorily, the higher will be 
self-finance; and the availability of bank loans for fixed 
assets, instead of decreasing self-financing, seems to increase
181« The value of the ARSIM test-statistics of 1.082 lies in the 
inconclusive region (for 18 observations and 2 explanatory 
variables at 5% level of significance, the lower and upper 
bounds of 3W statistics are 1.05 and 1.53 respectively).
182• The value of the ARSIM test-statistics of 2.333 is higher 
than 2.06, the upper bound DW statistics for 18 observations and 
5 explanatory variables, at 5% level of significance.
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it. Therefore, the equation only offers support that H in­
fluences self-financed investment, whereas the wrong signs of 
the coefficients for the remaining variables obviously indicate 
that the model does not fulfill one of the most important condi-
18 3tions for accepting it: congruence with theory.
3.4.2.Testing Kornai's theory
Kornai's (1980) theory will now be tested, in order to 
determine whether in the field of investment, Yugoslavia is 
indeed primarily a socialist economy. The following hypotheses,
184all referring to investment, have been quantified:
1)Expansion drive has been approximated by the priority of 
investment growth respect to consumption growth, represented by 
the variable ED (for all variables, see Appendix B(b)). 
Expansion drive is present whenever there is a positive dif­
ference between the growth rate of investment in fixed assets 
and the growth rate of GMP, i.e. at the expense of consumption.
2)Irresistability of growth. One aust grow. Productive
185forces of the socialist economy grow incessantly. The desire
183. He could have proceeded by including« instead of BL, 
alternative variables used before (T, DA), but the principal 
result presented here concerning the signs of the coefficients# 
is unlikely to have changed.
184. The determinants of savings will be specified later, 
independently of Kornai’s theory.
185. Kornai (1980), pp. 191-194, 202.
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to increase productive forces is represented by the variable
FXA<1># fixed assets of the social sector of the economy, lagged
by one year (increasing capital stock respect to previous
, 186 year).
3)No failure of investment projects. What is important is 
to get approval for the starting of an investment. A true in-
187vestment failure (in the financial sense) never occurs. This 
hypothesis is approximated by a variable on the stock of invest­
ment in unfinished projects# WIP (work in progress). The stock 
of unfinished projects, in the absence of failure of un­
profitable projects, is expected to put pressure on investment. 
The higher is WIP# the higher is effective investment likely to 
be.
4)Inves tment planning. Official expectations regarding 
investment behaviour# as one of the factors which explains
188investment tension, has been represented by a variable on 
planned investment growth PINV.
186. It could be argued that this is equally true for any 
economy, as replacement of capital in capitalist economies 
follows this rule. Nevertheless, because of the greater 
emphasis, in socialist economies# on material growth in general, 
the hypothesis could be considered as applying more to socialist 
than to capitalist economies.
187. Kornai (1980)# pp. 194-198, 523.
188. Kornai (1980)# p. 210.
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5)Growth priority. Investment tension is strengthened if 
central economic policy itself forces the fastest possible rate
189of economic growth. The influence of planned GMP growth is 
represented by the variable PGM?.
6)Tolerance limit. The upward swing of investment growth 
will last as long as the process does not hit one of the
190“tolerance limits*. In Yugoslavia# the tolerance limit
(worsening of balance of payments position) was hit at the end 
of 1979# which brought about a radical change in official 
policies from 1980 onwards: restrictive policy of all forms of 
consumption# especially of investment# in order to reduce the 
balance of payments deficit. Restrictive policies are repre­
sented by a dummy variable DA which is 0 until 1979 and 1 
thereafter.
The above hypotheses have been tested using a similar 
procedure as before. First# correlation coefficients between 
variables have been calculated# and their significance tested. 
Second# a series of single regression equations have been es­
timated . Since SD and SFI are not considered mutually dependent# 
there was no need to estimate a simultaneous equation model.
189. Kornai (1980)# pp. 208-209.
190. Kornai (1980)# pp. 211-214.
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However, we have used Kornai's theory only for the invest­
ment equations, since his analysis of savings in a socialist 
economy is very general* Kornai speaks of aotives for household 
savings in a socialist economy (1980, p. 455-459), but d o e s n ’t 
specify which economic aggregates are likely to influence them. 
He is only explicit in stating that the interest rate is not 
among these. However# in order to be able to offer an alterna­
tive to Purubotn and Pejovich's SD equation in the joint test 
which is to follow, we had to make our own assumptions on the 
variables determining savings.
3.4.2.1.Correlation
Two separate correlation matrixes are presented, one for 
variables reflecting Kornai's theory influencing investment and 
self-financed investment (Table 2), and another for those in­
fluencing savings (Table 3).
Table 2. CORRELATION MATRIX - KORNAI'S THEORY (1967-84)_______
INV SFI FXA<1> ED WIP PINV PGMP DA
INV 1.000
SFI 0.951 I.000
FXA<1>0.699 0.876 1.000
ED 0.601 0.333 -0.145 1.000
WIP 0.974 0.874 0.556 0.720 1.000
PINV 0*968 0.924 0.694 0.554 0.951 1.000
PGMP 0*800 0.936 0.981 0.005 0.677 0.804 1.000
DA 0.340 0.537 0.878 -0.431 0.206 0.419 0.762 1.000
All correlation coefficients higher than 0.5 have been put 
in bold. The t-test on the significance of the correlation 
coefficients showed that all are significant at the 5% level,
except for one (between ED and PGMP, tsQ-16# i.e. lower than 
2.12# for 16 df at 5%).
The correlation coefficients between the dependent vari­
ables and the explanatory variables are generally high# except 
between INV and DA# and between SFI and ED, As to the relation­
ship between the explanatory variables# it is clear that 
multicollinearity may pose a serious problem# since some of 
these variables are highly collinear (especially FXA<1> with DA 
and PGMP? WIP with PINV? PINV with PGMP).
The correlation matrix between SD and the variables assumed
to determine them are provided in Table 3.
Table 3.CORRELATION MATRIX - SAVINGS THEORY (1966-84)
SD________ INC_______GMP________ DA_________
1.000
0.8S8 1.000
0.818 0.660 1.000
0.253 0.193 0.734 1.000
The correlation matrix between SD and the variables assumed 
to influence SD suggest that whereas SD is highly correlated 
with GMP and INC# it is not correlated with DA (but has 
nevertheless been included in our regressions# because the low 
correlation coefficient does not yet mean that in conjuntion 
with other variables# DA will not prove significant).
3.4.2.2.The general model
Three single equations have first been estimated# using 
OLS. As before# aggregate data of the Yugoslav economy in the
SD
INC
GMP
DA
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period 1966-84 for the savings equation, and in the period 1967- 
84 for the investment and self-financed investment equations
have been used,
(1)Savings deposits
As already mentioned, the SD equation should not be con-
191sidered as representing Kornai's theory, but is based on our 
own assumptions. Savings deposits have been considered a func­
tion of disposable income, GMP, and government economic policy 
(limits on personal incomes imposed in the 1980s).
SD = b^IWC ♦ b 2GMP + b ^ A  ♦ b 4 ♦ u (2.1.)
b,>0, b >0, o <0 192x 2 J
INC: Household disposable income
GMP: Gross material product
DA : Dummy, reflecting restrictive policies of the government
from 1980 onwards.
(2)Investment
INV=biKD ♦ b2FXA<l>+ b3W IP ♦ b ^ I H V  ♦ b 5PGMP ^ D A  -fb ♦ u (2.2.)
193b >0, b->0, b*>0, b >0# t>c<0
191. Although partly it does reflect some of Kornai's views 
(e.g. OfP could be taken as approximating Kornai's assertion 
that in a socialist economy, with rising livings standards, the 
consumption of expensive consumer durables becomes more 
important# requiring prior savings, but this equally holds for 
any type of economy).
192. SD are expected to increase with the increase of disposable 
income and the rise in GMP, whereas restrictive policies are 
likely to have a negative impact.
193. Expansion drive, increase of fixed assets, stock of 
unfinished projects, planned investment and GMP growth, are all 
expected to have a positive influence on INV. The introduction 
of restrictive policies is expected to negatively influence INV.
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Ail explanatory variables reflect Kornai's hypotheses: SD
(hyp. 1 on expansion drive)? FXA<1> (hyp. 2 on growth of produc­
tive forces)? WIP (hyp. 3 on no investment railure)? PINV (hyp. 
4 on investment planning); PGMP (hyp. 5 on growth priority)? and 
DA (hyp. 6 on tolerance limit).
(3)Self-financed investment
Since Kornai suggests that expansion drive, the principle 
determinant of investment in a socialist firm, is present at all 
levels (1980, p. 193), investment financed by firms, repre­
senting a part of total investment, should depend on similar 
factors determining investment. Hence the same variables as in
194the INV equation have been included.
SFI=b1KD + b2FXA<l>+ b 3WIP + b ^ I N V  + b 5PGMP +b^DA +b?+ u (2.3.)
b >0, b->0, b_>0, b >0, b > 0 ,  bc<01 2 3 4 5 6
All variables are the same as in (2.2).
Results:
OLS Period: 1966-34_______________________________________ (2.1.)
Pep, variable: SD___________________ R2: 0.957 R2C: 0.949
______ Indep. variables Est. Coeff. St. dev. t______ BC%
B1 IRC 0.025 0.008 3.01 13.5
B2 GMP 0.142 0.016 8.63 55.9
B3 DA -13.476 2.192 6.15 30.9
B4 Constant___________ -15.062_________ 3.132_______ 4.81 0.0
St.error: 2.349 MAPS: 6.90 DW: 1.983 RH0(1): -0.05
Teste: NORMAL, OUTLIE, HETERO, DIFF, F (see Appendix B(b), 2.3.)
194. It may seem simplified to assume that INV and SFI are 
roughly proportional, but as seen in Chapter 2, the portion of 
fixed assets financed by enterprises sources in Yugoslavia has 
been relatively constant over time. Under such an assumption, it 
may have been sufficient to specify only one regression (whether 
for INV or SFI), but both were needed for our later analysis.
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All statistics for this regression are quite satisfactory: 
the fit is good, DW and RHO reveal no serial correlation 
(confirmed by the DW Exact: Prob. of 23.09%). The t-statistics 
reveals that all three variables are highly significant (at
1951%). Hence the regression supports our theoretical postula­
tions: savings deposits are positively influenced by the rise in 
disposable income and the rise in GMP, whereas restrictive 
policies have had a strong negative impact on savings. The model 
passed all of the performed tests.
OLS Period: 1967:94 (2. 2-)
Dep. variable: INV 32: 0.999 R2C: 0. 999
Indep. variables Sst. Coeff. St. dev. t 3C%
31 SD 0.343 0.328 12.37 34.1
32 ? x a <:> 0.028 0.009 3.19 17.9
33 WIP 0.058 0.019 3.07 11.3
B4 PINV -0.005 0.049 0.10 0.4
35 PGMP 0.162 0.034 4.77 32.5
B6 DA -2.830 1.117 2.53 3.7
B7 Constant -2.365 2.559 0.92 0.0
St.error: 0.336 MAPE: 0.86 DW: 2 .540 RH0(1): -0 .34
Tests: NORMAL, OUTLIE, HETERC, RBOW, DIFF, F (see Appendix
B ( b ) ).
This regression offers substantial support to Kornai's 
hypotheses. Not only is the fit very good, but there is no
196autocorrelation (DWH: Prob. of 2 5.19%). Hence the t-
statistics are precise, revealing that five out of six
195. For 16 degrees of freedom (19 observations and 3 
explanatory variables excluding the constant), at 1% level of 
significance t>2.291.
196. Since one of the regressors is a lagged variable, the DWH 
test was used for testing autocorrelation.
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explanatory variables are highly significant (four at 1%, and
1 9 7
one at 5% level of significance). However, the PINV variable 
is not significant. Whether it actually does not affect IN'/, 
will be evaluated in the next section. The model passed all of 
the performed tests.
OLS Period: 1967-84_______________________________________ (2.3.)
Dep. variable: SFI R 2 : 0.996 R2C: 0. 994
Indep. variables Est. Coeff. St. dev. t BC%
B1 CD 0.053 0.033 1.90 11.3
B2 FXA<1> 0.040 0.011 3.74 45.3
B3 WIP 0.030 0.023 1.32 10.5
B4 PINV 0.054 0.059 0.92 7.1
B5 PGMP 0.036 0.040 0.90 13.2
B6 DA -5.359 1.325 4.04 12.6
B7 Constant -5.848 3.037 1.93 0.0
St.error: 0.993 MAPS: 2.01 3W: 2.850 RHO(l): -0 .57
Tests: NORMAL, OUTLIE, HETERO, RBWO, DIFF, IMT, F (see Appendix
B(b)).
This regression again suggests a good fit, and absence of 
autocorrelation of residuals (DWH: Prob. 7.09%). The t statis­
tics reveal that FKA<1> and OA are highly significant at 1%,
198while ED is significant at 10% level of significance. 
However, the remaining three variables, WIP, PINV and PGM? have
197. For 13 degrees of freedom (18 observations and 6
variables), at 1% level of significance t>3.055, at 5% t>2.179.
Hence ED, FXA<1>, WIP and PGMP are significant at 1%, whereas DA 
at 5% level of significance.
198. For 18 observations and 6 explanatory variables, and hence 
12 degrees of freedom, at 1% level of significance t>3.055, and 
at 10% t>1.782.
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not proved significant. Whether this is due to high multicoi- 
linearity will be checked in section 3.4.2.4. The model passed 
all of tne tests applied.
3.4.2.3.Improving the model
(1)Investment
The investment equation has been reestimated by dropping 
PINV, the variable which previously was not significant.
Results: (2.4.)
OLS Period: 1967-84______________ _____________________________
Dep_. variable: INV R 2 : 0.999 R2C: :. 999
Indep. var iables Est. Coeff. St. dev. ♦»w BCt
B1 ED 0.342 0.025 13.53 34.3
B2 FXA<1> 0.029 0.007 4.10 18.4
B3 WIP 0.058 0.017 3.43 11.3
B4 PGMP 0.159 0.025 6.46 32.3
B5 DA -2.894 0.888 3.26 3.8
B6 Constant -2.247 2.193 1.02 0.0
St.error: 0.801 MAPE: 0.86 DW: 2.531 RH0(1): -0 .33
T e s t s : NORMAL, OUTLIE, HETERO, RBOW, DIFF, F (see Appendix 
B ( b ) ).
The results reveal that the R2 and R2C remain unchanged, 
and hence dropping PINV is probably justified. All variables are 
now highly significant (at 1%, for 13 df, t>3.012). The DWH 
confirms no autocorrelation of residuals (Prob. of 26.02%). The 
model passed all of the applied tests.
(2)Self-financed investment
In choosing which variables to include in the model, we 
were guided not only by the t statistics in equation 2.3. but 
also by the level of correlation between variables. Thus in 
addition to the highly significant variables in equation 2.3. 
(FXA<1>, DA), in choosing between two collinear variables, ED
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and WIP, ED was included because it proved more significant in
2.3. In choosing between the other two highly collinear vari­
ables, PINV and PGMP, PINV was included because it proved more
199significant in 2.3.
Results:
OLS Period: 1967-84
(2.5 .)
Dep. variable: SFI R2: 0.995 R2C: 0. 994
Indep. variables Est. Coeff. St. dev. £ SC%
B1 ED 0.083 0.022 3.74 14.2
B2 FXA<1> 0.052 0.003 15.66 56.5
B3 PINV 0.124 0.037 3.30 15.5
B4 DA -6.168 1.250 4.94 13.8
B5 Constant -1.314 1.319 1.00 0.0
St.error: 1.021 MAPE: 2.11 DW: 2.442 RH 0 (I): -0 .33
T e s t s ; NORMAL, OUTLIE, HETERO, ?, DIFF (see Appendix 
B(b)).
The results reveal that although the R2 is a bit lower than
in 2.3. (0.995 respect to 0.996), the R2C remains the same, and
hence dropping WIP and PGMP is probably justified. All variables 
are now highly significant (at 1%, for 14 df, t>2.977). The DWH 
confirms no autocorrelation of residuals (Prob. of 34.89%). The 
model passed all of the tests applied.
3.4.2.4.Kornai*s theory: a final evaluation
Finally, we wanted to check whether the low t values for
single variables which have been dropped in the second stage, 
really are a sign of no (low) influence of these variables on
199. If we had taken into account only t statistics in equation 
2.3., this would have led us to include ED and WIP, rather than 
ED and PINV or PGMP. Precisely because ED and WIP are highly 
correlated, this in fact, did not give satisfactory results.
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the dependent variable, or whether this is due to multicol- 
linearity.
In the original XNV equation (2.2.), the insignificant 
variable was PINV. The F test was applied to the estimated 
coefficient (HO: B4*0), which seemed to indicate that PINV is
not significant (Prob. 91.97 that the HO is correct). However, 
regressing PINV on INV, a very high R2 is obtained (R2»0.937) 
which suggests that 94% of variations in INV can actually be
explained by this single variable PINV.2®® Therefore, recalling 
that PINV was highly correlated with WIP and PGMP (correlation 
coefficients were C.951 and 0.804 respectively), the low t 
statistics for PINV in the general model (2.2.) is likely due to 
multicollinearity, and not to the small impact of PINV on INV.
In the original SFI equation (2.3.), the insignificant 
variables were WIP, PINV, and PGMP. The F test was applied to 
each of the estimated coefficients (HO: B3=0j HO: B4=0j HO:
B5*0, for WIP, PINV, and PGMP respectively), which seemed to 
confirm that these variables are not significant (the probabil­
ity that HO is correct was 21.44%, 37.89% and 38.82%
respectively). However, regressing each of these variables
200. This was to be expected, since the correlation coefficient 
between these two variables was 0.968 (see Table 2).
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separately on SFI, high coefficients of determination are ob ­
tained (SFI= blWIP + b2, R 2 = 0 .765? SFI=blPINV + b 2 , R2=0.854;
201SFI=blPGMP + b2, R2=0.876), which again suggests that each of 
these variables has substantial influence on SFI.
Recalling that these three variables were highly correlated 
(correlation coefficient between WIP and PINV was 0.951, and 
between PGMP and PINV 0.304), it can again be concluded that the
low t statistics for these three variables in the original model
is probably again due to multicollinearity, and not to the small 
influence of WIP, PINV, and PGMP on self-financed investment.
3.4.3.Joint testing of the two theories
An alternative way of confronting the two theories is to
use the complete parameter encompassing procedure: combine both 
sets of variables in a single regression equation (the 
"unrestricted" model), and then apply the F-test to test the 
significance of each of the two subsets of regression coeffi­
cients. If the null hypothesis being tested is accepted, the 
correct model will be the restricted model (restricted by the 
zero coefficients). This should reveal which of the two subsets 
(theories) helps to explain more the variation in the dependent 
variable.
201. Again, this was already suggested by high correlation 
coefficients between these variables in Table 2.
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Two alternative null hypotheses have been tested, in order 
to see whether the joint effect of the first/second subset of 
regression coefficients on the dependent variable is equal to
1)First theory: H0(1): B11=B12=...*Bln=0
2)Second theory: H0(2): B21*B223 •••sB2n-0
This procedure was applied to three regressions in which 
the explanatory variables are a combination of the two theories. 
They have been estimated without the constant in order to test 
the "net" influence of the first against the second group of 
variables.
(l)Savings deposits (3*1.)
QLS Period: 1966-84 _____________________________________________
Dep. variable: SD R 2 : 0.998 R2C: 0.998
Indep. variables Est. Coeff. St. dev. t BC%
Bll IR 0.638 0.335 1.90 15.8
B12 LR -0.314 0.319 0.98 8.2
B13 H -0.141 0.045 3.16 0.2
B14 PF 0.070 0.122 0.58 1.1
B21 INC 0.036 0.009 4.13 15.8
B22 GMP 0.129 0.015 8.43 41.0
B23 DA -9.738 2.067 4.71 17.8
St.error: 1.846 MAPE: 4.93 DW: 2 .036 RH0(1): -0 .03
Results of the F-test:
Probability that H0(1) (B11=B12=B13=B14*0) is correct: 0.031 
Probability that H0(2) <B21=B22*B23=0) is correct: 0.00%
202. The F-test gives the probability value that the H0(l)/H0(2) 
is correct? whenever this probability is higher than 5%, the HO 
is correct and hence can be accepted. In other words, the joint 
effect of this group of variables has no influence on the 
dependent variable.
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Therefore, we reject both H0(i) and H O (2): both groups of 
variables seem to influence SD. Nevertheless, the lower prob­
ability of H0(2) (rejecting it at IOC %) suggests that the second 
group influences aore the dependent variable than the first 
group of variables. Moreover, since there is no
203autocorrelation , additional conclusions can be drawn from t 
statistics and the Beta Coefficients. The overall significance 
of the second group of variables is clearly higher than that of 
the first group, and 74.6% of variation in SD can be explained 
by changes in the variables proposed by the alternative theory.
(2)Investment
OLS Period; 1967-84______________________________________________ (3.2.)
Dep. variable: INV R 2 : 1.000 R2C: 1.000
Indep. variables Est. Coeff. St. dev. t BC%
Bll IR 0.131 0.249 0.52 2.2
B12 LR -0.092 0.223 0.41 1.7
B13 H -0.016 0.058 0.27 0.0
B14 PF 0.099 0.143 0.69 1.1
B21 ED 0.377 0.080 4.73 37.0
B22 FXA<1> 0.029 0.029 1.00 18.2
B23 WIP 0.043 0.042 1.03 8.3
B24 PGMP 0.158 0.075 2.10 31.5
St.error: 1. 129 MAPE: 1.06 DW: 2 .097 RH0(1): -0 .09
Results of the F-test:
Probability that H0(1) (B11=B12=B13=B14=0) is correct: 83.99% 
Probability that H0(2) (B21=B22=B23=B24=*0) is correct: 0.00%
203. DW standard statistics are not directly applicable to 
regressions without an intercept. Therefore the DWE was applied, 
which gave a probability of 17.91% that HO on no autocorrelation 
is correct.
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As a representation of the second theory, the same number 
of explanatory variables have been included as for the first 
theory (the ones which previously proved most significant).
Since the H0(1) is accepted and the H0(2) is rejected, the 
results are rather more straightforward than in the SO equation, 
offering direct support to the second theory. Since there is no 
autocorrelation of residuals (DWH: Prob. of 83.63%), additional 
support can be derived from t statistics and the Beta 
Coefficients. The variables reflecting Kornai's theory are as a 
group clearly more significant than Purubotn and Pejovich's 
variables, explaining around 94.0% of variation in INV.
(3)Self-financed investment
Again, as a representation of the second theory, the same 
number of explanatory variables have been included as for the 
first theory (the most significant ones).
OLS Period: 1967-84
Oep. variable: SFI R 2 : 1.000 R2C: I. 000
Indep. variables Est. Coeff St. dev. t BCt
Bll IR 0.061 0.226 0.27 1.7
B12 LR -0.094 0.209 0.45 2.7
B13 H -0.033 0.026 1.24 0.0
B14 PF 0.089 0.085 1.06 1.6
B21 ED 0.104 0.030 3.50 16.5
B22 FXA<1> 0.056 0.005 12.38 56.3
B23 PIHV 0.080 0.053 1.52 9.3
B24 0* -5.683 1.451 3.92 11.8
St.error: 1.065 MAPB: 2.10 DW: 2.786 RH0(l): -0. 50
Results of the F-test:
Probability that H0(i) (B11=B12*B13*B14=0) is correct: 59.86% 
Probability that H0(2) (B21*B22*B23*B24*0) is correct: 0.00%
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Since H0(1) is accepted, and H0(2) is rejected, the second 
theory is again directly supported. Since there is no autocor-
204relation of residuals, additional support can be derived from 
t statistics and the Beta Coefficients. The variables reflecting 
Kornai's theory are as a group clearly more significant than 
Furubotn and Pejovich*s variables, explaining around 93.9% of 
variation in SFI.
In concluding, several limitations of the above analysis 
should be pointed out. The first is the small number of observa­
tions. However, quarterly data on some of the variables do not 
e x ist9 whereas extending the period prior to 1966 would not have 
been justified.
The second limitation is the use of aggregate data to test 
Furubotn and Pejovich's theory, which however primarily refers 
to enterprise behaviour. Nevertheless, it should be noted that 
the theory does propose that underinvestment at the firm level 
will have similar implications for the economy as a whole.
The third limitation is the approximation of several vari­
ables, especially of the time horizon (H)# profit rate (PF) 
(ideally# data on the marginal productivity of capital should
204. The DWH gave the probability of 9.55%, rejecting 
autocorrelation. However, because of the high value of RHO(l), 
in order to be sure that there is no autocorrelation, an 
additional test was applied (AR), which confirmed that there is 
no autocorrelation.
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have been used)# and most of Kornai's variables# as they are a 
simplification of the actual hypotheses (especially expansion 
drive).
Last but not least# the SFI variable has been represented 
using data on the proportion of investment in fixed assets 
financed by enterprise sources, which are not# however, an 
entirely voluntary component of enterprise savings. An alterna­
tive set of figures could have been used (e.g. mandatory 
depreciation, which is completely voluntary). However# not only 
is mandatory depreciation an underestimation of actual voluntary 
self-finance in Yugoslavia# but such an alternative model would 
not have provided us with the answers we were seeking. It might 
have offered an explanation of what determines depreciation in 
Yugoslavia# but not overall investment# or self-financed invest­
ment. What we were primarily interested in# was to evaluate the 
role of the two groups of alternative variables of the two 
theories in determining investment in Yugoslavia# irrespective 
of whether a smaller or larger part of it is imposed on firms 
through external regulations.
This may again imply that Furubotn and Pejovich's theory# 
which assumes voluntary investment decisions, cannot be refuted. 
Nevertheless, our analysis does show that the variables con­
sidered crucial by the theory have had a limited role to play in
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determining investment decisions in Yugoslavia, and hence con­
firms our previous conclusion that the theory is net fully 
applicable to the Yugoslav economy.
3.5.Concluding remarks
While Furubotn and Pejovich’s theory is based on assump­
tions which correspond to an idealised capitalist environment (a
perfect capital market, perfect labour mobility, project ap­
praisal according to criteria typically used by a capitalist 
firm), in Yugoslavia severe capital market distortions have 
prevailed, labour force mobility has been limited, and invest­
ment criteria have not been the ones typically used in market 
economies. This initial analysis already suggested that vari­
ables considered crucial by Furubotn and Pejovich's theory have 
had a limited role in determining investment decisions in
Yugoslavia.
Therefore we have sought an alternative theoretical 
framework in Kornai's theory# in order to propose that some of 
Kornai's hypotheses may be more applicable to Yugoslavia in 
comparison with Furubotn and Pejovich’s theory. We have argued 
that in spite of substantial institutional changes in
Yugoslavia# the essence of the investment process has remained 
much the same# and that in the field of investment the Yugoslav 
enterprise has retained many features of the traditional 
socialist firm. Data from Yugoslavia indeed suggest the presence 
of the soft-budget constraint, substantial cost overruns and
overdues of investment projects, proliferation of interfirm 
credits in times of restrictive monetary policy» and the use of 
non-market criteria in the allocation of investment resources, 
thus supporting some of Kornai's hypotheses.
In the econometric testing of the two theories, all regres­
sions based on Furubotn and Pejovich's theory suggested either 
misspecification (autocorrelation), or noncongruence with the 
theory. The presence of autocorrelation in turn implies im­
precise t-statistics on the significance of each of the 
variables, and inefficient estimates of the Beta coefficients. 
Therefore, at best, the initial analysis suggested that no 
definite conclusions could be made about the confirmation of the 
theory on Yugoslav data. In testing the alternative theory, on 
the contrary, good overall results were obtained.
In the joint testing of the two theories, additional 
evidence is provided which seems to indicate that Kornai's 
theory is in fact more supported by empirical evidence from 
Yugoslavia than Furubotn and Pejovich's theory.
The main implication of the analysis is that the investment 
behaviour of Yugoslav firms, in spite of decentralisation, self- 
management and increasing use of the market after 1965, is being 
determined primarily by the socialist features of the economy, 
rather than market signals.
Chapter 4. INVESTMENT INCENTIVES IN THE YUGOSLAV ECONOMY
In the pre-1965 period,*when the system of mobilysing and 
allocating investment resources was centrally directed through 
state investment funds, there was no need for investment incen­
tives at the enterprise level. Following the 1965 reform, 
however, decentralization and the desire to introduce a market- 
oriented system required the creation of new mechanisms which 
would provide built-in incentives for the enterprise to invest 
and allocate capital efficiently.
As our present analysis will show, however, in spite of 
intentions, reflected in the introduction of a number of innova­
tive financial instruments, these new schemes did not fully 
respond to this requirement. The theoretical framework of the 
new financial mechanisms introduced by the 1970s economic 
reform, based on Edvard Rardelj's ideas, is first presented, in 
order to pass to the discussion of existing mechanisms for 
incentivating investment in Yugoslavia. Recent proposals for 
reform are then reviewed, and workers' views on investment 
incentives are presented.
4.1.Theory: Kardelj's views on past labour
Among the various problems that emerged after the 1965 
economic reform, were also the ones of growing concentration of 
economic power in banks, and the related problem of "autonomous” 
financial capital. These problems were evaluated by Yugoslav 
authorities as being directly in conflict with self-management.
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because they implied rental income for privileged classes, and 
the deprivation of workers of a part of income produced. 
Consequently, the 1970s economic reform was supposed to: first, 
enable enterprises to appropriate a larger part of income; and 
second, decrease the role of banks, by introducing new forms of 
mobilizing savings that would not necessarily require their 
intermediation.
A lively debate at the end of the 1960s resulted in the 
victory of economic reasoning over ideology. Investing capital 
and entrepreneurship were finally recognized as functions that 
ought to be rewarded. It was Edvard Kardelj who laid down the 
theoretical bases of the new system. The new system envisages 
workers' remuneration based on the contribution of not only 
their "live" (current) labour, but also "past" (embodied)
labour. "Past labour" is a synonym for c a p i t a l , b u t  Kardelj 
preferred using the term "past labour" instead of "social 
capital” , "accumulation", or "means of enlarged reproduction", 
in order to emphasize that such a remuneration scheme would not
206be linked to capital, but to labour. Since workers directly 
contribute to the increase of capital through their investment 
decisions, they ought to be rewarded by receiving a part of
•205. More precisely, past labour refers to investment in capital 
stock undertaken by workers in the past.
206. See Kardelj (1978), pp. 52-53.
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income on this basis. The scheme was thus intended as an incen­
tive for stimulating workers' willingness to invest, both in 
their own, and in another enterprise.
Kardelj*s proposal at first provoked severe opposition. The 
most dogmatic ideologists identified the very notion of "past 
labour" with the concept of private shareholding, a capitalist 
category totally in conflict with marxism, socialism, and self-
207management. Their main argument was that since, in line with 
the Marxist theory of value, it is only live labour that 
produces new value, live labour should be the exclusive basis 
for rewarding workers. A remuneration scheme that includes the 
contribution of past labour (capital), would imply earning 
income on the basis of investing capital and not on the basis of 
work performed, and hence remuneration on the basis of property.
Kardelj strongly criticized such views, regarding them a 
misinterpretation of Marx. Although live labour is the only 
creator of value, a part of surplus value created by live labour 
(profit on capital, bank profit and rent), in spite of not 
producing new value, does represent value, and has a specific 
use value, as more efficient management of social capital 
creates more favourable conditions for the rise of live labour's
207. For a detailed survey of the discussions on past labour in 
the late 1960s, see Buric (1983), pp. 80-108.
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productivity (1978# pp. 55-56). Rewarding past labour cannot be 
interpreted as a scheme independent of workers' live labour# but 
on the contrary# because "it is clear that you need to open the 
tap of a cask in order to enable to flow of wine" (1971# p. 
139). The essential point is to prevent that workers fill the 
cask of social property with their work# while someone else 
opens the tap. Hence# "It is not a question of whether past 
labour produces value or not# but a question of who disposes of 
income" (1971# p. 141).
Kardelj recalled that Marx did not identify state ownership 
with social ownership# but considered social property should 
also enable a form of individual property. "Social property 
is...coamon property of all working men# and therefore also 
personal property of each individual worker in the scope and 
form in which it ensures him the right to work with social 
means" (1978# p. 24). Workers collectively dispose of means of 
production# but individually enjoy the fruits of their labour. 
However# social property is not a monopolistic right of any 
individual subject (the state# the working collective# the 
individual worker)# but property of everybody and nobody# i.e. 
common and personal. This is the only way that social property 
would really "belong" to all members of society (1972# p. 318? 
1978# pp. 11# 23). Nevertheless# social property must not be
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interpreted as a no-property category# since Mas long as ap­
propriation exists# property will continue to exist" (1972# p. 
293).
The post-1965 alienation of past labour related to "group- 
ownership" tendencies had according to Kardelj represented a 
form of managerial capitalism. Awarding workers' past labour 
would be the only way of really implementing self-management 
(1971# p. 137). Workers should receive an award for good manage­
ment of social capital# but should also bear the consequences 
deriving from its bad management (1978# p. 141).
Kardelj therefore regarded the system he was proposing a 
way of avoiding the negative effects of both state ownership and 
"group" ownership# but was also very explicit in emphasizing 
that the scheme would be fundamentally different from private 
shareholding. Indeed# he firmly rejected proposals on citizens'
208shares in socially-owned enterprises. Private shares imply a 
permanent right to exploit someone else's labour, while the 
proposed system would be based on the right of a worker deriving 
from his own work, thus definitely eliminating the old relation­
ship between the worker as hired labour, and the owner or
208. Among the proposals for introducing shares in Yugoslavia 
advanced in the late 1960s, is the proposal by S. Kavcic, who 
beleived it would be an adequate way for mobilizing citizens' 
savings; and the proposal of a Working Group of the Federal 
Assembly (see Korac, 1986, pp. 186-187).
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manager of capital (1978, p. 53). Personal income of workers 
would not be linked to the amount or cost of invested capital, 
because this would cause the division of social capital into 
shares, but would depend on obtained results, returns of an 
investment, in order to make the worker aware that his material 
position depends on his choice to accumulate. Workers would not 
receive this part of income as proprietors, but as managers of 
social capital, and thus would be stimulated to manage capital 
rationally (1978, pp. 68, 133-5).
However, while Kardelj is critical of shareholding, he at 
the same time proposes that possible forms of rewarding past 
labour could be shares and bonds (although he remains vague by 
suggesting this is "a secondary problem” for which "concrete 
solutions must be found” ; 1971, p. 140); he also stresses the 
need for a market for such securities. Since Kardelj's ideas 
concerning the issuing of workers' bonds had "provoked a real 
affair" (to use Kardelj's own words), Kardelj insisted that what 
the worker would receive on the basis of such a receipt would be 
a minimum of an incentive character. Hence, "it is absurd to 
identify a worker that consumes these means in the form of 
personal income with a capitalist that appropriates them on the 
basis of a share due to private capital" (1978, p. 70).
The main merit of Kardelj's writings on past labour is his 
emphasis that being rewarded for investment decisions is not 
only compatible with socialism, but is one of the necessary
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requirements for capital to be used rationally. Nevertheless, 
Kardelj's writings are not always sufficiently consistent. One 
of the central points that provokes confusion is the relation­
ship between "social" and '* individual", whether referring to 
property, income, past labour, or other categories he uses.
Thus Kardelj contemporaneously speaks of property "of the 
whole society"; of social property as a form of personal 
property; and occasionally, in spite of all his criticism of 
"group-ownership", seems to consider the enterprise the main
209subject of property rights. Similarly, Kardelj emphasizes the 
social character of income. Income is in social property, 
belonging to all workers and to each of them individually, since 
it is the result of labour of the whole society, the result of 
social productivity (1978, pp. 36-44). The same type of am­
biguity is also present in reference to past labour. Kardelj 
does not make a clear distinction between "social past labour" 
and "individual past labour", as his definitions are often
209. E.g.: "We have transferred social capital to basic
organisations of associated labour (BOALs)" (1978, p. 67); or 
"Self-managed associated labour today disposes of the entire 
social capital, but this social capital is distributed, i.e. 
decentralized to BOALs" (1978, p. 57).
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imprecise, ambiguous, even contradictory.
Kardelj fails to distinguish between initial capital endow­
ment given to enterprises by the state when social property was 
introduced, that could be considered "social property", the 
result of "social past labour", and thus ensuring a part of 
income that is "social", and successive increments of capital 
arising from "individual past labour", for which workers ought 
to be rewarded depending on realized income of the individual 
enterprise. In this sense, Kardelj is not explicit enough in 
emphasizing the individual basis of the scheme: because if the 
scheme is to be applicable in a functional way, the subject of 
property cannot be the whole society, income realized that 
serves as the basis for determining workers' past labour must be 
income of the individual enterprise, and past labour rewards 
ought to be linked to the individual worker's contribution.
Kardelj is also ambiguous concerning the relationship 
between the proposed scheme and socialist objectives. A way of 
avoiding tendencies towards private property relations would be
210. E.g.: "Past labour in the wider sense represents that part 
of value that workers have produced with their current labour, 
which the society in various ways allocates for accumulation" 
(1978, p. 52); "Pooling of income is not investment in another 
organisation, but investment in common social labour" (1978, pp.
* 39-44); "From the results of total social labour a worker ought 
to have a material benefit on the basis of his own past labour" 
(1978, p. 49).
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to implement simultaneously not only the principle of distribu­
tion according to work (both current and past), but also the 
principle of workers' solidarity (1978, p. 141).
Finally# in order to incorporate his scheme into a planning 
mechanism of coordination, Xardelj proposes that rewarding 
workers* past labour "would every year be stabilised by the 
social plan" (1978, p. 65), and that "a worker does not have the 
right to, through his personal income, appropriate a part of 
social capital ... since self-management agreements and social 
compacts should regulate distribution relations'* (1978, p. 141).
In conclusion, it seems that Kardelj encountered some 
difficulties in incorporating the envisaged individually-based 
system of workers' remuneration of past labour, into a more 
general framework that takes into account social interests, 
socialist objectives, and a planning mechanism of coordination.
4 ,2.Practical solutions
The economic reform implemented during the 1970s resulted 
in the adoption of several new schemes meant to stimulate in­
vestment, both within and outside the enterprise, and the 
financing of investment through a variety of new instruments.
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4.2.1.Incentives within the firm
In all of the major documents adopted during the 1970s, 
workers' past labour is explicitly recognised as a criterion 
that determines the level of personal incomes. However, legal
provisions on past labour are very general.2i2 They clearly 
state only that past labour should be rewarded, but there is no 
indication as to how an individual's contribution to capital 
increase should be measured, and according to which criteria. 
Details concerning past labour rewards ought to be specified in 
self-management acts of the enterprise, which are firm- 
213specific. And without precisely defined methods on rewarding 
past labour, it is not surprising that in every-day practice the 
scheme has been implemented in a rather simplistic way*
The common feature is that past labour rewards are usually 
determined in proportion to seniority. For each year of employ­
ment, usually starting with the second year, a worker is given 
an additional percentage (around 0.5%) of his personal in- 
214come. However, such a reward is usually linked to the total
211.The 1971 Amendments, the 1974 Constitution and the 1976 
Associated Labour Act.
212. See Constitution, 1974, Art. 20, and ALA, Art. 126 and 129.
213. The only restriction is that these acts may not be contrary 
to social compacts concluded by the enterprise (Art. 128, ALA).
214. A worker employed, e.g., for 10 years, would receive an 
additional 4.5% of his personal income on account of past 
labour.
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number of years a worker has been employed in the social sector, 
and hence the scheme does not guarantee a worker's stimulus for 
efficient management of capital (and investment) of the en­
terprise where he is employed.
Besides the described mechanism, in some enterprises an 
idemnity in cash is given to workers that are about to retire.
However, given that the amount is small,215 and is in no way 
related to investment, or successfull entrepreneurship, neither 
can this form of rewarding workers represent an adequate compen­
sation for their investment decisions*
Several Yugoslav economists have criticized the way the 
scheme is being implemented in practice, claiming that it repre­
sents a misinterpretation of the original idea advanced by 
Rardelj. In fact, Rardelj himself complained that the scheme did 
not have a positive impact on workers' motivation to invest, 
since bonuses on seniority are considered more as an instrument 
of social policy, than as an economic right of a worker linked 
to his investment decisions (1971a, p. 248).
Since the implementation of the past labour scheme did not 
result, as expected, in its further elaboration in practice, the
215. It usually does not represent more than a worker's monthly, 
or two months personal income*
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need was Celt to regulate the issue further. After long dis­
cussions and 7 versions of a law on past l a b o u r , i n  1982 the 
“Law on Enlarged Reproduction and Past Labour" (LERPL) was 
finally adopted. However, in spite of 24 articles devoted 
specifically to past labour, the Law does not clarify some of 
the crucial issues.
The procedure for determining the amount of income to be 
devoted to past labour rewards is rather complicated (see Art. 
60-69). This part of income is determined on the basis of not 
only 8 obligatory indicators for evaluating obtained business 
results, as prescribed in Art. 141 of the ALA, but also of other 
three criteria. The indicators are not only numerous, but are 
not mutually consistent: already the ones contained in the ALA 
have been demonstrated to be conflictual (see Babic, 1982). What 
is surprising is that the part of income initially set apart for 
past labour rewards, need not necessarily be used in the en­
terprise that has realized it, and need not be used exclusively 
to rewarding past labour.
Furthermore, the L a w  does not ensure that an individual 
worker will be rewarded according to the quantity and quality of 
past labour he has personally contributed (see Art. 70-83),
216. On the different versions and discussions on the n e w  law on 
past labour, see Buric (1983), pp. 121-125.
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since the incentive is more of a collective, than of an in­
dividual nature.2*^ The only significant innovation of the Law 
respect to the ALA is the possibility of realizing the right to 
past labour after a worker's termination of employment, probably 
in order to legalize what is effectively being done in practice.
A new system of rewarding past labour is presently being 
elaborated. An attempt has been made to define the part of 
income to be devoted to past labour rewards more accurately, by 
linking it to obtained "rentability" of an enterprise, 
"rentability” being defined as a ratio between accumulation (net
218savings) and average utilised business assets (capital). 
However, the rentability rate, instead of being calculated as a 
ratio between accumulation and total business assets of an 
enterprise, ought to have taken into account only returns from 
own capital (Dumezic, 1986). In addition, an efficient system of 
rewarding past labour ought to consider not only the 
profitability of invested resources, but the absolute increase 
in the value of net assets of an enterprise.
In the new system it has finally been recognized that the 
seniority criteria is not satisfactory, but past labour rewards
217. Two out of three elements that determine a worker's 
contribution are based on his contribution together with other 
workers *
218. See draft of the "Law on Revenue and Income", in Dumezic,
(1986).
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are simply the positive difference between gross personal in­
comes and personal incomes for current labour, to be distributed 
in every enterprise that allocates a part of net income to
219accumulation. This seems to imply that past labour rewards 
ought to be distributed in all enterprises (as a minimum to be 
allocated to accumulation is a legal requirement). Therefore, 
even if an enterprise allocates a minimum to accumulation, and 
incurs losses from investing these resources, it will reward its 
workers, instead of penalizing them. In addition, the system 
seems to shift emphasis from rewards for past investment, to 
rewards for current accumulation; but why should workers be 
rewarded for something they are not entirely free to decide 
upon?
4.2.2.Incentives for investing outside the firm
The 1970s economic reform introduced several instruments 
that were meant to increase the mobilization of savings exter­
nally, including different types of securities, while the 
organisation of an effective market for securitites was recom­
mended in all of the latest 5-year social plans from 1970 
onwards. The present analysis will be limited to long-ter*
219. See draft of the ‘•Social Compact on Income", in Bogetic,
(1987).
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financial instruments an enterprise can use for financing in-
220vestment.
D Pooling of labour and resources. At the enterprise level, 
one of the possible forms of the so-called “pooling of labour 
and resources'* is for one enterprise to invest in another. What 
is effectively being pooled is the investing enterprise’s finan­
cial resources with labour and resources of the enterprise 
invested in. Once the pooling of labour and resources is estab­
lished through the signing of a seIf-management agreement# the 
participants are supposed to jointly share income and risk# and 
influence the business and development policy of the firm (ALA# 
Art. 64-65).
However# legal provisions do not seem very stimulative for
221the investing enterprise. First# although the investing
enterprise is supposed to receive both a refund of invested 
capital and a compensation# the enterprise invested in is given
220. Thus short-term instruments (e.g. promissory notes used in 
direct inter-enterprise credits)# treasury bills of the National 
Bank of Yugoslavia# or certificates of deposit (issued by banks 
upon request)# all introduced by the 1971 "Law on Securities"# 
have not been considered.
221. Our observations have been inspired and are in part based 
on an excellent critique of these issues by S. Babic (1983).
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priority in income distribution. Second, the possibility of a 
permanent share in the income of the enterprise invested in is 
223clearly excluded. Third, contrary to the envisaged M joint
bearing of risk", it is the investing enterprise that bears all
the risk: once the time-limit of the contract has expired, it
has no further rights in recovering invested capital, while the
enterprise invested in is ensured, in advance, even a part of
income for accumulation. Finally, it is even envisaged that the
investing enterprise may renounce its right to the restitution
* , ^ 224of pooled resources.
Therefore it is not surprising that this form of pooling
resources has not had a significant role in stimulating direct
investment in other firms. Out of total long-term investment of
firms, in 1984 only 13.2% had been invested in other en-
225terprises. In 1981, long-term bank credits to enterprises
were eleven times higher than long-term pooled resources among
222
222. "Shares in joint income on account of past labour shall be 
realized from the part of such income left after the allocation 
of resources for personal incomes ..." (ALA, 1976, Art. 32; see 
also Art. 84).
223. "The right to the share in joint income shall expire upon 
the refund of the value of pooled resources and compensation, or 
upon the expiration of the time-limit determined by the 
selfmanagement agreement, irrespective of the amount in which 
the value of pooled resources has been refunded ...H (ALA, 1976, 
Art. 85; see also Art. 83).
224. ALA, Art 82 and Art. 85.
225. SZS, (1986), p. 43.
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enterprises; the ratio between short-term obligations of en­
terprises on the basis of pooled resources, bonds, bank credits,
22 6and direct credits, was 1:1 .5:10:20.
The 1982 LEHPL merely elaborates the legal provisions 
already contained in the ALA. It confirms the temporary charac­
ter of a contract concluded by the two enterprises, and provides 
an additional element to protect the enterprise invested in. The 
only exception to the rule that the partnership ends when the 
time-limit of the agreement has expired, is "in cases that the 
time-limit has been overpassed by the fault of the enterprise 
invested in" (Art. 39). Therefore, if the enterprise invested in 
encounters difficulties in realizing a joint project, it can 
prolong the duration of the contract, and hence effectively 
postpone its obligations towards the investing enterprise 
(instead of being in some way penalized).
2)Pooling resources in a b ank. Another form of pooling 
resources is the type that occurs when a bank is formed. Banks 
have during the 1970s been transformed into "service agencies" 
of enterprises, operating under direct control of their founding 
members. A bank can be founded by enterprises and self-managed 
communities of interest (prior to 1977, also by sociopolitical 
communities), which sign a self-management agreement on the
226. See Mramor (1984), pp. 82, 86.
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bank's foundation (ALA, Art. 16). The founders of a bank may 
contribute an initial amount of capital, but this is from 1977 
no longer obligatory. Founding members guarantee all obligations 
of a bank with their own resources, and thus jointly carry the 
liability for the bank's operations. All decisions are made not 
by workers of a bank, but by the bank's members, which all have 
equal say at the general assembly# irrespective of invested
227capital. After operating costs have been covered and
resources set aside for the bank's work community# all new 
income is distributed among founding members# both depositors 
and borrowers, as it is considered that both borrowing and 
lending contribute to the bank's income. The distribution of 
income is carried out proportionately to the "contribution" made 
by these organisations* to be determined in a self-management 
agreement (ALA, Art. 89).
However# the existing concept of banks as "service
agencies" is presently being changed. The federal government has 
recently advanced a rather bold proposal that banks should be 
transformed into "independent shareholding institutions".
Shareholders who contribute initial funds would have full
227• Prior to the 1977 Law on Banking, the number of votes of 
each founder was supposed to be linked to the amount of capital 
contributed# but in practice# each founder nevertheless usually 
had only one vote (see Mramor# 1984).
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property rights# including the right to management, which would 
be directly linked to the amount of invested capital. In addi­
tion to enterprises and self-managed communities of interest, as 
in the previous system, shareholders would also include 
sociopolitical communities, citizens, foreign investors and 
banks (although these categories would not oe allowed to estab-
228lish new banks).
For the different forms of pooling of resources, the 1971 
"Law on Securities" envisages the use of certificates of pooled 
resources, which entitle the bearer to participate in both 
profits and management. These certificates have a minimum 
redemption period of 10 years, can be issued by an enterprise, a 
bank, or an insurance company, and are transferable to other 
enterprises, banks, and sociopolitical communities. Certificates 
issued by an enterprise can be subscribed only by another en­
terprise or a foreign firm? those by a bank, by enterprises, 
communities of interest, and sociopolitical communities? and by 
an insurance company, in addition to the above categories, also
229by banks.
3)Bonds. Fixed-interest rate bonds of sociopolitical com­
munities and of enterprises have legally been introduced into
228. See Ekonoaska Politika no. 1908, Oct. 24, 1988, pp. 22-23.
229. 1971 "Law on Securities", Art. 16-23, 46, 52-55.
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the Yugoslav economy already during the 1960s, but those issued
230by enterprises were few and only on an experimental basis.
The 1971 Law introduced the possibility for enterprises, 
sociopolitical communities, and communities of interest to issue 
not only bonds at a fixed interest rate (which can be higher 
than the limited legal interest rate on bank credits), but also 
profit-related bonds, which bring an interest depending on 
business results of the enterprise issuer. The redemption period 
of all bonds must not be shorter than 2 years*
The 1971 Law has also relaxed conditions under which issues 
can be made* An enterprise has to have a minimum amount of
231capital in its business and reserve fund, and the total 
nominal value of bonds issued must not exceed the value of the 
enterprise's business and reserve fund. However, if an en­
terprise does not fulfill these conditions, it can still issue 
bonds if another enterprise, bank, or sociopolitical community 
is willing to guarantee*
Contrary to certificates on pooled resources, which can be 
subscribed by a limited number of institutions, bonds can be 
bought by practically all types of organizations and in addi­
tion, also by households*
>230* The first enterprise to issue bonds in Yugoslavia was 
"Crvena zastava* in 1969*
231* In 1971 set to 20 million dinars*
In practice, sociopolitical communities have issued bends
232far more often than enterprises. Earlier presented data
(Table 36, Appendix B) suggest that enterprises give preference 
to short-tera instruments, primarily promissory notes, which 
have accounted for by far the largest part of all securities of
233the enterprise sector in 1977-94 (see Graph 1).
Graph 1
Securities in Yugoslavia, bought by banks 
(as % of total)
1977-1984
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Source: Table B6 , Appendix B (a ).
lD Other
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1  Promissory notes
232. Prout, (1985), p. 95.
233. Comparing the value of all securities issued by productive 
OALs, with the value of promissory notes, leads to the 
conclusion that promissory notes accounted for 60% to 90% of 
securities issued by enterprises (see Table B6 ).
As can be see from Graph 1, the ratio of bonds to other 
types of securities has been steadily declining from 1977 on­
wards. Nevertheless# some recent examples of successful issuing 
of bonds by enterprises include "Elektroprivreda*# who has 
issued bonds at a fixed interest rate a bit higher than the bank 
interest rate# and HCrvena zastava’*# who has issued bonds for 
its newest "Florida" car at an interest rate lower than the bank 
interest rate# but ensuring to subscribers priority in delivery.
4)COAL3 . Existing laws envisage different ways of mobi­
lizing private savings of individuals in intermediate forms of 
enterprises# based on a mixture of private capital and the self­
management system. The first of these forms is a "contractual 
organisation of associated labour" (COAL)# in which an in­
dividual pools his labour and privately-owned resources with 
labour of other workers on a self-management basis. The in­
dividual receives a compensation for invested resources# 
participates in profits# and has the right to run# as manager# 
the business of a COAL. Private capital in a COAL can be con­
tributed by more than one individual.
Although the ALA envisages the participation of different 
organisations with their socially-owned assets in the estab- 
lishement of a COAL (Art. 306)# in practice existing COALs have
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more often been composed of solely private capital. Two 
features distinguish a COAL from small firms of the private
sector. First, in a COAL there is no limit on the number of
workers that can be employed, and hence, COALs are often much
larger enterprises than those of the private sector. Second, 
COALs must respect certain rules which apply to normal social- 
sector enterprises, which may be unstimulative. Thus workers' 
personal incomes are given priority in income distribution (the 
part paid to the manager on account of ownership, other than his 
personal income, is a residual); and the capital maintenance
requirement must be respected (Art. 311-312). Furthermore, the 
manager's rights on account of ownership are not clearly
defined, as they are determined by the contract on the estab­
lishment of the COAL (Art. 312). Finally, a COAL has been
envisaged as a transitional form of enterprise to be gradually 
transformed into a standard socially-owned firm: workers have
the right to buy the owner out over time, by paying the histori-
235cal cost of capital invested.
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234. Commentators have observed that this is in effect a private 
enterprise acting under certain legal restraints. Workers sign a 
contract with the owner, who in turn agrees to conform to self- 
management rules (Singleton and Carter, 1982, pp. 199, 203).
235. "If the value of the resources which the manager has pooled 
... has been paid out ... the manager's right to a share in 
income on account of his ownership right shall be terminated* 
(ALA, 1976, Art. 315).
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Evidence on COALs reveals that from 23 in 1976# their 
number has risen to 59 in 1978# to 156 in 1982# and to 225 in 
1984 (SZS 1986# p. 32)# the latest figure representing about
0.01% of the total number of organisations in Yugoslavia (all 
forms included).
5)Individual private savings. The second instrument for 
mobilizing private savings envisages that firms may collect 
financial resources from citizens (ALA# Art. 91). A citizen that
invests his savings in a socially-owned enterprise has the right
to recover invested capital# and to receive a compensation in 
the form of interest or other benefits. If these resources are
used for creating new work places# a labour relationship with
the citizen may be established.
The 1982 LERPI* specifies what is intended by "other 
benefits'1 (employment; housing and training; using services of 
the enterprise)# and clearly states what such a benefit may not 
include: that an individual enjoys the benefit for an unlimited 
amount of time; that he participates in management; and that he 
participates in income distribution# other than receiving inter-
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A special law regulating private investment by citizens has 
237been adopted in 1936. The law contains both stimulative and
unstimulative elements. It envisages that instead of employing 
the investor, a member of his family may be employed, but also 
specifies that the investor has the right to start recovering 
invested capital only after a period of three years, thus limit­
ing the liquidity of such an investment.
4.3.Recent proposals for reform
At the center of the present deoate on the economic reform 
in course is the question of property. The concept of social 
property, that has for years been accepted in a rather acriticai 
way as one of the fundamental features of the Yugoslav
238economy, is for the first time being openly criticized. 
Related to the issue of property, there is a revival of interest
2 36est (Art. 46).
236. Hence, even if the benefit takes the form of employing the 
citizen, such an individual is automatically put in a position 
of a "second-order* worker: not only must his employment be of a 
fixed duration, but he will be excluded from participating in 
management and income. This could not have been the intention of 
the Law.
237. "Zakon o p n b a v l j a n j u  sredstava od gradjana za prosirivanje 
materijalne osnove organizacija udruzenog rada", Sluzbeni List 
SFRJ no. 24, 1986, as reported by Labus (1987), pp. 139-40.
238. Nevertheless, endless discussions about the real meaning of 
social property have been going on for years, as disagreement 
among Yugoslav scholars exists on practically all issues. On 
these earlier discussions, see B. Horvat (1970), pp. 49-52.
in traditional financial instruments, and a lively debate on 
shareholding is presently going on. What has emerged from these 
discussions is a generally favourable attitude towards the 
diversification of property rights.
4.3.1.Workers * "shareholding-
Several economists have recently been advocating the intro­
duction of a form of w o r k e r s4 shareholding, i.e. "shareholding 
of past labour" in line with Kardelj's scheme on past labour. 
Some of these views will be discussed.
Thus S. Babic (1983) considers there is no reason why 
shareholding by producers should explicitly be prohibited, since 
the law does not prohibit shareholding by citizens (investing in 
savings accounts). In order to increase an entrepreneur's 
motivation to invest, both in his own and another enterprise, 
and increase the mobility of capital, Babic advances two 
principle proposals. The first is to introduce a "parametric" 
price (a scarcity-reflecting price, or charge) for the use of 
social capital, thus ensuring the social character of property. 
The second proposal is to allow "shareholding entrepreneurship",
i.e. the possibility for the collective entrepreneur to recover 
the principal of an investment, and receive a dividend for 
invested capital. If this type of shareholding was introduced, 
resources obtained through the capital charge would not be 
transferred to an external institution, but could be left at the
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disposal of the enterprise. The entrepreneur would be per­
manently excluded from consuming this part of income, but would 
become indifferent whether he will invest it in his, or another 
enterprise# as long as he can recover the principal of an in­
vestment •
While Babic's proposal would probably increase capital 
mobility, it would not eliminate the essence of the underinvest­
ment problem. Babic implicitly proposes that resources obtained 
through a capital charge would have to be used for investment. 
If this is imposed on the firm, the decision to invest hardly 
reflects a voluntary choice of the collective. Babic's solution 
would ensure higher levels of investment, but through ad­
ministrative norms and not by influencing an entrepreneur's 
"motivation to invest“ .
Furthermore, Babic does not consider the disincentive 
effects of the capital maintenance requirement. If the Yugoslav 
firm continues to be obliged to maintain the value of its capi­
tal, Babic's "shareholding entrepreneurship" per se could never 
ensure the full recovery of the principal of an investment. 
Although a partial relief from the capital maintenance require­
ment is present in practice, the obligation still applies to a 
part of capital, and hence there would be no possibility, under 
Babic's scheme, to recover the principal of an investment in 
capital which effectively is being maintained.
21S
M. Milovancvic (1986) develops a theoretical model of
239rewarding workers' past labour. Among the assumptions re­
quired for obtaining an equilibrium solution, is the existence 
of a capital market, and of a compensation for using social 
capital. The model shows that under free capital market condi­
tions, optimal remuneration of past labour is possible; and that 
an economy without a capital market is inferior respect to an 
economy having such a market, since it will have lower consump­
tion per employed in all time periods.
Milovanovic also offers a concrete proposal on how to 
introduce w o r k e r s1 shares in a socialist economy (1986, pp. 116- 
7). He proposes that the state issues initial shares in 
proportion to the value of social capital, and distributes them 
to the population. What would then follow is the trading of 
shares on an organised market. Workers would in general own 
shares of their own firm, but could also buy shares of other 
firms. Such ownership would not give the worker any right in 
management, which remains a self-management right of those 
employed, but would only guarantee a dividend depending on the 
firm's business results. When retiring, a shareholder would not
239. As a theoretical framework under conditions of certainty, 
Milovanovic uses the Austrian theory of capital (in a simple 
Fisher-Hayek form), and under conditions of uncertainty, 
Hirshleifer's theory of probabilistic decision-making.
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abandon his share; only after a worker's death do his rigths 
cease. Shares would not be transferable to heirs, but would go 
into a state fund from which each 18-year old citizen would be 
given a minimal amount of shares. In this way social resources 
would in a real sense become "social*,while workers would become
240permanently interested in investing.
Milovanovic*s proposal is appealing, but fails to clarify 
several issues. How are shares valued on the market, and would 
they reflect the net worth of an enterprise? What would be the 
incentive for outside shareholders to buy no-voting shares? How 
would a possible divergence of interests between workers and 
outside shareholders be resolved? According to which principles 
are initial shares distributed to the population? Would new 
shares, corresponding to the increment in social capital, be 
equally accessible to all; or would workers employed in the 
enterprise issuing new shares be given priority, in order to 
ensure that the majority of shareholders remain workers 
employed? Otherwise, the underinvestment problem would not be 
resolved: workers could vote for consumption rather than invest­
ment# while the outside shareholder, having no vote, would be 
powerless to press for more investment.
240. Milovanovic*s proposal bears some similarities with the 
proposal on "entrepreneurial socialism" of a Hungarian economist 
T. Liska, first advanced in the mid-sixties (see Barsony, 1982).
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Another economist in favour of shareholding is T. Nikolic, 
who argues (1986) that workers' shareholding has net advantages 
over credit relations that have enabled the present high indeb­
tedness of the economy. Workers as co-owners of social capital 
would be interested in its increase, because dividends on the 
basis of past labour would directly be linked to realized 
profits, and because their personal property (value of snares) 
would depend on the efficiency of its use. The introduction of 
workers' shareholding would not only prevent inefficient invest­
ment by political bureaucracyr out would resolve the "enigma” 
regarding the unprecise definition of social property, as eacn 
individual subject would need to bear risk and responsibility. 
Social capital would increase depending directly on the creation 
of domestic accumulation, and hence further indebtedness would
241be prevented. Workers' shareholding would not represent the 
negation of social property, since it is directly based on Marx. 
When describing cooperative factories, Marx spoke of a worker 
having two functions: as the proprietor of his own means of 
production, he is a capitalist and receives profit, and as a 
worker, he is hired labour and receives a wage.
241. This is doubtful, however? several economies with share 
capital have not avoided the problem of high external debt, e.g. 
Brasil, Mexico, etc.
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Nikolic does not discuss, however, the problem of hew to 
reconcile social property with the concretization of property 
rights and workers* share capital. In fact, he finds a com­
promise by using a highly ambiguous term: "workers*
shareholding social property".
A concrete solution to this problem is offered by Labus
(1987), who proposes a clear distinction between macro and micro 
interests and competences regarding property, to be divided 
between working collectives and state organs. In order to 
prevent "group-ownership" tendencies, a price for the use of 
capital should be introduced.
On the other extreme, several economists have attacked such 
proposals, mainly on ideological grounds, regarding workers* 
shareholding a step backwards, leading to reprivatisation and 
recapitalisation of socialism. M. Korac (1986, p. 188) has gone 
as far as to calculate what the introduction of workers* 
shareholding could cause in terms of capital losses: social 
capital, instead of increasing 6 times in the next 40 years, 
would only increase 1.8 times. Nevertheless, Korac's calcula­
tions are based on the simplified assumption that workers would 
distribute the larger part (two thirds) of accumulation in the 
form of dividends, that would thereafter go into their personal
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consumption, thus considerably decreasing the average accumula­
tion rate of the economy. However, he offers no arguments why
242this assumption should hold.
Similarly, Stambuk (1988) is against workers' shares, 
acritically opting for a status quo solution: according to the 
author, the only way to motivate workers to produce efficiently 
His by enforcing a property form through which individual and 
class interests of direct producers are expressed in a most 
efficient way, and this can only be social property* (p. 19).
Finally, Bajt (1988, pp. 6-7) has recently expressed doubts 
about the positive effects of workers' shareholding in en­
terprises where they are employed. He considers that workers 
would need to be given the possibility of selling their shares 
(otherwise motivation would be absent), which could seriously 
undermine the whole social sector and transform the Yugoslav 
system into a capitalist economy. The principal problem of the 
Yugoslav economy according to Bajt is not the lack of savings, 
but of entrepreneurship.
242. If workers are co-owners of capital, this would not be 
their long-term interest. Even if a large part of profits is 
distributed in the form of dividends, mechanisms meant to 
mobilize workers' savings for productive purposes could prevent 
the lowering of the accumulation rate.
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4.3.2 .Shareholding by external capital providers
The second group of proposals concerns incentives of an 
enterprise to invest outside the firm. Many of these proposals 
seek solutions for introducing, in some way or another, schemes 
similiar to shareholding, but without affecting the socialist 
features of the economy, e.g. by introducing shareholding on a 
limited scale, either in specific sectors, or in a mixed- 
property sector.
Recent discussions on the issue of a "mixed economy" sug­
gest that tne diversification of property forms in Yugoslavia 
could have important positive effects. B. Kovac proposed the 
division of the economy into three sectors: social, private, and 
mixed. The social sector could be given 5-6 years, a transition 
period during which conditions for the survival of firms would 
be tightened, and enterprises not surviving would be liquidatedr 
while the establishment of a mixed sector with diversified 
property forms* where shareholding would be allowed, would 
stimulate competition (Round Table Discussion-RTD, 1986).
Other economists are sceptical about the possibility of 
introducing shareholding even on a limited scale, because of 
ideological reasons (Mencinger), negative consequences 
shareholding may have, by increasing competition, on socially- 
owned enterprises (Inic), absence of citizens' confidence in the 
state without which a shareholding system cannot function 
properly (Jerovsek), incompatibility between a stock market and
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the present system in *hich the government "freezes'* and 
"unfreezes" the entire economy every three months (Labus), and 
eventual loss of control of the government, which can easily 
order 200 enterprise managers what to do, but not two million 
shareholders (Labus) (RTD, 1986). Bajt (1988, 1988a) puts em­
phasis on the high inefficiency of the Yugoslav economy, 
expressing doubts about shareholding being able to function 
under existing conditions: illiquidity problems of Yugoslav
enterprises in the past years have shown that they are often not 
even able to pay interest on bank loans, and hence would even 
less be capable of paying (higher) dividends.
However, the central argument that seems to worry Yugoslav 
economists is that shareholding may be in conflict with self­
management. Labus (in RTD, 1986) argues that no one would be 
willing to invest in a share of a firm unless he can retain some 
form of control in management* If this control is not ensured, 
shareholding capital would remain at a minimum level, but such 
control would be in conflict with self-management* Instead of 
shareholding, Labus considers that bonds, which do not imply the 
participation in management, have a better chance of success­
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fully being implemented.
Others, however, consider that the conflict between 
shareholding and self-management could be resolved. Bozovic 
suggests the parallel participation in management, of both 
workers and capital providers (in Lakicevic, 1987a). Nikolic and 
Raic (in Nikolic, 1986) propose the establishment of an assembly 
of shareholders in workers* councils of enterprises, which would 
have certain rights concerning the election of managerial bodies
244and the economic policy of the firm.
Finallyr these issues have widely been discussed also at 
the official level. Although the 1982 Stabilization Programme, 
the main document of the present reform, does not specifically 
treat the issue of property, problems related to property have 
lately been discussed officially by the Party, the government,
245and other political bodies. At a February 1987 meeting of the
243
243. Labus strongly advocates a system similar to the one 
existing in Mondragon cooperatives, where individual workers' 
accounts are not really shares, since a worker cannot sell the 
claim on his individual account before retiring.
244. We support the view that there are ways of reconciling
shareholding with seIf-management. The real obstacle to
shareholding in Yugoslavia is ideology, and not seIf-management 
(see Uvalic, 1988 ).
245. Discussions organized by the Central Committee of the 
League of Communists of both Macedonia (Skoplje, 1985) and 
Serbia (Belgrade, 1986), by the Presidency of the League of 
Communists of Yugoslavia (Kumrovec, 1986), and by the Chamber of 
Commerce (Belgrade, 1986) (see Korac, 1986, p. 187).
top Party organ (CCLCY), it has been proposed that individuals 
(even foreigners) should be permitted to privately own means of 
production (i.e., other than those in the small-scale private 
sector), while at a March meeting it has been suggested that 
Nthe economic and social situation requires that# in the 
framework of our socio-econcmic system# besides social, other 
forms of property are developed" (Lakicevic, 1987). This 
resulted in a document on property prepared for the Presidency 
of the CCLCY, which considers how to incentivate private invest­
ment on a wider scale# especially of Yugoslavs employed abroad, 
and how to encourage existing mixed property forms. In anotner 
document prepared for the government it has been proposed to 
ensure more rights to an enterprise investing in another 
(Lakicevic# 1987a).
The issue of workers shares in socially-owned enterprises 
has also in the meantime reached the official level, as a
proposal of the Serbian Commission for the reform.^46 It is 
reported that the proposal will in fact form part of the new
government measures, to be enacted by January 1, 1989.
246. As reported by Crnobrnja, head of the Serbian Commission, 
in Ekonoaska politika no. 1885, May 16, 1988.
247. See Wall Street Journal# 3-4 June, 1988, based on 
statements in Yugoslav press.
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Some of the articles concerning property in the 1974
Constitution will also be changed, as proposed in the draft of
the Amendment no. 9 to the Constitution which is presently under
discussion. For the moment, however, the document does not 
provide for any fundamental change. The problem deriving from
the unprecise definition of social property is recognised, but 
no concrete solution is offered, as social property in its 
existing form is to continue to be the dominant form of
property. Nevertheless, recent critiques of the document may
result in yet other modifications.
In the new Law on Enterprises, which has in the meantime
248been completed (but not yet approved), and which should, 
together with other two laws, replace the Associated Labour Act, 
four principal forms of property are envisaged: social, mixed, 
private, and foreign. In the case of non-social property forms, 
contributors of capital would actively participate, along with 
workers employed, in management, in proportion to invested 
capital, and the trade union would be given a more important
248. The Law has been submitted in the middle of October 1988 by 
the Federal Executive Council to the Federal Assembly for 
discussion and approval.
249. See "Politika", Oct. 26, 1988, p. 11.
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The prevailing position at the official level is that as 
long as the socially-owned enterprise continues to represent the 
dominant form of enterprise# shareholding on a limited scale 
need net threaten the socialist features of the economy. 
Nevertheless, there is still a lot of resistence towards cnanges
in this d i r e c t i o n . T h e  history of economic reforms in 
socialist countries teaches us, indeed, that there is a long way 
from proposals to elaboration and implementation.
4 . 4 .Workers * views
Finally, it is of interest to see how workers feel about 
the notion of past labour. A sociological study based on a 
questionnaire posed questions to some 3500 workers from Croatia 
and Slovenia on four specific issues: criteria for rewarding 
past labour, its concrete forms, the character of such a right, 
and its time dimension (Zupanov, 1977).
Table Cl. (see Appendix C) reveals that less precise 
criteria for rewarding past labour, such as personal income and 
total years of employment, were given priority. In order to 
explain such an attitude, additional questions were posed on the
250. E.g., the draft of the law on enterprises with foreign 
capital, meant to attract capital of Yugoslav workers employed 
abroad, had in the first instance been refused, on the basis of 
the argument that Yugoslav emigrants, having the exclusive right 
to invest in such enterprises, would be privileged respect to 
workers employed in Yugoslavia. However, the law has in the 
meantime been approved (late 1988).
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most precise criteria referring to individual investment by 
workers. A relative majority regarded this criteria was not in 
conformity with the law, which may be the reason for not having 
considered it.
Concerning forms of realizing the right to past labour, 16 
different forms were grouped into three subcategories depending 
on the role past labour rewards should have: entrepreneurial
(compensating postponed consumption); self-managed (managing 
social capital in general)? and security-oriented (securing 
workers' socio-economic welfare). Table C2 (see Appendix C) 
reveals that the most favoured forms of rewarding past labour
were those linked to: seniority in a specific firm (E), the
firm's productivity (J), nousing problems (0), and job protec­
tion (P).
The third group of questions concerned the character of the 
right to past labour rewards: whether it is a worker's subjec­
tive right, or a moral right based on solidarity? and whether it 
is a property right. Responding to the first question, the 
majority considered it a subjective right of each individual. 
Concerning the second question, workers thought past labour 
rights should not be linked to membership in an enterprise. 
However, a worker being fired for economic reasons should con­
tinue to enjoy such a right, but if he is dismissed because of 
his own fault, the right to past labour should cease. Only 
around 15% of workers thought that the right to past labour
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should be transferable, although the majority regarded it should 
be inheritable by family members (around 60% in both republics).
Finally, workers were asked what should be the minimum 
length of employment required for acquiring the right to past 
labour. In Croatia 51.5%, and in Slovenia 45% of workers thought 
5 years was sufficient. Workers were also asked whether the 
right to past labour ought to be recognised retrospectively; 50% 
of Croat, and 39% of Slovene workers expressed themselves in 
favour.
The results of the presented survey reveal that there might 
be social constraints to the introduction of workers' sharehold­
ing in Yugoslavia. On the one hand, it seems that the Yugoslav 
worker is risk-averse and is not willing to fully accept the 
role of an entrepreneur, but prefers the present "implicit" 
contract with the state which assures benefits irrespective of 
personal contribution. This is confirmed by workers preferring 
less precise criteria of rewarding past labour, their negative 
attitude towards investing personal savings, by answers on forms 
of past labour rewards, as three out of the four most preferred 
forms of rewarding past labour belong to the "security” oriented 
group ~(and not the entrepreneurial one), and by their attitude 
towards the right to past labour, which ought to be non- 
transferable, not linked to membership, but inheritable.
On the other hand, workers in Yugoslavia may be happy the 
, way things are: the solutions effectively adopted in practice do
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not diverge much from the desires of this group of workers,
given that the most preferred criteria, personal incomes and 
total seniority, are precisely those effectively applied in
practice, while out of the four most preferred forms of reward­
ing past labour, three can be said to be present in practice
(personal income depending on collective productivity, 30b 
protection, and social help for housing problems).
4.5.Concluding remarks
The new system of inducing workers to invest from retained 
earnings, based on rewards for past labour, has done little to 
increase a worker*s motivation to invest. Had Kardelj's scheme 
been implemented in a way as to link more directly past labour 
rewards to capital returns, or ideally, to the absolute increase 
in the value of net assets of an enterprise, the scheme might 
have improved investment incentives, as it would have contained 
some elements of shareholding. Workers would be rewarded for 
investing retained earnings in capital stock, and hence a 
worker, just like a shareholder, would be able to count on a 
personal return on a part of equity of the enterprise, while the 
fir* would be able to obtain, similarly to what is obtained by 
the issuing of shares, additional capital.
In this sense, a better application of K ardelj’s scheme 
could have improved incentives to invest, but it still would not 
have eliminated the disincentive to invest arising from the
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capital maintenance requirement (disregarding other considera­
tions which have pushed in the other direction). In spite of the 
partial ineffectiveness of the requirement in practice in 
Yugoslavia, the requirement is still likely to provoke some 
disincentive effects, albeit partial.
In addition, an important limitation would remain concern­
ing the possibility of converting shares into liquid assets. The 
collective would not be able to cash in past labour rights, as 
workers are not permitted to liquidate the enterprise volun­
tarily and distribute the proceeds, and neither would the 
individual worker be able to cash in these rights, as he cannot 
transfer them to other individuals. Therefore, past labour 
rewards could at best have taken the form of non-transferable, 
non-marketable dividends.
The second group of mechanisms, meant to incentivate in­
vestment outside the enterprise, also bear some similaritites 
with shareholding. Had the scheme of investing in other en­
terprises allowed a permanent sharing of income by the two 
enterprises# and had the joint bearing of risk been ensured, the 
instrument could have represented a form of shareholding of one 
socially-owned enterprise in another. The pooling of financial 
resources in a bank resembles shareholding insofar as it ensures 
founding members participation in profits, management, and the 
joint bearing of risk# but differs fundamentally from sharehold­
ing because it gives such a right to all members and hence
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irrespective of invested capital. The individual investing his 
capital in a COAL can be compared to a shareholder, as he does 
receive a part of profits on account of property, but sucn 
participation is also only temporary. Finally, the scheme for 
mobilizing private savings by socially-owned enterprises, as 
envisaged by the ALA effectively puts the citizen in the posi­
tion of a shareholder (although the 1982 LERPL took care of 
excluding such a possibility).
As to financial instruments, the certificate of pooled 
resources is the one that comes closest to shares, but in spite 
of being a long-term security, this certificate is also 
redeemable (as all other types of securities in Yugoslavia), and 
it cannot be subscribed by households.
Therefore, the nature of the schemes introduced into the 
Yugoslav economy during the 1970s clearly indicates that forms 
similar to shareholding are needed, also in a socialist economy.
At the same time, however, the discussion of these 
mechanisms indicates that in spite of intentions, the new 
schemes introduced by the 1970s economic reform were not quite 
successful in introducing built-in investment incentives, neces­
sary for the development of a market-oriented system in which 
enterprises would make autonomous investment decisions primarily 
according to market criteria.
The foregoing analysis serves to clarify further our 
principal hypothesis, proposed in Chapter 2 and explained in
234
Chapter 3, cn the continuous presence, in the whole post-1965 
period, of government intervention in the microeconomic sphere 
of investment decisions. Precisely because the discussed 
mechanisms have not functioned in a way to successfully sub­
stitute the role of state intervention of the previous periods, 
there remains a need for state involvement in investment 
decision-making in Yugoslavia.
A final question to be adressed is why the new financial 
mechanisms have not functioned as expected in incentivating 
efficient investment decisions in Yugoslavia. Is it because none 
of these instruments provide a permanent basis for income on 
account of ownership, in line with Furubotn and Pejovich's 
theory, or is it rather, because of other reasons? An answer to 
this question will be provided in the next, and last chapter of 
this study.
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Chapter 5. MOBILIZATION AND ALLOCATION OF INVESTMENT RESOURCES 
IN YUGOSLAVIA - SOME OPEN QUESTIONS
The major problem with the investment process in Yugoslavia 
in the post-1965 period has not been one of maintaining high 
levels of investment# but rather of mobilizing and allocating
251capital efficiently. Some of the principal problems of in­
vestment incentives, which have not yet been resolved by any of 
the undertaken reforms in Yugoslavia# will now be discussed.
These problems are directly linked to the efficiency of invest­
ment decisions, but are of a wider scope, since they concern the 
entire system of self-managed market socialism. Finding ap­
propriate solutions to these problems are among the necessary
conditions for improving the system of mobilization and alloca­
tion of investment resources. Possible solutions for improving 
the system will then be proposed# and concluding remarks drawn. 
5.1.Unresolved problems of investment incentives
Rewarding past labour has not improved much an enterprise's 
motivation to invest, nor has the diversification of financial 
instruments proved sufficient to increase the inter-enterprise
251. It is beyond the scope of this study to analyse in greater 
detail capital allocation inefficiencies in Yugoslavia, as this 
has been done elsewhere (Tyson, 1980? Schrenk et al., 1979; 
World Bank# 1983; etc.). The general conclusion of these studies 
is that after 1965 the allocation of capital has been suboptimal 
from several points of view.
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and inter-regional mobility of capital, and substitute bank 
credits by more direct forms of investment financing. Some of 
the reasons why the new schemes, discussed in the previous 
chapter, have not functioned as envisaged, include the absence 
of a secondary market of securities, an inadequate banking 
system, and inappopriate legislation. However, while these 
specific issues are important, the principal reason for the 
failure of the new instruments introduced into the Yugoslav 
economy in the 1970s, is of a more general character, and con­
cerns the unchanged nature of the enterprise-state relationship, 
and the related persistence of the soft budget constraint.
5.1.1.Secondary securities market
In order for securities to play the role they usually play 
in a capitalist economy, what is necessary is a developed market 
of securities, including a secondary market for securities. 
However, a secondary market for securities was never set up in 
Yugoslavia. The absence of such a market, which would have 
ensured immediate liquidity of resources placed in securities, 
is probably one of the principal reasons why securities in 
Yugoslavia, with the exception of promissory notes, have not 
been used to a greater extent.
Related to the issue of a secondary market of securities, 
is the problem of evaluation of net assets of enterprises. 
Although all of the discussed schemes introduced in the 1970s
bear some similarities with shareholding, they have nor suc­
ceeded in playing one of the essential roles equity shares play, 
or ought to play in the capitalist economy, of providing a
pricing mechanism by which enterprises v a l u e  themselves.
Motives for not setting up a secondary maricet of securities 
in Yugoslavia are of a wider nature. The rejection of a market 
for securities is directly linked to the cautious and limited 
use of tne market in general in Yugoslavia. The role of the
market in the Yugoslav economy has always been more important 
for final demand, than for factors of production. The normal 
functioning of both a capital market, and a labour market, has 
never been fully accepted, mainly for ideological reasons (see 
Schrenk et al. 1979). The belief present in the early 1960s, 
that a capital market is inconsistent with the principles of
252socialism, is widely diffused even today in Yugoslavia. 
Rather, a "specific" capital market, adapted to the needs of a 
self-managed, socialist economy (and hence a highly regulated 
capital market) is to be developed.
253Cirovic gives an illustrative explanation of the offi-
252. These discussions are reported in detail in Milenkovich 
(1971).
253. It is worth noting that professor M. Cirovic is one of the 
major Yugoslav experts on monetary issues, and his views on 
inflation have had a significant influence on government 
policies in recent years.
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cial attitude towards capital markets, in reference to 
securities: ‘'The introduction of a securities market is not a 
purely technical issue, since ... it enables speculative opera* 
tions on the market, ... financial losses for some and financial 
gains for others, leading to financial redistribution of income. 
This is directly in conflict with the self-managed economic 
system, which is trying to develop a system of distribution 
based on labour contributions. A complete market of securities 
would require the introduction of a flexible interest rate, 
formed exclusively on the basis of demand and supply of finan­
cial assets ... In such a system, associated labour would not be 
able to consciously regulate the level of the interest rate, but 
the market interest rate, formed 'behind the back of commodity 
producers', would be the main parameter. Hence the interest rate 
would dominate (rule over) enterprises... This is the principal 
reason why the Yugoslav economic system has not accepted the
introduction of a securities market...
Therefore, it is clear that the new financial instruments 
introduced in the 1970s, under conditions of a highly imperfect 
capital market, and the related impossibility of introducing an 
effective secondary market for securitites, could not have given 
the desired effects. Allowing economic agents to issue
,
254. Cirovic (1976), p. 85.
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securities, but without giving them the possibility of cashing 
them by trading them on the market, was only a half-way solution
which could not have proved satisfactory.
As to possible solutions, it is worth noting that e.g., in 
Hungary, a bond market has been operating since 1983, with both 
primary issues and secondary trading, whereas in China, several 
stock exchanges have oeen opened in 1986 (see tfuti, 1988b). 
These examples seem to indicate that capital markets (and stock 
markets) can be reconciled with socialism, and hence there is no 
reason why in Yugoslavia, secondary trading should continue to 
be regarded as being in conflict with socialist principles.
5.1.2.Banking system
The setting up of a secondary market of securities requires 
an adequate banking system which can successfully organise, and 
undertake operations on such a market. In Yugoslavia, however, 
all of the undertaken banking reforms, which have led to sub­
stantial decentralization of the banking aparatus, and the 
transferring of a part of investment decisions and investment 
financing to banks, have not been sufficient to assign the 
banking system the role it should have played as a financial 
intermediary.
255. On these issues, see Grlickov (1987).
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This is because commercial banks in Yugoslavia, at least 
until the very recent proposals, were never conceived as inde-
256pendent, prcfit-ma*ing institutions. In theory, they were to 
be merely "service1* agencies of enterprises founders operating 
under their direct control, and in line with such a concept, 
banks' capital funds have been limited by law.
A secondary market of securities could have developed if 
banks were prepared to buy as well as sell securities, but banks 
could only issue securities under very special circumstances
257with the permission of the Federal 2xecutive Council. The 
second part of Table B6 in Appendix B(a) indeed suggests that 
the value of securities issued by banks has remained modest, 
except for bonds. However, what is included in bonds, which have 
accounted for by far the largest part of all securities issued 
by banks, are obligatory funds for the development of less 
developed regions, which banks issue on behalf of en-
258terprlses.
On the other hand, while in theory banks were to be con­
trolled by enterprises founders, they have never really been
256. A possible exception is the period immediately following 
the 1965 economic reform.
*257. See Prout (1985), p. 94.
258.1 am grateful to M. Gaspari from the National Bank of 
Slovenia for having pointed out this to me.
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freed from the influence of political structures. Although some 
of the undertaken measures seemed to move in this direction, 
such as tne exclusion of sociopolitical communities, from 1977 
onwards, from the list of organisations permitted to found, and 
hence directly invest in banks, different political authorities 
have still been deciding on a number of other important issues
259concerning a bank's functioning*
Since the Yugoslav bank has no capital of its own, and 
cannot freely decide on the use of its funds since it is under 
the pressure of both enterprises founders, and political struc­
ture, it cannot have an important role in placing capital in 
most profitable ventures. In the absence of an independent 
banking system, it is not surprising that capital market imper­
fections have prevailed in Yugoslavia (serious underpricing of
260capital, administrative methods of capital allocation, etc.).
The consequence of the limited autonomy of the Yugoslav 
bank is that it does not bear risk and responsibility for its
259. Thus it is political organs at the republican level who 
issue the certificate that the necessary conditions are 
fulfilled for the founding of a bank; communal representatives 
participate actively in social compacts which dertermine the 
role of banks in the financing of priority sectors; political 
structures are also initiators of inter-bank social compacts 
(e.g., on interest rate policy); see Mramor (1984).
260. As noted by Tyson (1983), "the fatal shortcoming of the 
banking system reform was the failure to impose a price- 
rationing standard on the allocation of investment funds" (p. 
299).
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decisions. Indeed* the same type of socialization of losses 
present in enterprises is also present in banks* but to an even 
higher extent. The banking law envisages that banks should 
evidence all ncn-cashed liabilities in the course of 60 days* 
and should "regulate" them by refinancing* by writing them off* 
or by booking them as "dubious"* which effectively enables banks
not to evidence losses.261 It is only recently* in 1987* tnat 
the first commercial bank has been closed in Yugoslavia* in 
connection with the financial scandal of false promissory notes 
of the enterprise "Agrokomerc".
The recent proposal of the federal government of transform­
ing banks into shareholding profit-making institutions* seems to 
be the first step in the right direction. In addition* the 
legalization of political influence* by again allowing 
sociopolitical communities to found banks* and invest capital 
funds in them* is probably a better solution than the existing 
system which formally excludes state organs from banks' deci­
sions* but de facto ensures high influence of political 
structures.
261. As reported by Grlickov (1987a).
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5.1.3.Legislation
The legislation on all financial instruments existing in 
Yugoslavia does not seem sufficiently motivating for the poten­
tial investor. What is needed are regulations which would be 
more stimulative for the provider of capital. In the first 
place, the potential investor must be assured fuller control 
over invested capital, even if this may require decreasing 
existing "self-management rights” of workers in decision-making. 
Parallel participation in management, by both workers and capi­
tal providers, could be a possible solution.
From the legal point of view, since existing arrangements 
are all characterized by temporary participation in profits of 
the individual/institution contributing capital, a solution 
could be sought in explicitly allowing a continuous renewal of 
contracts with external providers of capital, thus allowing a 
"hidden” form of shareholding. Such schemes could be interpreted 
as a temporary (renewable) right to income from using socially- 
owned resources, and not a "permanent right to income from 
ownership", and hence would be fully acceptable from an 
ideological point of view, but could significantly increase the 
incentives to invest in another enterprise.
5.1.4.Enterprise-state relationship
The setting up of a complete market for securitites, paral­
lel with a more independent banking system, and more stimulative 
legislation for investors, would probably not be sufficient to
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have an efficient system of investment mobilization and alloca­
tion in Yugoslavia, without resolving the crucial issue: enable 
the individual enterprise to operate as an autonomous economic 
262agent. This in turn requires a clearer specification of
property relations, and related to this issue, a further hard­
ening of the budget constraint.
After the official abolition of state property, as already 
mentioned# all capital assets became social property, granting 
enterprises only the right to use socially-owned resources. 
Whereas this principal regulation concerning property has
263remained intact in the course of the next decades, the im­
plications of the rule in practice for the individual enterprise 
have been different.
The system applied in the 1965-71 period was a solution
that enabled the retaining of "social" property (although unof­
ficially still state property), while at the same time avoiding 
some of the problems of "group-ownership" tendencies.
Enterprises were charged a tax for the use of social capital, 
whereas resources collected through the tax on social capital
262. This does not exclude, as already mentioned, the 
possibility of having substantial government intervention, 
through various macroeconomic policy measures, but simply 
implies the exclusion of permanent government sector-specific 
interference in the microeconomic sphere.
263. The 1976 ALA clearly states that "no one may acquire the 
right of ownership over social resources" (Art. 12).
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were allocated, through the banking mechanism, to enterprises 
seeking investment loans.
However, in the early 1970s, the conclusion was reached 
that this solution was not entirely in conformity with self­
management, since a tax on social capital implied the imposing 
on the enterprise of a minimum level of savings from retained 
earnings for investment purposes. In order to further increase 
the autonomy of enterprises in investment decision-making, in 
1971 the tax on social capital was abolished. Investment 
resources were to be left to the enterprise, which would use 
them freely for investment purposes, mainly according to ten­
dencies prevailing on the market. The individual enterprise was 
thus expected to become an autonomous collective entrepreneur.
But in practice, the decentralization of investment deci­
sions, together with the elimination of charges for socially 
owned resources, led to a series of problems. The abolishing of 
the tax on social capital meant that enterprises acquired full 
rights to the income streams generated by social capital. This 
in turn meant the sanctioning of nonlabour factor incomes, the 
introduction of implicit factor incomes, and hence the gener­
ation of income inequality due to different capital
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endcwnments. These tendencies have been interpreted by many 
scholars as implying an effective redistribution of property 
rights, i.e. the expansion of enterprise property rights vis-à- 
vis the state. Bajt (1968) has in fact argued that economic 
ownership, reflected in the system of distribution (the right to 
entrepreneurial incomes), needs not correspond to the legal 
title of property, and consequently, that Yugoslav enterprises 
behave, and the law has to enable them to behave, as if they
265were the effective owners of capital.
However, it should be stressed that the interpretation of 
social property as a form of group property of the enterprise, 
is indeed a very specific form of "ownership” . By acquiring 
rights to the income stream generated by socially-owned capital, 
enterprises have not been assigned other functions that owner­
ship usually encompasses, including the right of disposal and 
the bearing of risk. These are the fundamental differences 
between the right to use and the right to own. What was not 
sufficiently recognized in Yugoslavia, and is only recently
264
264. As commented by Milenkovich (1971, p. 265), "The Yugoslav 
principle of distribution becomes to each according to the 
factors of production suplied by the human agent or to which the 
human agent has access, as valued on the (imperfect) market"; 
see further pp. 252-272.
265. However, it should be stressed that Bajt has in the 
meantime modified his view. In (1988) he argues that the real 
owners of social capital, even in the economic sense in 
Yugoslavia, are political structures.
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gaining ground, is that along with positive rewards for 
entrepreneurship, negative rewards (penalties) for poor 
(investment) decisions are also necessary, and hence an ap­
propriate incentives system of both profits and losses.
Under the existing system of "social" property, capital is 
officially owned by "the whole society", but the real owner of 
capital is the state. Although until the 1980s, the enterprise 
seemed the effective owner of income streams from socially-owned 
resources, the state (society) was responsible for the coverage 
of losses, the setting up and liquidation of enterprises, and 
for a number of other issues which determine "the rules of the 
game” . The very recent Yugoslav experience confirms that the 
real owner of capital in Yugoslavia is the state, as the 
Yugoslav enterprise has lost practically all control over its 
income, including entrepreneurial income. As stressed by Bajt
(1988), the Yugoslav LMF is no more than a form of workers* 
participation in state management of the economy (p. 35). Such
property relations have therefore had concrete negative implica­
tions on the responsibility of the single enterprise, including 
the bearing of all consequences for investment decisions.
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5.2 .Possible solutions
Although today# the traditional socialist doctrines on 
private property is being reinterpreted in most socialist coun­
tries,256 private property has always been identified with 
capitalism, and hence its extention in socialist countries needs 
to remain on a limited scale. This is equally true for 
Yugoslavia. A permanent right to an income from ownership poses 
unsurmountable ideological barriers even in a reformed, highly 
decentralized, socialist economy. Therefore it is necessary to 
seek solutions within the existing institutional framework of 
"social" property.
One solution would be to return to the system existing 
until 1971, by reintroducing a charge for the use of social
capital.2^7 However, since social property would effectively 
(unofficially) remain in state property, the responsibility for 
its use would at least indirectly remain in the hands of the 
state. This would probably again require the imposing of the 
capital maintenance requirement (in order to prevent workers 
from consuming capital), and hence from a purely theoretical
266. The most obvious examples are financial innovations in the 
USSR, Hungary, and China.
267. The prevalent position among Yugoslav economists is that 
enterprises should pay society the market-clearing interest rate 
for the use of social property.
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point of view, the disincentive to invest from retained earnings 
would not be eliminated.
The other solution is to decentralize ownership of social 
property, but without individualising it. Social property could 
officially be recognized as collective property. Concrete 
(collective) holders of property rights would be specified, 
which could be enterprises and all other forms of organizations 
existing in Yugoslavia, including the state. The part of capital 
stock inherited by an enterprise from the state, at foundation 
or at the time of transition to social property, would remain in 
social (state) ownership, for which the state would be given an 
appropriate number of shares. In spite of the fact that capital 
initially contributed by the state has lost much of its value or 
has become obsolete, it has still served in providing the gross 
income out of which some of today1s capital has come in exist­
ence, and this should therefore be recognized.
All subsequent increments of capital that the enterprise 
has financed through its own savings from retained earnings, 
could be left at its disposal. An enterprise's capital would 
thus consist of two principle parts: initial capital in social 
(state) property, and capital effectively owned by the en­
terprise, in collective property.
Such a concretization of social property would not only 
respond more to the requirements of self-management, but it 
would specify that it is the individual organisation (whether
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economic# non-economic, or state) that ought to bear full 
responsibility for the use of its part of social capital, and 
hence would imply the imposing of a hard budget constraint.
Since the issuing of shares to the state would prevent the
consuming of capital to which workers have not contributed,
in such a system there would be no need to impose the obligation
to maintain the value of capital assets, and hence the cause of
the underinvestment problem would be eliminated. At the same
time, in order to induce workers to undertake investment from
retained earnings, workers could be issued profit-related bonds
equivalent to reinvested income per head, as a recognition of
their Mpast labour19, and hence be rewarded accordingly for their
investment decisions. An appropriate incentives system could
take the place of individual workers' shares based on private
property, as risk-sharing does not necessarily require owner-
. . 268 ship.
In addition, in order to increase the mobility of capital, 
organisations who have free financial resources at their dis­
posal could invest them in other enterprises, for which they
268. Some regard workers' shares are fully compatible with 
social property and socialism, under the condition tnat an 
egalitarian system is provided that permits everyone access to 
capital? see Milovanovic (1986); and Liska, in Barsony (1982). 
For an alternative solution of introducing risk-bearing in a 
socialist economy but not private property rights, see Nuti 
(1987a).
would receive shares ensuring participation in management# which 
would be tradeable on the secondary market.
In case an enterprise is closed# initial capital con­
tributed by the state/society would be returned to the state, 
whereas all remaining capital, after debts are repaid, other 
enterprises' shares and workers' bonds redeemed, could be dis­
tributed to workers*
Or# following Nuti's (1987a, 1988a, 1988b) recent
proposals# a competitive periodic valuation of enterprise assets 
could be introduced through a process of bidding# where an 
enterprise’s capital would either be revalued# or overbid out of 
its hands by other enterprises. Such periodic valuation would 
ensure the potential mobility of resources towards their most 
productive uses. In such a system, state's initial capital would 
be continuously revalued; enterprises could benefit from a 
higher market valuation of their own assets if they are forced 
to surrender them; and individual workers would benefit from any 
reinvestment or revaluation of their past labour through the 
acquisition of bonds. If a worker left the enterprise# he could 
cash in his bonds corresponding to that part of enterprise 
capital financed by his efforts, or revalued during the period 
of employment in the enterprise since he joined, and hence would 
leave nothing behind (Nuti# 1988a).
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5.3.Concluding remarks
When institutions that ensure the direct interest in effi­
cient factor use that ownership provides do not exist, they can 
be simulated. Property is becoming less important even in 
capitalist countries, as the recent tendency towards 
reprivatization has shown that efficiency is not necessarily a 
question of ownership, but of incentives.
It is probably possible to find solutions that could lead 
to efficient investment decision, also in socialism, without the 
introduction of private ownership of capital. Decentralization 
of investment decisions does not necessarily require the 
reprivatisation of capital, but it does require risk-bearing.
It is not a question of returning to capitalism, but of 
using its financial instruments by adapting them to socialism, 
through the definition of alternative mechanisms of incentives 
that could play the role they play in capitalist economies. And 
as noted by A. Bajt: ’'The most efficient way of simulating
capitalist relations of property, entreprenuership, and manage­
ment (in Yugoslavia), is by liquidating all decision-making on 
entreprenuership outside associated labour, i.e. by transferring 
entrepreneurial functions to working collectives" (1986, p. 45).
In concluding, it would be unfair to ascribe all inef­
ficiencies in investment decision-making in Yugoslavia to 
socialism. Self-management, or rather, the institutional forms 
of self-management implemented in Yugoslavia, have had their
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role in hampering efficient investment decisions. The develop­
ment of self-management has meant extensive (and probably 
excessive) decentralisation, which has resulted in extreme 
régionalisation and fragmentation, the pursuing of local inter­
ests, the building of "political" factories and superfluous 
duplication of plants, and the suboptimal utilization of 
269resources. However, respect to the other problems that have 
been discussed, which concern the most fundamental issues of a 
market-oriented socialist economy, these problems are of minor 
importance.
269. These problems have also greatly been enhanced by the fact 
that Yugoslavia is a multinational country.
CONCLUSIONS )
Each chapter of our study has tried to answer a specific 
question related to investment of L M F s . These questions, and the 
answers provided by our research, are summarized below.
Ch. 1: Does the LMF exhibit a distinct investaent be­
haviour, and will this result in underinvestaent?
Respect to a capitalist firm, a LMF does face a distinct 
problem, which we have called the LRC principle, which derives 
from limited transferability rights: a worker of a LMF cannot 
sell his job and the future income stream it can generate, and 
hence can benefit fully from undertaken investment only if he 
stays in the firm for a sufficiently long period of time. The 
LRC principle is therefore expected to lead the LMF to adopt a 
'•truncated1* time horizon, and this in turn is likely to provoke 
the underinvestment effect.
Nevertheless, the conclusion on underinvestment cannot be 
generalized, as it needs to be evaluated by taking into account 
the concrete institutional setting in which a LMF operates. The 
concrete implications of the LHC principle for the LMF's invest­
ment decision will depend on specific regulations governing 
capital withdrawals in LMFs, distinguishing between those 
present in Yugoslavia (CMR), and those existing in workers' 
cooperatives (RWC).
The disincentive to invest would fully be present only in 
the extreme case, usually not encountered in practice, of a LMF 
obliged to respect a strong CMR (but even in this case may be 
removed if infinite time horizons are assumed). If a partial
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relief from the CMR is present, as has been the case in 
Yugoslavia, the investment bias is likely to be weaker, but is 
still likely to exhibit itself more than in workers* coopera­
tives (disregarding other considerations which have pushed in 
the otner direction), because the CMR is a more restrictive 
regulation than those existing elsewhere.
In the absence of a CMR, the LRC principle need not lead to 
the adoption of a truncated time horizon, the use of the time 
horizon as the dominant criterion in investment selection, and 
hence to underinvestment. RWC do impose concrete restrictions on 
cooperatives (but not in all countries), but do not seem to 
prevent cooperatives from adopting remuneration schemes which 
could compensate workers for the imperfect liquidity of an 
investment. That these restrictions need not produce a disincen­
tive to invest if an adequate system of rewarding workers’ 
investment decisions is introduced, seems indeed confirmed by 
the experience in some Western countries, in spite of the fact 
that it is precisely these countries in which the strictest 
rules are applied.
A LMF on which a CMR is not imposed may exhibit a 
preference for short-lived projects, but only if its' time 
horizon is shorter than the repayment period of an investment. 
This distortion, however, is not equivalent to underinvestment, 
and can be removed if sufficiently long time horizons are as­
sumed, or if we consider that in practice today, a capitalist 
firm may often have the same preference for quickest-yielding 
projects. If, on the contrary, the LMF's time horizon exceeds
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the repayment period of an investment, workers could, through 
appropriate schemes, fully benefit from income flows of an 
investment, and underinvestment need not prevail.
Ch. 2: Does Yugoslav empirical evidence on savings and
investment support the theoretical hypothesis on underinvest­
ment?
Empirical evidence from Yugoslavia revealed that relatively 
high investment and savings rates have been maintained in most 
of the period under examination. The short-term moderation in 
these rates at the aggregate level immediately after 1965, and 
the drastic reduction in investment spending in the 1980s, 
suggested that the state has retained substantial control over 
the investment process in Yugoslavia.
In addition, Yugoslav enterprises' savings have been posi­
tive and not exceptionally low in the whole 1966-85 period, and 
have accounted for a rising portion of gross domestic savings. 
Similarly, the theoretical hypotheses on the financing of in­
vestment of a LMF are also not fully supported, as Yugoslav 
firms have been financing a large portion of their fixed invest­
ment from internal sources.
However# since the theory is based on the assumption that 
LMFs are free to decide on their principal policy issues, 
whereas in Yugoslavia at least a part of savings and investment 
have not been entirely voluntary, such evidence cannot be taken 
as definitely refuting the theory. Nevertheless, neither does 
empirical evidence from Yugoslavia generally support the theory, 
as our analysis has suggested that a part of enterprise savings.
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and hence self-financed investment, is undertaken on a voluntary 
basis.
Ch. 3: Why are theoretical predictions not supported by
empirical evidence from Yugoslavia?
Thus theory predicts underinvestment of the LMF respect to 
its capitalist counterpart, but the Yugoslav LMF has maintained 
high investment rates. Why is this so? Confronting the theory 
with Yugoslav practice has revealed that while Furubotn and 
Pejovich's theory is based on assumptions which correspond to an 
idealised capitalist environment (a perfect capital market# 
perfect labour mobility, project appraisal according to criteria 
typically used by a capitalist firm), in Yugoslavia severe 
capital market distortions have prevailed, labour force mobility 
has been limited, and investment criteria have not been the ones 
typically used in market economies. This initial analysis al­
ready suggested that variables considered crucial by Furubotn 
and Pejovich's theory have had a limited role in determining 
investment decisions in Yugoslavia. It has also revealed that 
the principal shortcoming of the theory is of a methodological 
nature: the authors put all emphasis on limited property rights, 
but disregard all other features of the Yugoslav system, among 
which quite a few seem to have favoured investment in non-owned, 
respect to owned assets.
Hence an alternative approach is used, based on Kornai's 
theory on the socialist enterprise, in order to propose that 
some of Kornai's hypotheses may be more applicable to
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Yugoslavia, It is suggested that in spite of substantial in­
stitutional changes, the essence of the investment process in 
Yugoslavia has remained much the same, very similar to that in 
other socialist countries. In the field of investment, the 
Yugoslav enterprise has retained many features of the tradi­
tional socialist firm (expansion drive, absence of a hard-budget 
constraint, etc*). Some preliminary data suggested that Rornai's 
theory is indeed supported by Yugoslav empirical evidence*
The econometric testing of the two theories confirmed our 
previous conclusions, namely that Rornai's theory is in fact 
more supported by empirical evidence from Yugoslavia than 
Furubotn and Pejovich's theory.
An explanation for the divergence of Yugoslav empirical 
evidence from theoretical predictions is therefore found in two 
principal conclusions: l)Furubotn and Pejovich's theory is not
fully applicable to Yugoslavia; and 2)the investment behaviour 
of Yugoslav firms, in spite of decentralisation, self-management 
and increasing use of the market after 1965, is being determined 
primarily by the socialist features of the economy, rather than 
market signals, and hence the state has retained substantial 
control over the investment sphere.
Ch. 4: Why has state involvement in investment decision- 
making remained present?
Innovative mechanisms and new financial instruments intro­
duced by the 1970s economic reform in Yugoslavia, in spite of 
intentions, have not meant the introduction of built-in invest­
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ment incentives, necessary for the development of a marke.- 
oriented system in which enterprises would make autonomous 
investment decisions primarily according to market criteria. 
Rewarding past labour does not seem to have increased an en ­
terprise's motivation to invest, nor has the diversification of 
financial instruments proved sufficient to increase the inter­
enterprise and inter-regional mobility of capital, and 
substitute bank credits by more direct forms of investment 
financing.
Since the new instruments have not been quite successful in 
substituting the role of the state, there remains a need for 
state involvement in investment decision-making in Yugoslavia.
Ch. 5: Why haven't the new schenes functioned, and how
could persistent state influence in the microeconomic sphere be 
reduced?
Some of the reasons why the new schemes have not functioned 
as envisaged include the absence of a secondary market of 
securities, an inadequate banking system, and inappropriate 
legislation. However, while a resolution of these problems is 
among the necessary conditions for the improvement of the system 
of capital mobilization and allocation in Yugoslavia, it is not 
sufficient. The most important requirement is to enable the 
individual enterprise to operate as an autonomous economic 
agent, and to introduce a further hardening of the budget con­
straint, which in turn requires a clear specification of 
responsibilities regarding social property.
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However# inefficiencies in capital allocation deriving from 
an imperfect capital market and other problems that have charac­
terized the Yugoslav economy cannot all be blamed on the absence 
of private property rights. Collective ownership of assets cculd 
be reconciled with appropriate remuneration of entrepreneurship# 
without necessarily decreasing the level of economic rationality 
of a LMF. A possible solution is to decentralize ownership of 
social property# but without individualizing it. Social property 
could officially oe recognized as collective property# while 
concrete (collective) holders of property rights would include 
enterprises, other forms of organizations existing in 
Yugoslavia, and also the state.
In concluding# the major problem with the investment 
process in Yugoslavia today is that all undertaken reforms, 
which snould have enforced market criteria, have been imple­
mented only half-way. The Yugoslav experience clearly shows how 
difficult it is for a socialist country to combine partial 
planning and partial use of the market# and find adequate in­
struments for guiding enterprises to conform with social 
objectives# while at the same time allowing their autonomous 
functioning.
What are the principal findings of the study? Can evidence 
fro« Yugoslavia be considered sufficient to refute the conven­
tional theory on the LMF's investment behaviour? The answer is 
negative# since the theory is not really applicable to Yugoslav 
conditions. However# some additional observations need to be 
made.
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Yugoslavia has remained a typical socialist country in the 
field of investment decision-making, in spite of the continuous 
development of self-management. Hence, regardless of whether the 
Yugoslav LMF maximizes income per worker, managerial bonuses, or 
total profits, systemic features of socialist countries have 
clearly remained present, including the absence of risk bearing 
and the persistence of a soft-budget constraint, which have had 
a significant role in encouraging investment. Does this mean 
that no inherent characteristics are present in labour- 
management, that it is only a different form of organising the 
production unit? For the field of investment in a socialist 
country such as Yugoslavia, this is indeed so. In a market 
economy, it may equally be true that workers' cooperatives 
behave similarly to privately-owned firms, in spite of the 
application of self-management principles.
This suggests a plausible hypothesis: that it is the basic 
mechanism of allocation of resources, whether market or 
planned/regulated, that determines a LMF's actual behaviour. 
This would imply that self-management cannot (yet) be viewed as
a new economic system (in spite of its distinct
characteristics), but coexists within a socialist/capitalist 
framework, and is dominated by such a framework.
Therefore, while refuting the theory on the basis of
Yugoslav evidence is not really possible, our study also sug­
gests that certain properties attributed to the LMF, including 
underinvestment, need to be evaluated in a broader methodologi­
cal framework, by taking into account the principal
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characteristics of the institutional setting in which a LMF 
operates. In this sense, "systemic1* features of the LMF, broadly 
discussed in the theoretical literature on the LMF, are perhaps 
exagerated.
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Appendix A(a)
New regulations on income distribution in Yugoslavia
In line with the changes introduced by the 1970s reform, 
income policies are regulated by Social Compacts on Income, for 
each republic separately. The republican Social Compacts, al­
though different, are based on similar principles.
The new regulations introduced in 1971 link the maximum 
permissible amount that can be paid for personal incomes, or the 
minimal savings requirement, to the skill structure of workers 
and realized net income* Workers are classified into skill 
groups, of which the last is the "non-skilled worker** which is 
used as a numeraire# with each other category being reduced to 
'•non-skilled worker1' equivalents, according to determined coef­
ficients* Aggregating across skills gives the "standardized 
worker" of an enterprise in "non-skilled worker" equivalents.
The Croatian Social Compact sets the maximum level of 
personal incomes per standardized worker which an enteprise may 
pay, given that enterprise's income per standardized worker. If 
an enterprise's net income is larger than this basis, the dif­
ference is divided in determined proportions between personal 
incomes and accumulation. Thus an enterprise's income perfor­
mance in relation to other enterprises of the republic sets 
limits on the extent to which its personal income distribution 
policy can depart from the republican average, whereas the 
minimum savings requirement is treated as a residual*
The Serbian and Montenegrian agreement, on the contrary, 
set the minimum savings required of an enterprise, given its 
income per standardized worker, relative to the average income 
per standardized worker for the republic (see V* Dubey et al, 
1975, p. 351-353).
In 1975 the system was somewhat modified* The basic amount 
that can be paid out for personal incomes no longer depends on 
the skill structure of employed workers, but on the personal 
income fund in the previous period, corrected for the rise in 
net income of the enterprise (see Mramor, 1983). Currently, 
discussions are in course on a yet different system to be intro­
duced by the new set of reforms.
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Appendix B(b)
Econometrics appendix
1.DATA
Deflation; Since the Yugoslav economy has been characterised by 
high inflation, all data in current dinars have been deflated 
and transformed into constant 1972 dinars (current dinar 
values/cost of living index, base year 1972). 1972 was chosen as 
the base year because it is the base year usually used by the 
Federal Statistical Institute in its Statistical Yearbooks of 
Yugoslavia (SGJ) when reporting statistics in constant prices.
Variables:
S D ; Savings deposits of households (excluding foreign currency), 
in 1972 dinars, as provided by tne SGJ.
(Although households are allowed to have foreign currency ac­
counts, they cannot freely acquire foreign currency, and this 
justifies the exclusion of foreign currency deposits).
INV: Investment in fixed assets of the social sector, in 1972 
dinars.
Calculated from investment in fixed assets of the social sector 
in current dinars, as provided by SGJ, deflated by the cost of 
living index (1972=100).
S F I : Investment in fixed assets financed by enterprises of the
social sector, in 1972 dinars.
Calculated from SGJ data on investment in fixed assets of the 
social sector financed by firms in current dinars, deflated by 
the cost of living index (1972=100).
I R : Real interest rate on savings deposits of households. 
Calculated from National Bank of Yugoslavia (NBY) data on 
nominal interest rates on time deposits of households (end- 
year), and SGJ data on the annual percentage increase of the 
cost of living index (CLI), according to the formula:
IRa i(1+NIR) - 1]*100 
(1+CLI)
L R : Real lending rate of bank loans extended to firms.
Calculated from NBY data on nominal interest rate on loans to 
enterprises (end-year maximum), and SGJ data on the annual 
percentage increase of the cost of living increase (CLI), ac­
cording to the formula:
L R = [(1+NLR) - 1]*100 
(1 +CLI)
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H: A proxy for the time horizon of the average worker, calcu­
lated from the indicator on the average monthly fluctuation of 
workers (labour turnover) (in %):
FW= WL
WTT+WN where 
WL: number of workers left during a month 
WT: total number of workers at the begining of month 
WN: newly admitted workers during month
The time horizon proxy can be represented as H=1-FW. The 
lower is the fluctuation of workers, the longer the time horizon 
of the average worker.
(FW could have been used directly, but since H and FW are in­
versely related, this would have provoked confusion in expected 
signs).
P F : Profit rate (in i), according to balance sheet data of 
social sector firms distribution of GMP in current dinars (SGJ), 
using the formula:
PF=GMP-depreciat ion-personal incomes 
Historical value of capital
D I R : Absolute difference between the real interest rate on
savings deposits and the real lending rate for enterprises, i.e. 
DIR * IR - LR
B L : Bank loans for fixed assets extended to enterprises (social 
sector), in 1972 dinars.
Calculated from SGJ data on bank loans for fixed assets given to 
enterprises in current dinars, deflated by the cost of living 
index (1972*100).
T: Trend variable, which takes the values 1-14 in 1966-84.
D A : Dummy variable, which takes the value of 0 until 1979, and 1 
thereafter. It reflects the presence of restrictive measures of 
the government, after one of the tolerance limits is hit.
INC: Total disposable income of households, in 1972 dinars. 
Calculated from SGJ values in current dinars, deflated by the 
cost of living index (1972=100).
G M P : Gross material product, in 1972 dinars, as provided by the 
SGJ.
E D : Kornai's “expansion drive", represented as the difference 
between the investment index (INV variable, base year 1966=100) 
and the GMP (social sector) index (SGMP, base year 1966=100):
ED=INVi - SGMPi
FXA<1>: Fixed assets of the social sector of the economy, in 
1972 dinars# as provided by tne SGJ, lagged for one year.
wIP; Stock of investment in fixed assets in unfinished projects 
in 1972 dinars.
Calculated from SGJ data on estimated cost of investment in 
unfinished projects reported in current dinars, deflated by the 
cost of living index (1972=100).
PINV: Planned growth of investment in fixed assets, in 1972
dinars.
Calculated from the planned annual rate of growth of investment 
in fixed assets in % (PGRI), as provided by annual resolutions 
(one-year plans)# and the actual level of real investment in 
fixed assets in previous year:
PINV(t)=INV(t-l) + I(PG R I (t ) * INV(t-l)]
PGMP: Planned growth of social sector GMP, in 1972 dinars. 
Calculated from the planned annual rate of growth of GMP in % 
(PGMP), as provided by annual resolutions (one-year plans), and 
the actual level of real 3MP in previous year:
PGMP(t)=GMP(t-l) ♦ ((P G M ? (t ) * GMP (t - 1 )]
2 ♦STATISTICS
In all our calculations, the IAS-System has been used, an 
econometric software package for the analysis of time series 
data, developed by Sonnberger et al. (1986).
2.1.Standard statistics. The standard way of reporting regres­
sions in the IAS-System is the one used in the text, while the 
meaning of the statistics reported is the following:
R2 is the Coefficient of Determination, and R2C is the Corrected 
Coefficient of Determination. For regressions without an inter­
cept, R2 and R2C are computed using a special option (R) which 
takes into account the non-inclusion of the intercept.
BC are the so-called Beta-Coefficients, which measure the per­
centage of change in the dependent variable explainable by the 
change in the explanatory variable.
DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic, testing for the presence of 
serial autocorrelation of the residuals. Whenever DW lies in the 
inconclusive region, or whenever the standard DW tables are not 
applicable, as in the case of regressions without an intercept, 
a user can use the Durbin Sxact Test (DWE) to obtain the exact 
probability that the Durbin-Watson statistics takes a value less 
than or equal to the sample outcome. The null hypothesis on no 
autocorrelation is rejected whenever the probability is less 
than the assumed %-level of the Durbin-Watson test (usually 5%).
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Thus at 5% level of significance, if we are testing for positive 
autocorrelation, its presence will be confirmed if DWE gives a
probability lower than 5%? if we are testing for negative
autocorrelation, its presence will be confirmed if DWE gives a
probability nigher than 95%. In case a lagged variable is in­
cluded among the explanatory variables, Durbin*s h-statistics 
can be used for testing for autocorrelation by applying the 3WH 
Test.
RH0(1) is the first order autocorrelation coefficient of the 
regression residuals.
ST. ERROR: Standard error of the regression.
MAPE is the Mean absolute percentage error of the regression, 
defined as:
T
MAPE = 100 (1/ft^  u t/^t ^ f where u is the estimated residual of 
t = l
the regression, u * y - xb.
2.2.T e s t s :
1)NORMAL: Jarque-3era test for normality. HO: residuals are
normally distributed.
2)HARVEY: Harvey-Collier test for functional misspecification. 
HO: equation linear in variable X.
3)R B O W : CJtts test for correctness of the functional form. H O : 
Model is correct.
4)DIFF: Plosser-Schwert-White test for correctness of the model 
specification. HO: Standard assumptions of OLS regression apply.
5)I M T j White and Hall*s test for correctness of the model 
specification. HOs Standard assumptions of OLS regression apply.
6)H ETE R O : Pagan-Hall-Trivedi test for specific heteroscedas- 
ticity. HO: variance of residuals is constant.
7)F test, testing whether single parameters in a regression are 
equal to certain values.
All of the above tests give the probability value that the 
null hypothesis is correct. Whenever this probability is higher 
than 5%, the null hypothesis can be accepted at 5% level of 
signif icance.
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8)OUTLIE: Cook-weisberg test for the presence of outliers. The 
test gives the maximum t-value of the outlier coefficients, 
which should be lower than the critical value (reported in 
tables) in order to conclude that there are no outliers.
9) ARSIM: Harvey-Phillips test for autocorrelation. The test 
detects first order autoccorelation of the regression distur­
bances of a single equation in a simultaneous equation system. 
HO: Residuals of the equation are uncorrelated. The test reports 
the value of test-statistics, which should then be checked in 
the DW tables.
10)AR: Breusch-Paqan and Godfrey*s test, testing for the 
presence of higher order autocorrelation of residuals.
2 • 3 .Results of tests performed:
Equation: 1.1. 1.2. 1.3. 2.1. 2.2. 2.3. 2.4. 2.5.
Test
NORMAL (prob.) 19.84 20.87 26.79 64.09 76.17 45.51 75.68 64.68
OUTLIE (t-value) 2.49 2.28 2.36 2.45 2.16 2.14 2.19 1.92
HETERO (prob.) 26.04 25.22 54.38 23.72 11.70 75.91 11.32 5C.63
HARVEY (prob.) 
Variable 1 91.74 74.62 63.24
Variable 2 31.45 13.14 12.87 - - - - -
Variable 3 24.97 32.02 35.75 • • - - -
Variable 4 16.08 38.40 65.10 - - - - -
RBOW (prob.) 75.79 87.52 91.08 - 95.75 47.06 91.58 -
DIFF (prob.) 17.29 14.60 24.30 33.91 56.81 41.03 42.55 28.41
IMT (prob.) - - 99.99 - - 52.80 - -
F TEST E quat.2.2. HO: B4=0 E q u a t .2.3. HO: B3=0 B4=0 B5*0
Prob. HO correct: 91.97 21.44 37.89 38.82
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Appendix C
Table Cl. CRITERIA FOR REWARDING PAST LABOUR_____________________
% of positive
C r i t e r i a  answers Rank
Croat. Slov. C r . Si.
1.Investment of own capital
(workers' savings; personal loans) 18 * 9 22.8 5 4
2.Rewards for innovation 28.4 21.1 4 5
3.Total personal income 70.5 69.5 1 1
4.Years of employment in firm 40.7 42.5 3 3
5.Total years of employment 61.4 52.2 2 2
Table C2. FORMS OF REWARDING WORKERS' PAST LABOUR
% of positive answers 
Orientation F o r m  Croat. Slov.
Entrepreneur .A.Worker invests in the firm,receives 
pers. income and a part of income,
depending on profit.
B.Worker puts his savings at firm's 
disposal, receives interest in
68.2 75.3
advance
F.Worker receives a special reward 
depending on contribution to past
51.4 58.6
labour while employed in that firm 
J.Worker's pers. income depends on
58.7 55.3
Self-managed
productivity in the whole firm 
K.Worker's pers. income depends on 
average productivity in the ind­
80.3 89.0
ustry (of that republic)
L.Worker's pers. income depends on
48.3 40.6
average productivity in the commune 
M.Worker's pers. income depends on
37.7 29.4
average productivity in the republic 
N.Worker's pers. income depends on
40.0 32.0
Security
average productivity in Yugoslavia 
C.A11 workers receive equal rewards
38.2 23.4
depending on firm's business results 
D.Worker receives a special reward
49.8 47.5
depending on total seniority 
E.Worker receives a special reward
72.8 68.0
depending on seniority in that firm 72.8 
G.Worker receives a pension depending
76.5
on seniority in that firm 51.4 52.6
H.All workers receive same pension
I.Workers performing similar jobs
23.3 18.9
receive equal pensions 61.5 62.1
0.Workers helped for housing problems88.4 88.5
P.Workers job protection 72.8 31.3
Source: Zupanov et al., (1977).
238
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books and articles
A o k i , M. (1984), The Co-operative Game Theory of the Fir«,
Clarendon Press.
Babic, S. (1982 ), ‘•On the problem of choice of economic ef­
ficiency indicators in the Yugoslav economic system 1976-1980” , 
Economic Analysis and Workers* Management, vol. XVI, no. 4.
Babic, 5. (1983), "Zakon o udruzencm radu - Podsticaj ili
barijera udruzivanju raca u samoupravnoj robnoj privredi?” , 
("ALA - A motivation or a barrier to associating labour in a 
self-managed commodity economy?*), Treci program, Spring.
Bajt, A. (1968), “Property in capital and in the means of
production in socialist economies'*, The Journal of Law and 
Economics, vol. XI, no 1-4.
Bajt, A. (1985), "Dugovanja i potrazivanja u inflatornoj priv­
redi i njihov obracun" ("Debts and liabilities in an
inflationary economy and their accounting**), Privredna kretanja 
Jugoslav!je no. 155, October, Ljubljana, pp. 22-49.
Bajt, A. (1986), "Preduzetnistvo u samoupravnoj socijalistickoj
privredi*1 ("Entrepreneurship in a self-managed socialist 
economy**), Privredna kretanja Jugoslav!je no. 159, February, 
Ljubljana, pp. 32-45.
Bajt, A. (1988), Samoupravni oblik drustvene svojine (The Self-
Managed Form of Social Property), Globus, Zagreb.
Bajt, A. (1988a), **Akcionarske iluzije** (HIllusions about
shareholding**), Ekonomska politika no. 1891, June 27.
Balassa, B. and Tyson, L. (1985), "Policy responses to external 
shocks in Hungary and Yugoslavia: 1974-76 and 1979-81**, Joint 
Economic Committee Congress of the United States Selected 
Papers, October 28, 1985.
Barsony, J. (1982), "Tibor L i s k a ’s concept of socialist 
entrepreneurship*1, Acta Oeconomica, no. 28, pp. 422-465.
Bartlett# W. (1984), "Vanek’s theorem on internal and external 
sources of finance for a labour-managed firm - a critique” , 
mimeo, EUI, Florence.
Bartlett, W. (1984a), "Enterprise investment and public consump­
tion in a self-managed economy”, mimeo, EUI, Florence.
Bartlett, W. (1986), "Capital accumulation and employment in a 
self-financed worker cooperative", mimeo, EUI, Florence, July.
289
Bartlett# W. and Uvalic, M. (1986), "Labour-managed firms, 
employee participation and profit scaring: theoretical perspec­
tives and European experience", EUI Working Paper no 86/236, and 
Management Bibliographies and Reviews, Vol. 12, no. 4, MCB 
University Press.
Bauer, T. (1978), "Investment cycles in planned economies", Acta 
Oeconomica, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 243-260.
Bauer, T. (1985), "The new Hungarian forms of enterprise manage­
ment and their economic environment", Working Paper for the 1985 
Radein Research Seminar, mimeo, presented at the EUI, Jane 5, 
1986.
Bendekovic, D. et al. (1987), Prirucnik za planiranje inves- 
ticionih projekata (Handbook for the Planning of Investment 
Projects), Ekonomski institut, Zagreb.
Bendekovic, J. (1977), "Ocjena investicionih projekata" 
("Evaluation of investment projects“ ), Poduzece-banka, no. 5, 
pp. 13-20.
Bendekovic, J. and Teodorovic, I. (1977), "Osvrt na dosadasnju 
praksu planiranja investicionih projekata u Jugoslaviji" ("A 
survey of practice m  planning investment projects in 
Yugoslavia"), Poduzece-banka, no. 7, pp. 28-32.
Bergson, A. (1967), "Market socialism revisited", The Journal of 
Political Economy, vol. 75, no. 5, October.
Bogetic, G. (1987), "Kako menjati dogovor o dohotku" ("How 
should the Compact on Income be changedH ), Ekonomska politika 
no. 1823, March 9.
Bonin, J.P. (1985),"Labor management and capital maintenance: 
investment decision in the socialist labor-managed firm1', 
Advances in the Economic Analysis of Participatory and Labor- 
Managed Firms, vol. I, JAI Press, London, Greenwich C.T., pp. 
55-69.
Bonin, J.P. and Putterman, L. (1987), Economics of Cooperation 
and the Labor-Managed Economy, Harwood Academic Publishers.
Buric, I. (1983), Udruzeni rad i minuli rad, (Associated Labour 
and Past Labour), Informator, Zagreb.
Burkitt, J. ?. (1983), The Effects of Economic Reform in
Yugoslavia - Investment and Trade Policy, 1959-1976, Research
Series no. 55, Institute of International Studies, University of 
California, Berkeley.
Celenkovic, T. et al. (1984), Efikasnost procesa investiranja
(empirijsko istrazivanje), (Efficiency of the Investment
Process, An Empirical Research), Udruzena beogradska banka, 
Centar za ekonomska istrazivanja, Beograd, March.
290
Chilemrai, 0, (1981),"Sul regime del capitale nell’impresa
autogestita", Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e 
Commercial!, vol. 28, pp. 151-169.
Cirovic, M. (1976), Monetarno-kreditni sistem (Monetary and 
Credit System), Second edition, Savremena administracija, 
Beograd.
Ciayre, A. (1980), The Political Economy of Co-operation and 
Participation! Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Comisso, E.T., (1979), Workers Control under Plan and Maket, 
Yale University Press, New Haven and London.
Commission of the European Communities (1984), Prospects for 
Workers' Cooperatives in Europe, Volume I, II and III, Office 
for Official Publications, Luxembourg.
Connock, M. (1982),"Capital maintenance and investment in 
Yugoslavia: two observations**, Economic Analysis and Workers' 
Management, Vol. XVI, no. 3, pp. 2 87-298.
Conte, M. (1980), HA theory of investment for a labor-managed 
firm*4, mimeo, University of New Hempshire.
Crnobrnja, M. (1988), "Kako oziveti proizvodnju" ("How to 
revive production"), Ekonomska politika no. 1885, May 16, 1988.
Defourny, J. (1933), *'L* autofinancement des cooperatives de 
travailleurs et la theorie économique", Annals of Public and Co­
operative Economy» Vol. 54, pp. 201-224.
Dimitrijevic, D. and Macesich, G. (1983), Money and Finance in 
Yugoslavia - A Comparative Analysis, New York, Praeger.
Domar, E. (1966),"The Soviet collective farm as a producer 
cooperative", American Economic Review, Vol. 56, pp. 734-57.
Drakul, L. (ed.J, (1984), "Economic development 1971-1982", 
Economic Survey, Vol. XXV, no. 2, May, Beograd.
Dreze, J.H. (1976), "Some theory of labour management and 
participation", Econometrica, Vol. 44, no. 6, pp. 1125-1138.
Dubey# V. et al. (1975), Yugoslavia: Development with
Decentralization, A world Bank Country Economic Report, Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Dumas,A. (ed) (1981), L'autogestion» un systeme économique?
Dunod, Paris.
Dumas, A. and Serra, D. (1973), "Modele d'autofinancement dans 
1'entreprise autogeree d'un system socialiste", Revue d-
'economie politique, Vol. 6, pp. 1022-1041.
291
Dumezic, T . , (1986), "Raspodela - Razrada neusagiasenog
concepta", ("Distribution - Elaboration of an unconformed 
concept” )/ Ekonomska politika no. 1808/1809, Nov. 24.
Ekman, E.V. (1978), Some Dynamic Econo®ic Models of the Firm. A 
Microeconomic Analysis with Emphasis on Firms that Maximize 
other Goals than Profit Alone, Akadercisk Avhandling, Stockholm.
Ekonomski Institut Pravne fakultete (1985), “Negativne kamate 
ruse osnove druseveno-ekonomskog sistema" (“Negative interest 
rates undermine the bases of the socio-economic system*), 
Privredna kretanja Jugoslavije no. 157, December, Ljubljana, pp. 
24-45.
Ellerman, D. P. (1986), "Horizon problems and property rights in 
labor-managed firms", Journal of Comparative Economics, vol. 10, 
pp. 62-78.
Estrin, S. (1983), Self-Management - Economic Theory and 
Yugoslav Practice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Estrin, S. (1985), "The role of producer cooperatives in employ­
ment creation", Economic Analysis and Workers' Management, vol. 
19, no. 4, pp. 345-94.
Estrin, S. and Bartlett, W. (1982), "The effects of enterprise 
self-management in Yugoslavia: and empirical survey", in D.
Jones, J. Svejnar (eds), Participatory and Self-Managed Firms, 
Lexington Books, Lexington.
Estrin, S., Jones, D.C. and Svejnar, J., (1984), "The varying
nature, importance and productivity effects of worker participa­
tion: evidence for contemporary producer cooperatives in
industrialised Western economies", CIRIBC Working Paper, 84/04, 
University of Liege.
Estrin, S. and Jones, D.C. (1987), ,#The determinants of invest­
ment in labor managed firms: evidence from France", mimeo,
January.
European Communities (1986), The Cooperative, Mutual and Non­
profit Sector and its Organizations in the European Community,
Luxembourg, European Communities, Economic and Social Committee.
Furubotn, E.G. (1971), "Toward a dynamic model of the Yugoslav 
firm", Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 182-97.
Furubotn, E.G. (1974),"Bank credit and the labor-managed firm: 
the Yugoslav case", American Slavic Studies, Vol. 8, no. 1, 
pp. 89-106.
Furubotn, E.G. (1976), "The long-run analysis of the labor- 
managed firm: an alternative interpretation", American Economic 
Review, Vol. 66, no. 1# pp. 104-23.
292
Furubotn, E.G. (1978),"The long-run analysis of the labor-
managed firm: reply*', American Economic Review, vol. 68,
no. 4, pp. 706-709.
Furubotn, E.G. (1979), MDecision making under labor-management: 
the cotnmitment mechanism reconsidered*1, Zeitschrift fur die
gesamte Staatswissenschaft, vol. 135, no. 2, pp. 216-227.
Furubotn, E.G. (1980a), '•The socialist labor-managed firm and
bank-financed investment: some theoretical issues**, Journal of 
Comparative Economics, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 184-91.
Furubotn, E.G. (1980b),"Bank credit and the labor-managed firm: 
reply**, American Economic Review, vcl. 70, no. 4, pp. 800-804.
Furubotn, E.G. (1980c), ’Tradeable claims and self-financed
investment in the capitalist labor-managed firm", Zeitschrift 
fur die gesamte Staatswissenchaft, vol. 136, no. 4, pp. 630-41.
Furubotn, E.G. and Pejovich, S. (1970a),"Property rights and the 
behavior cf the Yugoslav firm in a socialist state: the example 
of Yugoslavia", Zeitschrift fur Nationalökonomie, Band 30, Helf 
3-4, pp. 431-454.
Furubotn, E.G. and Pejovich, S. (1970b),"Tax policy and invest­
ment decisions of the Yugoslav firm", National Tax Journal, 
vol. 23, pp. 335-348.
Furubotn, E.G. and Pejovich, S. (1972), "Property rights and 
economic theory: a survey of recent literature", The Journal of 
Economic Literature, vol. X, no. 4, pp. 1137-1162.
Furubotn, E.G. and Pejovich, S. (1973), "Property 
rights,economic decentralization and the evolution of the 
Yugoslav firm, 1965-72", Journal of Law and Economics, vol.
16, pp. 275-302.
Furubotn, E.G. and Pejovich, S. (1974), The Economics of 
Property Rights, Ballinger Publishing Company, Cambridge, Mass.
Grlickov, V. (1987), "Bankarski sistem: propisana samostalnost" 
("Banking system: prescribed independence"), Ekonomska politika 
no. 1843, July 27, 1987.
Grlickov, V. (1987a), "Bankarstvo - kako do realnog bilansa?" 
("Banking - how to obtain a real balance?"), Ekonomska politika 
no 1858, November 9, 1987.
Gui, B. (1981),"Investment decisions in a worker-managed firm", 
Economic Analysis and Workers' Management, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 
45-65.
Gui, B. (1984),"Basque versus Illyrian labor-managed firms: the
problem of property rights*', Journal of Comparative Economics, 
vol. 8, pp. 168-181.
2 ? 3
Gui, B. (1985), "Limits to external financing. A model and an 
application to labor-managed firms", Advances in the Economic 
Analysis of Participatory and Labor-Managed Firms, Vol. I, JAI 
Press, London, Greenwich C.T.
Gujarati, D. (1978), Basic Econometrics, McGraw-Hill Bock 
Company.
Hirshleifer, J. (1970), Investment, Interest and Capital#
Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs.
Hodder, J.E. (1986), "Evaluation of manufacturing investments: A 
comparison of U.S. and Japanese practices*', Financial
Management, Spring, pp. 17-24.
Horvat, B. ( 1958), "The optimum rate of investment11, Economic 
Journal, December, pp. 747-767.
Horvat, 3. (1967),"Prilog zasnivanju teorije jugoslovenskog
preduzeca" ("A contribution to the theory of the Yugoslav 
enterprise"), Ekonomska analiza, vol. 1, pp. 7-28.
Horvat, B. (1970), Privredni sistem i ekonomska politika 
Jugoslavije (Economic System and Economic Policy in Yugoslavia), 
Institut ekonomskih nauka, Beograd.
Horvat, B. (1972), "Critical notes on the theory of the LMF and 
some macroeconomic implications", Economic Analysis and W o r k e r s 1 
Management, vo1. V I .
Horvat, 3. et al. (1975), Self-governing Socialism: A Reader, 
International Arts and Sciences Press, White Plains, New York.
Horvat, B. (1976), The Yugoslav Economic System, International 
Arts and Sciences Press, White Plains, New York.
Horvat, B. et al. (1980), II sistema jugoslavo. Dall'impresa 
alia societa autogestita: esperienza e progetto, De Donato
Editore, Bari.
Horvat, B. (1982), The Political Economy of Socialism, 
Robertson, Oxford.
Horvat, B. (1984), Jugoslovenska privreda 1965-1983 (The 
Yugoslav Economy 1965-1983), Vol. I, II, Cankarjeva zalozba, 
Ljubljana, Zagreb.
Ireland, N.J. (1984), "Codetermination, wage bargaining and the 
horizon problem", Zeitschrift fuer Nationaloekonomie, vol. 44, 
no. 1, pp. 1-10*
Ireland, N.J. and Law, P.J. (1982),The Economics of Labour- 
Managed Enterprises, St. Martin's Press, N. Y. Ch. 3 and 8.
294
Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W.H. (1979),"Rights and production 
functions: an application to labour-managed firms and
codetermination", Journal of Business, vol. 52,pp. 469-506.
Jones, D. C. and Backus, D. X. (1977), "British producer 
cooperatives in the footwear industry: an empirical evaluation 
of the theory of financing“ , Bconoaic Journal, vol. 87, pp. 488- 
510.
Kardelj, E. (1971), *'0 probiemima socijalnih razlika i o minulom 
raduH , ("On problems of social differences and on past labour"), 
in E. Kardelj, Saaoupravljanje, vol. 5, (1979), Svijetlost, 
Sarajevo, pp. 127-148.
Kardelj, E. (1971a), "Skonomski i politicki odnosi u samouprav- 
nom socijalistickom drustvu" ("Economic and political relations 
in a self-managed socialist society"), Speach on the Second 
Congress of Self-managers of Yugoslavia, in Saaoupravljanje u 
Jugoslaviji 1950-1980» Dokuaenti razvoja, (1980), Privredni 
pregled, Beograd, pp. 237-248.
Kardelj# E. (1972), "?rotivrecnosti drustvene svojine u sav-
remenoj socijalistickoj praksi", ("Contradictions of social 
property in contemporary socialist practice**), in E. Kardelj, 
Saaoupravljanje, vol. 1, (1979), Svijetlost, Sarajevo, pp. 287- 
405.
Kardelj, E. (1978), Slobodni udruzeni rad - Brionske diskusije, 
(Free Associated Labour - Brioni Discussions), Second Edition, 
Radnicka stampa, Beograd.
Keren, M. (1985), "The asymmetry of property rights and the 
long-run behavior of the labor-managed firm", mimeo.
King, A.E. (1979)» "Property rights and investment in human
capital by the labour-managed firm: a note on Vanek's
conjecture", Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Bconoaiche e 
Coaaerciali, vol. 26, no. 9, pp. 858-64.
Knight, P. T. (1984), "Financial Discipline and Structural
Adjustment in Yugoslavia"» World Bank Staff Working Papers no. 
705» The World Bank» Washington D.C.
Korac, M. (1986), Probleai sticanja i raspodele dohotka u SFRJ. 
Analiza stanja (1977-1985) i aoguca resenja (Problems of acquir­
ing and distributing incoae in Yugoslavia. An analysis of the 
situation (1977-1985) and possible solutions), Globus, Zagreb.
Kornai, J. (1980) Econoaics of Shortage, North-HOlland
Publishing Company, Amsterdam, Mew York, Oxford.
Kornai, J. (1984), "The softness of the budget constraint - An 
analysis relying on data of firms", Acta Oeconoaica, vol. 32, 
pp. 223-249.
295
Kornair J. (1986), "The soft-budget constraint” , Kyklos, vol. 
39, no. 1, pp. 3-30.
Kornai, J. (1986a), "The Hungarian Reform Process: Visions, 
Hopes, and Reality", Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXIV, 
December, pp. 1687-1737.
Labus, M. (1935), "The Furubotn-Pejovich effect: some Yugoslav
evidence", Fourth International Conference on the Economics of 
Self-Management, Liege, July.
Labus, M. (1987), Drustvena ili grupna svojina (Social or Group 
Property), Naucna xnjiga, Beograd.
Lacko, M. (1980), HCumulating and easing of tensions (A simple 
model of the cyclical development of investments in Hungary)“ , 
Acta Oeconomica, vol. 24, nc. 3-4, pp. 357-77.
Lajsic, Dj. (1984), Metodologija ocene investicionih projekata u 
sistemu Odruzene beogradske banke (Methodology for Evaluating 
Investment Projects in the System of the Associated Belgrade 
Bank), Udruzena beogradska banka, Centar za ekonomska 
istrazivanja, Beograd, January.
Lakicevic, M., (1987), "Drustvena svojina - Vreme za promene"
("Social property - Time for changes"), Ekonomska politika no. 
1827, April 6.
Lakicevic, M. (1987a), "Praksa ispred ideologije", ("Practice 
ahead of ideology” ), interview with R. Bozovic, Ekonomska
politika no. 1843, July 27.
Lavigne, M. (1962), Le Capital dans l'économie sovieétique,
Paris, 5.E.D.3.S.
Lavigne# M. (1968), "Coefficient de capital et politique de
l'investissement dans l'industrie soviétique” , in Annuaire de 
l'U.R.S.S. 1967, Paris, éd. du C.N.R.S.
Lavigne# M. (1978)# "Productivité du capital et efficacité des 
investissements en U.R.S.S.” , in Le Capital dans la fonction de 
production, Paris, C.N.R.S.
Lund, Ph. (1979)# Investment - The Study of an Economic
Aggregate, North Holland# Amsterdam.
Lydall, H. (1984)# Yugoslav Socialism# Theory and Practice, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Madzar, LJ. (1978), "Anumulativna sposobnost, alokacija inves- 
t ici ja i dinamicka efikasnost privrede" ("Accumulative capacity, 
allocation of investment and the dynamic efficiency of the 
economy” ), Institut ekonomskih nauka, Beograd.
296
Marglin, S. A . (1963), "The social rate of discount and the
optimal rate of investment", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
vol. lxxvii, pp. 2 5 - i n .
Markovic, M. (1987), 'Program stabilizacije - ubrzanje na istoj 
osnovi" (‘•Stabilization program - acceleration on the same 
basis*, Ekonomska politika no. 1823, March 9.
Mayes,A. and Mayes# D. (1976), Introductory Economic Statistics, 
John Wiley and Sons.
McCain, R.A. (1977), "On the optimum financial environment for 
worker cooperatives", Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie, vol. 
37, pp. 355-34.
Meade, J.E. (1972)# ••The theory of labour-managed firms and of 
profit-sharing", Economic Journal# vol. 82, pp. 402-428.
Meade# J.E. (1982)# Stagflation - Volume 1: Wage-fixing# Allen & 
Unwin# London.
Meade# J.E. (1986)# Alternative Systems of Business Organization 
and of Workers' Remuneration# Allen & Unwin# London.
MilanoviCr 3. (1993),"The investment behaviour of the labour- 
managed firm: a property rights approach", Economic Analysis and 
Workers' Management, vol. XVII, no. 4, pp. 327-340.
Milenkovich# D. (1971), Plan and Market in Yugoslav Economic 
Thought# Yale University Press, New Haven and London.
Milosevic, D. and Zivkovic# Z. (1984), Promet# koriscenje# 
amortizacija i revalorizacija drustvenih sredstava (Circulation# 
use# depreciation and revalorization of social resources), 
Beograd# Strucna knjiga.
Milovanovic# M. (1986)# Rapital i minuli rad (Capital and Past 
Labour)# Savremena administ r a d j a #  Beograd.
Morley-Fletcher E. (ed.) (1986)# Cooperare e competere,
Feltrinelli# Milano.
Mramor, D. (1984), Analiza banaka kao posrednika kod prenosa
novcane akumulacije u Jugoslav!ji u razdoblju 1945-1982 godine 
(Analysis of banks as intermediaries in transferring financial 
accumulation in Yugoslavia in the 1945-1982 period)# M.A. 
thesis# Faculty of Economics# University of Belgrade.
Nickel1# S.J. (1979)# The Investment Decisions of
Firms#Cambridge University Press# Cambridge.
Nikolic# T. (1986), "Zablude o svojini"# ("Illusions about
property11)# Ekonomska politika no. 1784# June 9.
297
Nuti, D.M. (1984J#"Economic and financial evaluation of invest­
ment projects: general principles and E.C. procedures", BUI
Working Paper no. 84/119, Florence.
Nuti, D.M. (1985), ’•Systemic aspects of employment and invest­
ment in Soviet-type economies", in D. Lane (ed), Labour and 
Employment in the USSR# The Harvester Press# London.
Nuti, D.M. (1987)# "Pay-off and recoupment periods as investment 
criteria", in J. Eatweil, M. Milgate# and P. Newman (eds)# The 
New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economic Theory and Doctrine, 
Macmillan.
Nuti# D.M. (1987a), "Financial innovation under market 
socialism", EUI Working Paper no. 87/285, Florence.
Nuti# D.M. (1988)# "Progetto per un Fondo Mutualistico per la 
promozione e lo sviluppo di imprese cooperative" (Project for a 
Mutual Fund for the promotion and development of cooperative 
enterprises), Paper for a Conference held by LICM, March.
Nuti, D.M. (1988a), "On traditional cooperatives and James 
Meade*5 labour-capital discriminating partnerships", EUI Working 
Paper no. 38/337# Florence.
Nuti, D.M. (1988b), "Remonetisation and capital markets in the 
reform of centrally planned economies", Paper presented at the 
Third Annual Conference of the European Economic Association, 
Bologna, August.
Nutzinger, H . G . (1975), "Investment and financing in a labour-
managed firm and its social implications", Economic Analysis and 
Workers' Management, vol. 9# no. 3-4# pp. 181-201.
Nutzinger# H.G. (1982)# "The economics of property rights - a 
new paradigm in social sciences"# Economic Analysis and 
Workers' Management, vol. XVI, no. 1, pp. 81-97.
Oakeshott, R. (1978)» The Case for Workers' Coops# London, 
Routledge and Regan Paul.
OECD# Economic Survey - Yugoslavia, various years.
OECD# Bconomic Surveys - Italy, August 1987» OECD.
Olbina# Z. (1981), Investicione odluke u samoupravnoj privredi 
(Investment Decisions in a Self-managed Economy)# Privredni 
pregled, Beograd.
Ostojic# S. et al. (1985)# Investiciona aktivnost privrede UBB u 
periodu 1981-85 (Investment Activity of the Economy of the 
Associated Belgrade Bank in the 1981-85 Period), Udruzena 
beogradska banka# Centar za eKonomska istrazivanja# Beograd, 
April.
293
Ott, D.J., Ott, A*F • and Yoo, J.H. (1981), Macroeconoaic Theory, 
5th printing, International Student Edition, McGraw-Hill 
International Book Company, Ch. 5.
Pancic, V. (1985), Revalorizacija i aaortizacija drustvenih 
sredstava (Revalorization and Depreciation of Social Resources),
Fifth edition, Informator, Zagreb.
Pejovich, S. (1969),"The firm, monetary policy and property 
rights in a planned economy", Western Economic Journal, vol. 
7, no* 3, pp. 193-20C.
Pejovich, S. (1976),"The labor-managed firm and bank credit", in 
J. Thornton (ed) (1976),The Economic Analysis of the Soviet-type 
Systea, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Pindyck, R.S. and Rubinfeld, D.L. (1931), Econoaetric Models and 
Econoaetric Forecasts, Second Edition, McGraw Hill Book Company.
"Politika" (a daily newspaper), various issues*
Prasnikar, J. (1980), "Yugoslav self-managed firm and its 
behaviour", Econoaic Analysis and Workers' aanageaent, vol. XIV, 
no. 1.
Prasnikar, J. (1983), Teorija i praksa organizacije udruzenog 
rada (Theory and practice of the organisation of associated 
labour), Centar za kulturnu djelatnost, Zagreb.
Prout, C. (1985), Market Socialisa in Yugoslavia, Oxford 
University Press.
Rankov, I. (1986), "Inflacija: Osnovni izvori, I & II"
("Inflation: principle sources, I & II"), Koaunist, no. 1533 and 
1534.
Rankovic, J. (1985), "Obracunski sistem i inflacija" 
("Accounting system and inflation"), Ekonoaska politika no. 
1748, Sept. 30.
Republicki zavod za drustveno planiranje SR Srbije (1984), 
Kriteriji i æ r i l a  za ocenjivanje efektivnosti i selekciju 
investicionih projekata (Criteria for Evaluating the Efficiency 
and Selection of Investaent Projects), Beograd, June.
Rock, C. and Defourny, J. (1983),"The financing of self-managed 
enterprises", mimeo, Cornell University and CIRIEC.
Round table discussion (1985), "Ostvarivanje i zastita drustvene 
svojine" ("Effectuation and protection of social property"), 
Socijalizaa, vol. XXVIII, no. 4.
Round table discussion (1986), "Mesovita privreda - Sansa ili 
pretnja socijalizmu?" ("Mixed economy - An opportunity or a 
threat to socialism?"), Ekonoaska politika no. 1801, Oct. 6.
299
Sacks, S.R., <1983)/ Self-Management and Efficiency: Large
Corporations in Yugoslavia, George Allen and Unwin, London.
Sapir, A. (1980), "Economic growth and factor substitution: what 
happened to the Yugoslav miracle? The Economic Journal, Vol. 90, 
June, p. 294-313.
Savezni zavod za statistiku (1936), Jugosiavija - 1945-1985, 
Statisticki prikaz (Yugoslavia - 1945-1985, A Statistical
Survey), Federal Institute of Statistics, Beograd.
Savezni zavod za statistiku, Savezni zavod za drustveno 
planiranje (1982), Razvoj Jugoslavije 1947-1981# Statisticki 
prikaz (The Development of Yugoslavia 1947-81, A Statistical 
Survey), Beograd.
Schall, L.D., Sundem, G.L. and Geijsbeek W.R. Jr. (1978), 
"Survey and analysis of capital budgeting methods", Journal of 
Finance, March, pp. 281-87.
Schlicht, E. and Von Weizsacker, C.C. (1977), "Risk financing in 
labour managed economies: the commitment problem", Zeitschrift 
fur die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft, pp. 53-56.?
Schrenk, M., Ardaian, C., and El Tatawy, A. N. (1979), 
Yugoslavia, Self-management Socialis*. Challenges of 
Development, A World Bank Country Economic Report, The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, baltimore and London.
Seligman, J., (1986), "The one share, one vote controversy", The 
Investor Responsibility Research Center, Washington.
Sen, A.K. (1967), "Isolation assurance and the social rate of 
discount", Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 80, pp. 112-124.
Sertel, M.R. (1982), Workers and Incentives, North Holland, 
Amsterdam.
Singleton, F. and Carter, B. (1982), The Economy of Yugoslavia, 
Croom Helm, St. Martin's Press, pp. 198*204.
Sire, L. (1979), The Yugoslav Economy under Self-Management, 
Macmillan, London.
Sonnberger, H., Kramer, W . , Schraick, W . , Reschenhofer E., 
Wasilewski 2., and Zeisel H. (1986), IAS System: User Reference 
Manual, Vienna, Institute for Advanced Studies, Institutsarbeit 
no. 234, February.
Stambuk, V. (1988), "Ustavne promene i akcionarstvo - Treba li 
zabludom na zabludu?" ("Constitutional changes and shareholding 
- From one illussion to another"), Nin, March 27.
300
Steinherr, A. and Thisse, J.F. (1979), "Is there a negatively-
sloped supply curve in the labor-managed firm?", Economic
Analysis and Workers' Management, vol. XIII, pp. 23-34*
Stephen, F.H. (1978), "Bank credit and investment by the
Yugoslav firm*, Economic Analysis and Workers'
Management, vol. 12, pp. 221-39.
Stephen, F.H. (1979), "Property rights and the labour managed
firm in the long run", Economic Analysis and Workers' 
Management, vol. 13, no. 1-2, pp. 149-66.
Stephen, F.H. (1980), "Bank credit and the labor-managed firm: 
comment’', American Economic Review, vol. 4, pp. 796-99.
Stephen, F.H. (1982), "The economic theory of the labour-managed 
firm", in F.H.Stephen (ed.), The Economic Performance of 
Labour-managed Firms, London, Macmillan.
Stephen, F.H. (1984), The Economic Analysis of Producers' 
Cooperatives, Macmillan,London and Basingstoke.
Stephen, F.H. and Smith, B. (1975),"Capital investment in the 
Yugoslav firm", Canadian Journal of Economics, vol. 8, pp. 609-
17.
Suvakovic, Dj. (1977), Samoupravno i kapitalisticko preduzece 
(The Self-managed and the Capitalist Firm), Savremena ad- 
mini stracija, Beograd.
Teodorovic, J. (1977),"Ocjena investicionih projekata" 
("Evaluation of investment projects"), Poduzece-banka, vol. 5, 
pp. 12-26.
Thomas, H. and Logan, C. (1982), Mondragon: An Economic
Analysis, London, George Allen and Unwin.
Thornley, J. (1981), Worker Cooperatives, London, Heinneman.
Tyson, L. D'A. (1977), "A permanent income hypothesis for the 
Yugoslav firm", Economica, vol. 44, pp. 393-408.
Tyson, L. D'A. (1977a), "Liquidity crises in the Yugoslav 
economy: an alternative to bankruptcy” , Soviet Studies, Vol. 29, 
no. 2, April, pp. 284-95.
Tyson, L. D'A. (1980), The Yugoslav Economic System and its 
Performance in the 19708, Regents of the University of 
California.
Tyson, L. D * A . , (1983), "Investment allocation: a comparison of 
the reform experiences of Hungary and Yugoslavia", Journal of 
Comparative Economica, Vol. 7, no. 3, Sept, pp. 288-303.
301
Udruzenje banaka Jugoslavije and Ekonomski institut, Zagreb, 
(1981), Prirucnik za planiranje investicionih projekata 
(Handbook for Planning Investment Projects), Privredna stampa, 
Beograd.
Udruzenje bankarskih organizacija Beograd (1985), Prirucnik za 
primenu jedinstvene metodologije, kriterijuaa i merila za 
analizu, vrednovanje, selekciju, izbor i ocenu prihvatljivosti 
investicionih projekata (Handbook on the Application of the 
Unique Methodology and Criteria for the Analysis, Appraisal, 
Selection, Choice, and Evaluation of the Acceptability of 
Investment Projects), Beograd.
Uvalic, M. (1986), "The investment behaviour of a labour-managed 
firm", Annals of Public and Cooperative Economy, vol. 57, no. 1.
Uvalic, M. (1988), " Shareholding1 in Yugoslav theory and
practice” , BUI Wbrking Paper no. 88/330, Florence.
Uvalic, M. (1988a), MThe investment behaviour of the labour- 
managed firm: An econometric analysis", BUI Working Paper no.
88/354, Florence.
Vanek, Jan, (1972), The Economics of Workers' Manaement - A 
Yugoslav Case Study, George Allen and Unwin, London.
Vanek, J. (1970), The General Theory of Labour-managed Market 
Economies, Cornell Univ. Press, Ithaca.
Vanek, J. (1971), "The basic theory of financing of par­
ticipatory firms’', Cornell Univ. Working Paper no. 27, Ithaca, 
reprinted in J. Vanek (ed) (1975), Self-management. Economic
Liberation of Man, Penguin, Harmcndworth.
Vanek, J. (1973), "The investment decision under labor- 
management and its social efficiency implications", Cornell 
University Working Paper no. 55, Ithaca.
Vanek, J. (1977), The Labor-managed Economy: Essays, Cornell
University Press,Ithaca,N.Y.
Vanek, J. and Jovicic, M. (1975), "The capital market and income 
distribution in Yugoslavia: a theoretical and empirical
analysis", Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. XXXIX, no. 3, 
pp. 432-443.
Vojnic, D. (1985), Ekonomska stabilizacija i ekonomska kriza
(Economic Stabilization and Economic Crisis), Globus, Zagreb.
Vujovic, D. (1978), "Mesto drustvene ocene projekata u sistemu 
samoupravnog planiranja i upravljanje privrednim razvojem" ("The 
role of social evaluation of projects in the system of self­
managed planning and the management of economic development"), 
Gledista, vol. 7, no. 8, pp. 25-36.
3C2
Ward, B. (1958), "The firm in Illyria - market syndicalism", 
American Economic Review, vol. 48, pp. 566-89.
Wall Street Journal# "Belgrade plans to let citizens buy 
securities’*, 3-4 June, 1988.
World Bank, (1983), Yugoslav Adjustment Policies and Development 
Perspectives, A World Bank Country Study, Washington.
Zafiris, N . , (1982), "Appropriability rules, capital maintenance 
and the efficiency of cooperative investment” , Journal of 
Comparative Economics, vol. 6# pp. 55-74.
Zarkovic, D. and Vujicic, D. (1987), Amortizacija i 
revalorizacija drustvenih sredstava (Depreciation and 
Revalorizatioo of Social Resources), Skonomika, Beograd.
Zelic, N., (1975), "Investicioni kriterij u samoupravnoj
privredi" ("Investment criteria in a self-managed economy"), 
Gledista, no. 2.
Zelic, M. (1976), "Yugoslav firm and theory of behavior of self­
management economy", Economic Analysis and Workers' 
Management, vol. X, no. 1-2, pp. 61-77.
Zelic, N . (1982), Efikasnost jugoslovenskog privrednog sistema
(Efficiency of the Yugoslav Economic System), Kultura, Beograd.
Zevi, A. (1984), "Diritti patrimonial! dei soci e comportamento 
dell'iropresa cooperativa di produzione e lavoro nella dis­
ciplina vigente e nelle proposte di riforina", Rivista della 
cooperazione, vol. 21, Numéro Speciale, ott.-dic., pp. 284-308.
Zupanov, J. et al, (1977), "Misljenja privrednika o minulom 
radu", ("Workers' views on past labour"), in J. Zupanov et al. 
(1977), Sociologija i samoupravl janje (Sociology and Self­
management), Skolska knjiga, Zagreb.
Official documents and laws
Dokumenti komisije saveznih drustvenih saveta za problem«? 
ekonomske stabilizacije (Documents of the Commission of Federal 
Social Councils for the Problems of Economic Stabilization), 
Centar za r a d m c k o  samoupravljanje, Beograd, 1982.
Drustveni dogovor o davanju misljenja o drustvenoj i ekonontskoj 
opravdanosti nameravanih invest icija (Social compact on giving 
opinion on the social and economic justification of intended 
investments), Sluzbeni list SFRJ (Official Gazette), Dec. 20, 
1985.
Drustveni plan razvoja Jugoslavije od 1966 do 1970 godine, 
(Social Plan of Development of Yugoslavia, 1966- 
1970), Sekretarijat za informâtivnu sluzbu Savezne skupstine, 
Beograd, 1966.
3C3
Drustveni plan Jugoslavije za period od 1971-1975 godine, 
(Social Plan of Yugoslavia for the 1971-75 Period), Sekretarijat 
za informâtivnu sluzbu Savezne skupstine, Beograd, 1311,
Drustveni plan Jugoslavije za period od 1976 do 1980 godine 
(Social Plan of Yugoslavia for the 1976-80 Period), Savezni 
komitet za informacije, Beograd, 1976.
Drustveni plan Jugoslavije 1981-1985 (Social Plan of Yugoslavia 
1981-1985), Jugoslovenski pregled, Beograd 1981.
Ostav SFRJ (Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia), Beograd, 1974.
Zakon o amortizaciji osnovr.ih sredstava radnih organizacija (Law 
on depreciation of fixed assets of work organizations), Sluzbeni 
list SFRJ no 29, 1966.
Zakon o amortizaciji osnovnih sredstava osnovnih organizacija 
udruzenog rada (Law on depreciation of fixed assets of basic 
organisations of associated labour), Sluzbeni list SFRJ no. 16, 
1974.
Zakon o amortizaciji osnovnih sredstava osnovnih organizacija 
udruzenog rada i drugih korisnika durstvenih sredstava (Law on 
depreciation of fixed assets of basic organisations of as­
sociated labour and other users of social resources), Sluzbeni 
list SFRJ no. 58, 1976.
Zakon o amortizaciji drustvenih sredstava (Law on depreciation 
of social resources), Sluzbeni list SFRJ no. 70, 1984.
Zakon o amortizaciji drustvenih sredstava (Law on depreciation 
of social resources), Sluzbeni list SFRJ no. 72, 1986.
Zakon o hartijama od vrednosti (Law on securities), Sluzbeni 
list SFRJ, December 22, 1971.
Zakon o prosirenoj reprodukciji i minulom radu (Law on enlarged 
reproduction and past labour), Sluzbeni list SFRJ, April 23,
1982.
Zakon o rehabilitaciji i sanaciji organizacija udruzenog rada 
(Law on rehabilitation and liquidation of organisations of 
associated labour), Sluzbeni list SFRJ no. 72, Dec. 31, 1986.
Zakon o rehabilitaciji i sanaciji organizacija udruzenog rada 
(Law on rehabilitation and liquidation of organisations of
associated labour), Sluzbeni list SFRJ, Dec. 31, 1986.
Zakon o revalorizaciji drustvenih sredstava i sredstava zajed-
nicke potrosnje od strane korisnika drustvenih sredstava (Law on
revalorization of social resources and resources for collective 
consumptions by users of social resources), Sluzbeni list SFRJ 
no. 32, 1975.
304
Zakon o revalorizaciji drustvenih sredstava (Law on revaloriza­
tion of social resources)# Sluzbeni list SFRJ no. 70, 1984.
Zakon o stopama amortizacije osnovnih sredstava radnih or- 
ganizacija (Law on depreciation rates of fixed assets of work 
organisations), Sluzbeni list SFRJ no. 52, 1966.
Zakon o udruzenom radu, Prosveta, Beograd, 1976; English trans­
l a t i o n  Sekretarijat za informacije skupstine SFRJ, Associated 
Labour Act, Prosveta, Novi Sad, 1977.
Zakon c ukupnotn prihodu (Law on total revenue), Sluzbeni list 
SFRJ no 72, 1936.
Statistical sources
Ekonomski institut (1981), "Statisticko-dokumentazione osnove za 
sistem prosirenje reprodukcije 1961-1980", Zagreb.
Ekonomski institut (1986), "Statisticko-dokumentacione osnove za 
sistem prosirenje reprodukcije 1981-1986", Zagreb.
Narodna banka Jugoslavije, Quarterly Bulletin, Belgrade, various 
issues.
Savezni zavod za drustveno planiranje, Indikatori razvoja, 
Appendix to Annual Economic Resolutions, Belgrad, various years.
Savezni zavod za statistiku, Statisticki godisnjak Jugoslavije, 
(Statistical Yearbook of Yugoslavia), Belgrade, various years.
Savezno drustveno knjigovodstvo, Bilten SDR, Belgrade, various 
issues.






